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About the Cover

This photo was taken by senior editor Jason Rozbruch when he visited Victoria Falls in Zambia in December 2014. Jason majors in history and is an Afroamerican and African Studies honors program minor. He is also an executive board member of the Michigan Pre-Law Society and the social justice chair of the Michigan student chapter of the NAACP.

Michigan Journal of History Editorial Board, 2015-16

A Letter From the Editor-in-Chief

Dear Readers,

On behalf of the editorial staff I would like to thank you for reading volume XII of the Michigan Journal of History. This volume marks the 15th anniversary of the Journal, which was founded in 2001. The Journal has grown immensely since its foundation; now receiving hundreds of submissions each year from students both from the United Sates and internationally. This year was another year of continued growth and we believe that the essays published in volume XII demonstrate the exemplary historical research and writing occurring at the undergraduate level today. Our aim for this year's publication was to highlight historical research that is not only rooted in the past, but also relevant in the present. We believe we have accomplished this goal while at the same time publishing a diverse collection of essays centered around a multitude of countries, regions, ethnicities, and belief systems.

I would like to thank and congratulate the editorial staff for their hard work this year. The Journal's continued growth is only possible through their dedication, collaboration, and input. A special thank you to the faculty of the History Department of the University of Michigan for their continuing, invaluable support of this publication. We are also immensely appreciative of all the students who have submitted their excellent work to the Journal this year. Finally, I would like to extend my congratulations to the authors published in volume XII of the Michigan Journal of History.

Sincerely,

Hannah M. Graham
Editor-in-Chief, Michigan Journal of History

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Out of Thin Air: Poisonous Gas and the Genesis of the Military Laboratory During World War I

Ari Feldman
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'My love!' one moaned. Love-languid seemed his mood
Till slowly lowered, his whole face kissed the mud
And the bayonets' long teeth grinned;
Rabbles of Shells hooted and groaned;
And the Gas hissed.
- The Last Laugh, Wilfred Owen

The origin stories of novel inventions in science are often complex, calling for the historian to disentangle not just the science inherent but also the very unscientific threads of events, characters, and culture. In few such stories are the mists as murky as in the creation of the secret military laboratory. This institution, long since a fixture—and even a trope—within the cultural imagination, has its humble, messy, and confusing beginnings in the First World War, following the initial use of poisonous gas on the Western Front by the German Army. This essay will examine the impetus for specialized research into poisonous gas and the emergence of military laboratories both during and immediately after the war. In addition, it will show that this emergence owes perhaps more to the nature of the laboratory and scientific inquiry than the realities and brutalities of warfare. The conclusion will consider problems posed by this narrative and the significance of this story to the history and anthropology of the laboratory, as well as identify areas for further research.

In the early evening of April 22nd, 1915, Fritz Haber watched from behind the German line watched as 150 metric tons of chlorine, released from 6,000 cylinders, slowly floated southwest toward the line of French Algerian soldiers near Ypres, in

Belgium.[1] Haber, recently promoted to Captain, had almost single-handedly organized and implemented the German gas program. As a signer of the Manifesto of the Ninety-Three German Intellects, he was insistent on German superiority, and offered his lab at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Physics to be used at the disposal of the German *Obereste Heeresleitung*.[23] Two-and-a-half months of intense multi-disciplinary preparation had culminated in this attack: a sickly yellow mist wrapped around the French Algerian unit; after a couple minutes most of the men were choking or in spasms. The rest ran away, exposing a hole five miles wide in the Allies' front line.[4]

Despite Haber's visionary enthusiasm for gas warfare, the German command at Ypres was dubious, and they were unable to capitalizeon the collapse of the Allied lines. It didn't matter, for the gas attack did what would become its chief function in warfare: to strike fear in the hearts of men. Upon learning of the attack, Field Marshal John French sent a dispatch to the British General Headquarters (GHQ), urging "that immediate steps be taken to supply similar means of most effective kind for use by our troops," and that they also be provided with something to counteract the gas.[5]

Five more attacks occurred over the next month, and by the end of May the trench lines had taken the shape they were to hold for the next two years. The Allied reaction was a "mixture of panic and determination."[6] The British Ministry of Munitions (MoM) held preliminary trials releasing cylinders of chlorine gas; shells containing gas were sent

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[1] L. F. Haber, *The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 34.
[2] Professors of Germany. "To The Civilized World." *The North American Review* 210 (1919): 284-87.
[3] L. F. Haber, *The Poisonous Cloud* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 107.
[4] "Chemical Warfare in the Twentieth Century," in *Report of the Chemical Warfare Review Commission* (Washington, D.C.: Commission, 1985), 10.
[5] John D. P. French,"Dispatch No. 140."
[6] L. F. Haber, *The Poisonous Cloud*, 45.

to France in July. As the war in the trenches bled lamely into each new month, British officials were at work finding a suitable site for their research to begin. The MoM's Scientific Advisory Committee, largely made up of members of the Royal Society, visited sites across southern England before acquiring a twelve-square-kilometer parcel of land near Porton Down, in Wiltshire County.[7] Work began in March 1916 with a member of the Royal Engineers directing locals to move one hundred one-and-a-half meter-tall cylinders into the woods, as there were no structures on the property in which to store the tanks. A guard was hired to watch them.[8]

From humble beginnings Porton grew to be a formidable scientific complex. While the German military structure formally incorporated Haber's lab, hundreds of soldiers and dozens of scientists were being diverted to Porton. A small city of military-style tents arose on the hill: barracks enough to fit nearly one thousand enlisted men, multiple dining halls, housing for officers, scientists and engineers, a hut for the fire brigade, a concert hall, a canteen, and a bath house. Various animals were kept and bred for trials. The base supplied its own electricity, and maintained machine shops for carpentry and blacksmithing.[9]

The British also became the only belligerent with an experimental ground in the field, shipping over eighty soldiers and two officers in July 1915 to a site near GHQ in St. Omer.[10] It operated in tandem with Porton Down, sending notes back and forth. Morale in the cadre was high. The British finally retaliated in late September, at the Battle of Loos. "A certain amount of gas leakage" was reported, and many British casualties were

[7] G. B. Carter, *Porton Down: 75 Years of Chemical and Biological Research* (London: H.M.S.O., 1992), 7.
[8] Ibid., 9
[9] Haber, L. F. *The Poisonous Cloud*, 108.
[10] G. B. Carter, *Porton Down*, 10.

endured on account of the gas.[11] Still, British officials celebrated the attack, and moved onto the next task: produce mortar shells to lob gas at the enemy line.

Gas was a shock to the world, and its dramatic introduction led to widespread research into its possibilities. By the Armistice over 5,500 people were involved in research into poison gas in the U.S., the U.K., France and Germany. Roughly a third had university degrees; all were working independently of market demands.[12] While the British research center was a ways away from London, other countries centralized their laboratories: the United States commandeered the facilities at American University, and France headquartered their gas research in the Sorbonne. Never before had a war so galvanized science. Scientific research became, one of the focal points of the war, and, forever after, of warfare.

Yet this research was not a particularly well-organized enterprise in any country. The personnel in the labs were largely civilians, and, to make up for a wartime lack in young, university-trained scientists, many science teachers were brought in. Because of the specialized nature of chemical laboratories even at the beginning of the twentieth century, equipment often had to be improvised and experimental techniques altered to suit the situation. Fritz Haber himself admitted that no progress was actually made on gas itself during the war, and that research was a rehashing and retesting of old data.[13]

Across the board the research operations were strangely inefficient. It seems that military predilection for bureaucracy followed the scientists into their labs. In the chapter "Chemists At War," L. F. Haber lists a few illustrative examples: during the war the French filed no less than seventeen full reports on gas masks for horses; in the last five months of 1917 British scientists filed seventy reports concerning mustard gas despite

[11] L. F. Harber, *The Poisonous Cloud*, 57.
[12] Ibid., 107.
[13] Ibid., 109.

there being no increases in its production over the same period. "Scientists," Haber concludes, "appeared to be working aimlessly and writing copiously."[14]

The research could also take on characteristics of scientific adventures from a bygone time. Arthur Crossley, the wartime director of Porton Down, related to J. B. S. Haldane an experiment in which he stepped into a small chamber with a dog in tow to test the effects and potency of hydrogen cyanide: "One minute thirty-five seconds after the commencement the animal's body was carried out, respiration having ceased and the dog apparently being dead. As regards myself, the only real effect was a momentary giddiness when I turned my head quickly."[15] Such slapdash experimentation was also widespread on volunteer soldiers, a fact that attracted much attention after the war.

There were certainly some successes from the laboratories. The Livens Projector, originally fashioned from scrap in the field, was engineered at Porton into the most effective poison gas weapon the Allies used in battle.[16] Yet even this invention was victim to the hyper-meticulousness characteristic of wartime scientific research, and the subjected to continued testing over five months after it first saw (successful) use in the field.[17]

Porton was more successful in its defensive inventions. By early 1916 its scientists and engineers had come up with a design for the gas mask that remained the primary model throughout the rest of the war.[18] However, the use of mustard gas,

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[14] Ibid., 110.
[15] J. B. S. Haldane, *Callinicus; a Defence of Chemical Warfare* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1925), 76-77.
[16] C. H. Foulkes, *'Gas!' The Story of the Special Brigade* (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1934), 167.
[17] L. F. Harber, *The Poisonous Cloud*, 120.
[18] G. B. Carter, *Porton Down*, 19.

beginning in July 1917, rendered any anti-gas system that exclusively protected the lungs and mouth obsolete.[19]

Gas was pursued with a drive and obsession that had not been seen in science since the advent of the Industrial Revolution and the flurry of inquiries into steam engines. Yet even during the war it was clear that gas was not a deadly weapon when compared with machine guns, howitzers, and incendiary bombs. In the First World War roughly sixty-five million men were mobilized across Europe and North Africa. Between thirteen and fourteen million soldiers were killed (either by the enemy or infection), reported missing in action, or injured.[20] Of these between 500,000 and one million casualties were caused by gas; on the Western Front, as few as 26,000 men died from gas exposure (a tragic minority). As the war went on and the gases became more vesicant than asphyxiating in effect the number of deaths declined.[21]

How, then, can we account for such hyperactive laboratory experimentation and fieldwork? The novelty of gas may be to blame: the use of gas, much less poisonous gas, by armies or police officers before 1914 was virtually non-existent.[22] Much enthusiasm within the scientific community over gas stemmed from the attitude that a new weapon is a new weapon: there were no more favorable options. Sir William Pope, an active British gas researcher, wrote in 1921 that critics of the use of poisonous gas erred by "assuming any one form of warfare can be more bestial than another."[23] These moralizing scientists, J. B. S. Haldane declaimed, would have everyone use only "such humane weapons as bayonets, shells, and incendiary bombs." He concluded by aligning anti-gas sentiments

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[19] H. L. Gilchrist, *A Comparative Study of World War Casualties from Gas and Other Weapons* (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Printing Office, 1928), 14.
[20] Winston, Churchill, "Blood Test," in *The World Crisis* (New York: Scribner, 1931), 558.
[21] H. L. Gilchrist, *A Comparative Study*, 7.
[22] L. F. Harber, *The Poisonous Cloud*, 15-17.
[23] Sir William Pope, "The Case for Chemical Warfare," *Chemical Age* 7 (1921): 6.

with fear of the unfamiliar: "As long as we permit ourselves to be afraid of the novel and unknown, there will be a very great temptation to use novel and unknown weapons against us." [24] The above two sources are postwar publications, yet their authors were each resonant supporters of gas throughout the war, and their sentiments characteristic of the scientific consensus on gas.

Another thing was new: the intimacy of science and warfare, two habitually self-sustaining institutions. The employment of the one by the other may have created a kind of sinister factory capable of smelting its own logic in addition to arms. Such an establishment is typified by Porton Down, a site that literally made its own grist and fodder. Rob Evans, a journalist for The Guardian, wrote of Porton Down during the Cold War period, "From a purely scientific point of view, they produced a huge amount of data about the effects of nerve gas on the human body."[25] They certainly did so from 1915 to 1918 with respect to that period's chemicals of choice. What else could their point of view have been?

The public reaction to gas, as a foil to that of the scientists, was profound. The horror of gas—the biblical boils, suffocating fogs in greens, whites, and yellows—induced shock and awe. Wilfred Owen's *Poems*, which included the harrowing *Dulce et decorum est*, was published in 1920—it was a small but representative piece of the sensational way in which postwar literature immortalized the soldier's experience of gas. In Britain many doctors bemoaned its use in journals and newspapers, and it became a topic of much discussion.[26]

Despite the public outcry, gas research was continued, and, more importantly, the laboratory settings of such research remained intact, and indeed expanded. Though the

[24] J. B. S. Haldane, *Callinicus*, 27.
[25] Robert Evans,"The past Porton Down Can't Hide," *The Guardian*, May 6, 2004.
[26] Norman Moore, Et Al, "Gas Warfare," *Times of London,* November 29, 1918.

Treaty of Versailles outlawed Germany from manufacturing or importing of any gas-related items, German scientists found a way back to gas research as soon as 1923.[27] The Americans, having been handed thirty percent of their casualties by German gas projectiles, expanded the annual budget of the American Chemical Warfare Service to $4.5 million.[28] As intelligence detailing the growing international interest in gas warfare, research at Porton Down also increased.[29] Secrecy was key to all of these operations—the public knew little.[30]

Such is the origin story of the secret military laboratory, now an almost banal fixture of the military-industrial complex. It is a story of essentially bad science and poor laboratory work, even for the time. Yet its military roots led to the research facilities of poison gas in various countries becoming more than just laboratories. They became nuclei of military concern and inquiry: eyes in the storm. The effects this has had on science, or on specific fields, is treated elsewhere, especially as concerns the wide-ranging "fallout" from the atomic bomb. This story also begs for the human—or, perhaps, humanizing—element. Who were these scientists? Characters such as Fritz Haber, both the elder and junior Haldane, and Arthur Crossley must be sketched for the current crop of military scientists. Perhaps they will be able to find their own fears and certainties reflected in their predecessors' words and actions.

How does it feel to advance warfare? What responsibilities must science bear on its shoulders? "Modern warfare," Emil Fischer wrote, "is in every respect is so

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[27] "Article 171," in *The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany: Signed at Versailles, June 28th, 1919* (London: H.M. Stationery Off, 1919).
[28] That translates to about $70 million in today's currency. Sir William Pope, "The Case for Chemical Warfare," 7.
[29] G. B. Carter, *Porton Down*, 29.
[30] L. F. Haber, *The Poisonous Cloud*, 282.

horrifying, that scientific people will only regret that it draws its means from the progress of the sciences."[31] And do they? Should they?

[31] Emil Fischer, Fischer to Margaret Oppenheim, 14 Dec 1917. Fischer Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California.

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The Revolution That Never Was:
How the FBI Ignored the Differences Which Kept the New Left and Black Civil Rights Movements Divided

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From an early point in its history, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had battled what it perceived as widespread, unified conspiracies by radical groups to overthrow the American government. When labor unions and the Communist Party gave way to a new wave of radical groups, of various races and concentrated in younger demographics than ever before, the FBI approached it with the same mindset. This mentality pervaded the larger political establishment, which also subscribed to the Domino Theory of expansion by a monolithic, international Communist movement. In reality, New Left and Black Civil Rights groups did often work together at the local level, and used rhetoric of solidarity between the movements. The FBI saw in this local cooperation the potential for the formation of a nationwide revolutionary movement and used controversial, often illegal, means to prevent this from happening. In their assessment, the FBI neglected to consider differences in ideology and agenda which hampered cooperation within and between the movements, and thus made a united revolutionary front impossible.

When discussing the protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s, it is often convenient to use the term "New Left" to refer the many predominantly white groups who advocated for social change. Likewise, all groups whose work concerned the situation of African-Americans at this time are typically included under the heading of the "Black Civil Rights" movement. While these terms are useful in the abstract, it is important to recognize the incredible diversity among the backgrounds and beliefs of the

members of both of these movements. Blake Slonecker, in his examination of the 1968 Columbia takeover, highlights the "wide spectrum of activist ideology" present among the white student protesters, in addition to that of the black protesters, which featured local civil rights activists and black separatists, as well as black students.[32] In his book on SDS - Students for a Democratic Society - David Barber attributes its collapse, at least in part, to its breakup into ideological factions over the issue of violence, some of which had existed prior to the formation of SDS.[33] In its reactions to the Weathermen's violence, the Black Panther Party showed its own internal divisions, as Dan Berger highlights when he compares Fred Hampton's condemnation of the Days of Rage riots to the New York Panthers' approval.[34] Clearly, despite the tendency to characterize these movements as monolithic entities, they were quite fragmented in their beliefs and operations. In this paper, I examine the FBI's perception of the New Left and Black Civil Rights movements, specifically its lack of consideration of the ideological diversity highlighted by the aforementioned scholars.

The FBI viewed events such as the Columbia takeover, in which New Left and Civil Rights movements worked together in blatant defiance of authority, as signs of a revolution in the making. In his book, *Surveillance in America*, Ivan Greenberg argues that the FBI feared an alliance "between SDS and the Panthers", as well as between SDS and anti-war veterans' organizations.[35] FBI reports from this period not only confirm this, but show that the Bureau feared any signs of cooperation between the black and white

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[32] Blake Slonecher, "THE COLUMBIA COALITION: AFRICAN AMERICANS, NEW LEFTISTS, AND COUNTERCULTURE AT THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PROTEST OF 1968," *Journal of Social History 41* (2008): 967-996,1103, 968.
[33] David Barber, *A Hard Rain Fell: SDS and Why It Failed* (University Press of Mississippi, 2010), 5.
[34] Dan Berger, *Outlaws of America: The Weather Underground and the Politics of Solidarity* (AK Press Distribution, 2005), 108.
[35] Ivan Greenberg, *Surveillance in America: Critical Analysis of the FBI, 1920 to the Present* (Lanham: Lexington, 2012), Introduction.

protest movements. These reports contain countless mentions of even the most trivial contacts between organizations, and always noted when African-Americans attended New Left events, and vice-versa. One report dedicates dozens of pages, providing details on individuals and even vehicles, to a "convoy" of VVAW - Vietnam Veterans Against the War - and SCLC - Southern Christian Leadership Conference - members to Cairo, Illinois to distribute food to the poor, in conjunction with the United Front of Cairo, a Black Civil Rights organization. The language used in this report reveals how dangerous the FBI considered these organizations, especially civil rights groups. The report describes the United Front as a "black militant organization", though, in reality, it had formed as a means of self-defense for the black population of Cairo, who had suffered violence at the hands of white residents.[36] Clearly, the Bureau saw even peaceful interactions between the two movements as a threat, as evidenced by its incredibly extensive surveillance. In its mission to monitor – and prevent – the connections between these groups, the FBI often resorted to extralegal means.

In dealing with New Left and Black Civil Rights groups, the FBI drew on a long tradition of surveillance and repression of radical groups, especially labor and communist groups. These earlier actions had led to a series of legal decisions, which shaped the Bureau's policies regarding the new movements of the '60s and '70s. From an early point, the FBI had made a distinction between cases involving domestic organized crime and cases involving foreign threats to "national security."[37] As J.Q. Wilson discusses in "Buggings, Break-ins, & the FBI", legal doctrine from the first half of the 20th century gave agents much more freedom to use wiretaps and warrantless searches in national

[36] My source for all quotes/information on the VVAW convoy to Cairo in this paragraph is: FBI Springfield Illinois Office, *File 100-HQ-448092: Section 35 November / December 1972*. November / December 1972. America in Protest: The Vietnam Veterans Against the War Collection. FBI Library. *Archives Unbound.* Web. 11 Apr. 2015, 140.
[37] J. Q. Wilson, "Buggings, Break-ins, & the FBI," *Commentary (Pre-1986)* (1978): 53.

security cases, so the Bureau would often attempt to make links between foreign governments and groups they considered "subversive."[38] Many FBI reports from the 1960s and '70s regarding protest movements reflect this, as they contain mentions of these types of links, often with little or no supporting evidence. For instance, one report describes a meeting between VVAW members and North Vietnamese representatives, then explicitly indicates that the meeting showed no signs of a "working relationship."[39] Later confessions by informant Bill Lemmer showed that the Bureau had tried to use him to enact a similar plan and, thus, justify further surveillance, so it is unclear how much the VVAW and North Vietnamese ever actually interacted.[40] Agents made similar claims of about the Weather Underground being connected to "both the Cubans and the PLO."[41] The lack of concrete evidence for these claims seems to indicate that, at least in some cases, the FBI used them to exploit previous judicial decisions and avoid constitutional obstacles in their investigations.

The Bureau further justified these efforts by playing on fears of Communism, a tactic they had previously used against labor unions. The era of McCarthyism, which directly preceded this period, had created an association in the public mind between Communist sympathies and subversive collaboration with foreign powers. Hoover himself alleged that one of Dr. King's advisers was a communist, thus making King a worthy target for surveillance. A Senate committee, when later investigating the FBI's actions against King, noted that:

> "Rather than trying to discredit the alleged Communists it believed were attempting to influence Dr. King, the Bureau adopted the curious tactic of

[38] Ibid.
[39] FBI Springfield Illinois Office, *File 100-HQ-448092: Section 35*
[40] Frank Donner, "The Confessions of an FBI Informer," Harper's Magazine via Weisberg-Watergate Files, The Harold Weisberg Archive. December, 1972.
[41] Wilson, "Buggings, Break-ins, & the FBI," 57.

> trying to discredit the supposed target of Communist Party interest—Dr. King himself'' (Senate Select Committee, 85).[42]

In this case, the committee detected an example of one of the Bureau's favorite tactics, using justifications pioneered in earlier periods to attack newer groups. Since many groups in both the New Left and Civil Rights movements embraced Communist teachings, and some publicly praised the governments of Communist countries, the public was quick to believe the FBI's accusations of foreign collusion. This allowed the FBI to maintain their efforts against these groups for years without any significant challenge.[43]

While the FBI approached the New Left and Black Civil Rights movements within the framework of its earlier actions to quash subversion, these groups represented a new type of radicalism, so the Bureau created a new program, called COINTELPRO, in response to this shift. In the early 1960s, the FBI expanded COINTELPRO to cover racial groups – both black and white – and radical student and veteran groups of the New Left.[44] Allegations of communist association still appear in FBI reports after this change, but they became less important, especially as the protests by these groups began to turn violent at the end of the 1960's.

As the public later learned following the 1975 Church Committee's investigation into COINTELPRO, the program's tactics ranged from typical law enforcement practices to Orwellian acts of repression. Agents routinely used warrantless searches, known as "black bag jobs", of buildings affiliated with protest movements to acquire private

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[42] The Senate quote and the preceding Hoover quote come from: Encyclopedia Entry: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Martin Luther King, Jr. Papers Project, the Martin Luther King Research and Education Institute, Stanford University

[43] Wilson, "Buggings, Break-ins, & the FBI," 54.

[44] Greenberg, *Surveillance In America*, 12.

materials from these organizations.[45] The laws governing warrantless searches changed several times during the 1960s, and high ranking members of the Bureau and Department of Justice consistently denied authorizing them, but their use persisted throughout the decade.[46] To gain a more intimate look into the inner workings of target groups, the Bureau used wiretaps, which were completely legal before 1967, so long as the installer never entered the target's residence and any "intelligence" gathered remained unpublished.[47] To infiltrate groups, so that they could be "neutralized from the inside",[48] the FBI used informants, either undercover agents or hired amateurs.[49] Many amateur informants were Vietnam veterans who suffered from PTSD and were thus easier to manipulate.[50] The FBI often used these informants as "provocateurs" to try to directly inspire acts of violence – the more public the better – both to justify prosecution and to publicly discredit the group.[51] Efforts to discredit organizations also took the form of "false and derogatory [news] stories", which the Bureau could publish through its network of "cooperating journalists."[52] When opportunities arose, agents would also use fabricated materials to try to provoke conflicts between groups, distracting them from their goals and preventing the formation of alliances.[53] In many cases, the FBI

[45] Wilson, "Buggings, Break-ins, & the FBI," 53.
[46]For an in-depth examination of the FBI's tactics regarding searches and wiretaps, refer to Wilson's "Buggings, Break-ins, & the FBI." Wilson also argues that high ranking members of the Bureau, Department of Justice, and sometimes Congress had much more to do with the FBI's surveillance efforts than they admitted publicly, an interesting argument that I won't tackle in this paper.
[47] Wilson, "Buggings, Break-ins, & the FBI," 52-53.
[48]Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, *The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI's Secret Wars against Domestic Dissent* (South End Press, 1990), 181.
[49] Interview of Scott Camil by Stuart Landers, October, 20, 1992, Alachua County, FL, 72-73.
[50] Donner, "The Confessions of an FBI Informer," 57, 61.
[51] Camil Interview, 78.
[52] Kathleen Cleaver and George Katsiaficas, *Liberation, Imagination and the Black Panther Party: A New Look at the Black Panthers and Their Legacy* (Routledge, 2014), 84.
[53] For examples of this practice in use against the Black Panthers, see Matthew Fleischer, "Policing Revolution: How the LAPD's first use of SWAT - a massive military-style operation against the Black Panthers - was almost its last," LA Times, April 2011 and Jakobi Williams,

coordinated with other agencies, such as the DEA, IRS, and local police departments, allowing them to attack target organizations from multiple angles.[54]

As the Vietnam War, and the movement seeking to end it intensified, radical groups became increasingly visible and thus grew to be one of the government's top domestic concerns. The FBI, as the main source of information for the federal government regarding domestic activism, shaped the political establishment's perception of the protest movements. At the height of protest activity in 1968, the FBI was "routinely sending reports to the White House" detailing the "agitational activity" of the New Left and Civil Rights movements, inspiring a concerted legislative effort to combat this perceived threat.[55]

Informed almost exclusively by the staunchly conservative FBI, and frightened by the increasingly violent actions and revolutionary rhetoric of the protest movements, even liberal politicians began to embrace Hoover's repressive policies. A series of laws passed in 1968 reflect this reactionary shift. The Civil Rights Act of 1968, considered a landmark victory for the Black Civil Rights movement, contained a provision which made crossing state lines to "incite a riot" a punishable offense. The Act also contained clauses which exempted "law enforcement" and "members of the Armed Forces" from respecting the bill's affirmations of civil rights when "suppressing a riot or civil disturbance", giving police more freedom to use violence against protests.[56] Just two months later, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act created structures for

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From the Bullet to the Ballot: The Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party and Racial Coalition Politics in Chicago (UNC Press Books, 2013), 162.

[54] For an example of the FBI's coordination with the DEA and local courts to impede the VVAW, see Interview of Scott Camil by Stuart Landers, October, 20, 1992, Alachua County, FL. For an example of the FBI's coordination with the IRS against the Black Panthers, see Cleaver and Katsiaficas, *Liberation, Imagination and the Black Panther Party,* 86.

[55] Greenberg, *Surveillance in America*, p. 12

[56] *Civil Rights Act of 1968*, April 11, 1968, Public Law No. 90-284.

coordination between the FBI and local law enforcement, and gave huge grants to local agencies to fund both "organization, education, and training" of riot control units and the "acquisition of riot control equipment."[57] Just a few months after that law, the Gun Control Act of 1968 made it illegal to sell firearms to anyone who was "an unlawful user of or addicted to marijuana or any depressant or stimulant…or narcotic drug."[58] The specific mention of marijuana makes the intention clear, as members of both movements embraced the use of the drug. The Panthers posed the greatest threat of armed resistance, so this law, coupled with the frequent recoveries of weapons and marijuana from raids on Panther offices, gave federal and local law enforcement a way to put unprecedented numbers of Panthers behind bars. The combination of these laws, passed in such close succession, constituted a direct federal response to the wave of violent protests which had rocked the country in 1968. Government forces could subsequently attack the protest movements from multiple angles which led to increasingly effective FBI action against both movements in the years after 1968.

All of the FBI's surveillance and repression activities stemmed from the assumption that the New Left and Civil Rights movements could unite to form a single revolutionary entity, but this viewpoint ignored the diversity of race, class, and ideology that caused problems whenever groups tried to coordinate their efforts. Two prominent places where New Left and Civil Rights groups worked together, Chicago and Columbia, demonstrate the difficulties of even local coordination, making the FBI's imagined national alliance practically impossible.

In Chicago in the late 1960s, Black Panther organizer Fred Hampton formed the Rainbow Coalition, composed of Panthers, SDS, Young Lords (a Puerto Rican Gang),

[57] *Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968*. June 19, 1968, Public Law No. 90-351.
[58] *Gun Control Act of 1968*. October 22, 1968, Public Law No. 90-618.

Young Patriots (a White Appalachian gang), and other local organizations to serve the needs of Chicago's poor.[59] Hampton, along with Jose Jimenez of the Young Lords and Bill Fesperman of the Young Patriots, was able to convince most of the local gangs to stop fighting each other and focus on community service.[60] In this coalition the ethnic and local organizations, following the Panthers' example, focused on providing free meals, medical care, and other community services in poor neighborhoods, as well as operating ran "community daycare centers", which enabled women to participate.[61] Groups like the Young Lords, which began as local gangs, further followed the Panthers' example and required potential members to "take political education classes" and "conduct community service" before they could join.[62] Through meetings with police and government officials, protest marches, and nonviolent occupations of several government buildings, the Coalition secured funding for low-income housing and challenged police brutality in poor communities.[63] Their free breakfast program was so successful, that Mayor Daley "demanded that city officials develop their own breakfast program" to avoid embarrassment.[64] SDS, though not an official member due to its objection to violence, printed materials for the coalition and worked to organize unemployed whites and garner support among middle class white Chicagoans.[65] The working class counterpart to SDS, Rising Up Angry, aided efforts to "politicize" white youth in the city

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[59] Greenberg, *Surveillance in America*, 13.
[60] Williams, *From the Bullet to the Ballot*, 136, 146.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid., 146.
[63] Ibid., 138, 146-147.
[64] Ibid., 152.
[65] Ibid., 163. FBI Charlotte Field Office, *Section 4B*. N.d. FBI File on the Black Panther Party, North Carolina. Federal Bureau of Investigation Library. *Archives Unbound.* Web. 12 Apr. 2015. 64. Richard Flacks, *Chicago: Organizing the Unemployed*, Economic Research and Action Project, Students for a Democratic Society, April, 1964, http://www.sds-1960s.org/sds_wuo/erap_organizing_unemployed/

and recruit them to the coalition.[66] The earlier SDS community organizing program, JOIN (Jobs or Income Now), in the predominantly white, working class Uptown area had catalyzed the formation of the Young Patriots, a critical component of the coalition.[67] The success of the Coalition inspired ethnic gangs and self-defense organizations in several other cities, including Detroit and New York City, to eschew intergroup violence and focus on coordinating to improve conditions in their communities.[68]

The assassination of Fred Hampton, the architect of the Rainbow Coalition, by Chicago police removed Hampton's uniting force from the local alliance and allowed differences in ideology and background to divide the coalition. The breakup of SDS in 1969, primarily over the use of violence, accelerated the collapse of what remained of the Rainbow Coalition.[69] Though they preached commitment to the plight of African-Americans, the Weathermen, successors to SDS, rejected the Black Panther-led United Front Against Fascism initiative.[70] Previously, after the Weathermen orchestrated the so-called "Days of Rage" riots, Hampton had "denounced the group as 'anarchistic, opportunistic, individualistic, chauvinistic, and Custeristic.'"[71] Despite this, the Weathermen would still carry out bombings in his name after his death, illustrating a larger trend within the white student movement of misunderstanding the Black Civil Rights movement.

The collapse of the coalition and the radicalization of some factions of SDS led many Black Civil Rights leaders to distance themselves from the group. Jesse Jackson, who filled part of the void left in Chicago by the murder of Fred Hampton, and formed

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[66] Williams, *From the Bullet to the Ballot*, 154.
[67] Ibid., 140. Flacks, *Chicago: Organizing the Unemployed.*
[68] Williams, *From the Bullet to the Ballot*, 165.
[69] Dan Berger, *Outlaws of America: The Weather Underground and the Politics of Solidarity* (AK Press Distribution, 2005), 109.
[70] Barber, *A Hard Rain Fell*, 256.
[71] Berger, *Outlaws of America*, 122.

his own "Rainbow Coalition", made pointed criticisms of the New Left, particularly SDS. In reference to white student protesters, he claimed that they possessed "the same moral ideals", but due to their white, affluent backgrounds, "the issues that move[d] them [were] qualitatively different from the ones that concern[ed] blacks." In his experience, white student activists focused too heavily on revolution and not enough on alleviating the problems caused by poverty in black communities, which he argued must be solved before any meaningful change could take place.[72] In speeches given to white students at the University of North Carolina, Bobby Lee Rush and Bill Fesperman, leaders of the Chicago Panthers and Young Patriots, made similar criticisms of SDS for its inability to "relate to the working class."[73] These criticisms were not unfounded; as the actions of SDS and, especially, the Weathermen, reflected a misunderstanding of the African-American experience.

The Weather Underground represent this white student emphasis on revolution, with a corresponding neglect for combatting poverty, in its most extreme form. In their rhetoric, they claimed to draw inspiration from "black revolutionaries" who were attempting to stop the "attempted genocide against black people."[74] They subsequently pledged that "never again would [those black revolutionaries] fight alone."[75] After the death of Fred Hampton, the Weathermen performed a series of bombings of federal buildings, supposedly in retaliation for the murder of Hampton and other Civil Rights figures.[76] Rather than help the Black Civil Rights movement, their emphasis on violence

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[72] All of Jackson's quotes in this paragraph come from: Interview of Jesse Jackson by Arthur Kretchmer, November, 1969, *Playboy*.
[73] FBI Charlotte Field Office, *Section 4B,* 77.
[74] Bernardine Dohrn, "Communique #1 from the Weatherman Underground," May 21, 1970, Students for a Democratic Society Archives and Resources, www.sds-1960s.org
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid. Bernardine Dohrn, "Communique #2 from the Weatherman Underground," June 9, 1970, Students for a Democratic Society Archives and Resources, www.sds-1960s.org

alienated it, and their image of the noble black revolutionary had more in common with the FBI's imaginings than with actual civil rights activists, most of whom focused on improving conditions in black communities. Even the Black Panthers, who today carry a reputation of a violent, paramilitary force, primarily specialized in providing free food and medical care to black communities and helping black people find employment.[77] At the time of the Weather Underground's rise to prominence, the Panthers were feeling the effects of a government crackdown, which had left Fred Hampton dead, Bobby Seale imprisoned, and countless others dead, imprisoned, or exiled. Rather than engage in violence, they wanted to "build a broad united front for their own self-preservation", and feared the Weathermen would provoke the government into even stronger repression.[78] As the actions of the Weathermen, along with the earlier Columbia takeover would show, the white student movement and the Black Civil Rights movement had overlapping, but quite distinct agendas that often prevented them from working together effectively.

At its outset, the 1968 joint takeover of Columbia University by a coalition led by SDS and the Student Afro Society seemed like a step towards unity between the New Left and Civil Rights movements. Tom Hayden, one of the main SDS organizers in the takeover, had earlier, in the Port Huron Statement, called for a "full-scale public initiative for civil rights" and had expressed solidarity with America's black community.[79] When SAS, along with the Harlem chapters of CORE and SNCC, began a series of protests against the university's planned construction of a gym on public park land, an act they saw as furtherance of the school's "'communicidal' policy toward Harlem", SDS readily

[77] FBI Charlotte Field Office, *Section 4B,* 64.
[78] Berger, *Outlaws of America*, 122.
[79] Tom Hayden, "The Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society," University of Michigan, 1962, https://www.lsa.umich.edu/phs/resources/porthuronstatementfulltext

joined the coalition.[80] Though SDS primarily sought to attract public attention to the university's involvement with the Institute for Defense Analysis and, by extension the Vietnam War, the gym construction issue united almost all campus reformers and took precedent over other issues.[81]

Besides coordinating their protests with the black campus movement, SDS members also took cues from earlier black civil rights activists. In the days before the protests, SDS leader Mark Rudd wrote and circulated an open letter to University President Grayson Kirk, which included the quote "Up against the wall motherfucker, this is a stick up" from the poem "Black People!", by Black Nationalist poet Amiri Baraka.[82] The quote was popular among black power groups, and when later asked to explain his use of it, Rudd explained that SDS had "adopted the struggle of blacks and the other oppressed as [their] own", as shown by their opposition to the gym's construction.[83] The coordination between white and black student groups initially paid off, as the university administration feared that responding too violently to a protest involving both black students and black residents of Harlem would provoke a race riot.[84] This allowed the protests to continue for several days, garnering major publicity and drawing the eyes of the nation to the issues in question.

Despite the early indications of unity between the white and black protest movements, the conflicting goals of SDS and SAS caused the protest to fragment. The Student Afro Society, a black advocacy organization, saw "themselves essentially as an extension of [Harlem's] black community", and, thus, were primarily protesting the

[80] Slonecker, "The Columbia Coalition," 970.
[81] Ibid., 971.
[82] Stefan M. Bradley, *Harlem vs. Columbia University: Black Student Power in the Late 1960s* (University of Illinois Press, 2009), 63.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Slonecker, "The Columbia Coalition," 978-979.

construction of a university gym over top of a public park.[85] Local chapters of SNCC and CORE joined them in their protest, and their leaders gave speeches in favor of "black separatism."[86] In contrast, SDS, as a predominantly-white New Left group, cited the university's connections to the Vietnam War as their primary issue and pursued the "radicalization" of the white student body.[87]

The actions and rhetoric of SDS leaders at the Columbia protests perfectly exemplify Jesse Jackson's argument that white student activists focused too heavily on revolution, without considering the needs of poor and nonwhite communities. Tom Hayden, who had previously authored the Port Huron Statement expressing SDS solidarity with African-Americans, gave a speech in which he quoted Castro in describing the SDS members as "guerrillas in the field of culture."[88] When Mark Rudd, later a prominent Weatherman, used the quote "Up against the wall motherfucker," in his open letter to the university president, he ignored its original context, which was a poem advocating violent uprisings of black people against the white race as a whole.[89] This ignorance of the African-American experience proved to be a theme among white radicals, as demonstrated in countless other instances of attempted cooperation between white and black protest groups.

The difference in goals came to a head when "SAS and Harlem activists evicted all white students" from their shared building, just one day after the takeover had begun.[90] SAS members argued that the white protests distracted the public from what was

[85] Ibid., 974.
[86] Ibid., 967-968.
[87] Ibid., 969.
[88] Ibid., 980.
[89] Amiri Baraka, Imamu Amiri Baraka, William J. Harris, *The LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka Reader* (Basic Books, 2000).
[90] Slonecker, "Columbia Coalition," 974.

essentially an issue of the black community.[91] Though the two groups continued to emphasize their solidarity, they remained in separate buildings until the end of the protests.[92] At Columbia, as in many other places where New Left and Civil Rights groups attempted to work together, the differences proved too great to overcome, to the detriment of both sides.

The inability of the two movements to coordinate at Columbia and Chicago, which resulted from fundamental differences in ideology and background between members of different organizations, demonstrates the impossibility of the FBI's imagined nationwide revolutionary alliance. Some local coordination was certainly possible and did take place, but this was always temporary and no formal national alliance ever successfully materialized. The Bureau's misconceptions about the movements, and its resulting paranoia regarding a widespread revolutionary movement, caused it to violate the civil rights of countless individuals. The public revelation of COINTELPRO shook public confidence in the FBI, at a time when other scandals, such as Watergate and the Pentagon papers, had already shattered the people's faith in their government. Had the FBI recognized the diversity and disagreement present throughout the New Left and Black Civil Rights movements, they could have taken avoided stepping outside legal boundaries and, thus, avoided the resulting public backlash.

[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid., 975.

Appendix A – Images

Image 1 – "David Shapiro sits at President Grayson Kirk's desk during the April 1968 protests" – Following the eviction of white protesters from Hamilton Hall, SDS occupied several other buildings, including Low Library, where someone snapped this photo of Shapiro smoking a cigar at the President's desk. [Posted to Columbia University Wiki, April 8, 2007, http://www.wikicu.com/David_Shapiro]



INTERSTATE FLIGHT - MOB ACTION; RIOT; CONSPIRACY

WANTED BY FBI

The persons shown here are active members of the militant Weatherman faction of the Students for a Democratic Society - SDS.

Federal warrants have been issued at Chicago, Illinois, concerning these individuals, charging them with a variety of Federal violations including interstate flight to avoid prosecution, mob action, Antiriot Laws and conspiracy. Some of these individuals were also charged in an indictment returned 7/23/70, at Detriot, Michigan, with conspiracy to violate Federal Bombing and Gun Control Laws.

These individuals should be considered dangerous because of their known advocacy and use of explosives, reported acquisition of firearms and incendiary devices, and known propensity for violence.

If you have information concerning these persons please contact your local FBI Office.

William Charles Ayers
W/M, 25, 5-10, 170
brn hair, brn eyes

Kathie Boudin
W/F, 26, 5-4, 128
brn hair, blue eyes

Judith Alice Clark
W/F, 20, 5-3, 125
brn hair, brn eyes

Bernardine Rae Dohrn
W/F, 28, 5-5, 125
drk brn hair, brn eyes

Image 2 – "FBI wanted poster for leaders of the Weatherman Underground" – Following a series of bombings and murders, the Weathermen became some of America's most wanted criminals. Despite this, many of them were able to evade capture for years, and when a series of legal decisions related to COINTELPRO overturned many of their indictments, they were able to come out of hiding and face minimal punishment. [Taken from Weatherman/Weather Underground Organization, Students for a Democratic Society Archives and Resources, www.sds-1960s.org]



Image 3 – "Leaders of the Rainbow Coalition" – Fred Hampton, pictured here with Bobby Lee Rush, another Panther leader, and Bill Fesperman, the leader of the Young Patriots. Hampton's Rainbow Coalition united black and white ethnic gangs and New Left activists with the common goal of improving the quality of life for Chicago's poor. [Photo courtesy of Paul Sequeira. Appears in Jakobi Williams, *From the Bullet to the Ballot: The Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party and Racial Coalition Politics in Chicago*. (UNC Press Books, 2013), p. 136]

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Postcolonial Politics: Korean "Comfort Women" and Japanese Reparations

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"We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history"

- 1993 statement by Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono

The Japanese government's abuse of "comfort women" during World War II exemplifies the intersection of gender dynamics and colonial control. Under the "comfort women" system, the Japanese government took women - mainly from its colonies such as Korea - to serve as sexual slaves for soldiers. While official documents reveal the extensive role of the Japanese government in constructing military brothels, staffing them with abducted women, and mistreating "comfort women," this human rights violation remains a point of contention internationally. The Japanese government still refuses to issue a full apology to the victims, which would include acknowledging its responsibility for their inhumane treatment and compensating them with government funds. By failing to make adequate reparations and refusing to acknowledge what occurred, the Japanese government has re-victimized these women and perpetuated their feelings of abuse for decades. As revealed in their memoirs, the collective memory of "comfort women" is essential in verifying the reality of their experiences and asserting their entitlement to reparations rather than perpetuating victimization. Colonial dynamics thus remain a powerful force over time, controlling public knowledge and shaping the way that historical events are perceived and recorded by the various parties involved.

The "comfort women" system arose as a byproduct of colonial dynamics, which

had historically placed Japan in a position of socio-political dominance over Korea. Although Japan's colonization of Korea was short-lived, its impact on this nation was extensive. From 1910-1945, Korea lived under the yoke of Japanese imperial rule.[1] Japanese control of Korea can be traced to the Kangwha Treaty of 1876, which opened up Korea to Japanese trade and increased its influence in the peninsula.[2] In order to secure control over Korea, Japan signed a series of deals with the United States and Great Britain wherein each power agreed to respect the colonial interest of the other empire.[3] As a result, while still nominally independent, Korea's foreign relations came under the sole control of the Japanese through the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth.[4] From there, it was a small jump for Japan to seize formal control of Korea, annexing it as a colony on August 22nd, 1910.[5] After gaining legal control of Korea, Japan moved quickly to initiate "the complete Japanization of Korea."[6] Korean culture was all but wiped out by regulations favoring elements of Japanese society. Asserting its power as a colonizing government, Japan even forced Koreans to assume Japanese names and learn the Japanese language.[7] Thus, cultural imperialism led to restrictive policies and extensive discrimination towards Koreans, creating ripe conditions for wartime abuse of this colony.

As Japan sought to expand its imperial control during the Asian and Pacific War (1932-1945), it increasingly abused Korean subjects.[8] The Japanese government dehumanized Koreans, treating them as expendable wartime supplies and a fresh source

[1] Dai Sil Kim-Gibson, *Silence Broken: Korean Comfort Women* (Parkersburg: Mid-Prairie Books, 1999), 32.
[2] Kim-Gibson, *Silence Broken*, 33.
[3] Ibid., 34.
[4] Ibid., 35.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid., 36.
[7] Keith Howard, *True Stories of the Korean Comfort Women* (New York: Cassell, 1995), 2.
[8] Pyong Gap Min, "Korean 'Comfort Women:' The Intersection of Colonial Power, Gender, and Class," *Gender & Society* 17, no. 6 (2003): 938.

of disposable labor. Starting in 1939, the Japanese government "began to enforce the all-out systematic mobilization of Koreans of both sexes for the war effort."[9] This mobilization was only voluntary in name, as Japanese officials coerced Koreans to join the war effort and belittled them if they resisted. Japan further pressured Koreans by promising them that their nation would be included as part of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere once they secured victory in the Pacific.[10] This push to engage in total war eventually spilled over into matters of sexuality.

The "comfort women" system grew out of misplaced nationalism and an environment of flagrant aggression. The Rape of Nanking in 1937 was a public relations disaster for Japan.[11] The desire to avoid international denouncement, rather than a concern for human rights, led Japan to change its official policies regarding military prostitution. These new policies gave rise to the "comfort women" system, which the Japanese government considered to be beneficial for several reasons. First, this system enabled the military to hide sexual abuses behind the walls of government-supported comfort stations. Second, since soldiers would be satisfied by "comfort women" rather than raping local women, this would "prevent anti-Japanese sentiment from fomenting among local residents in the occupied territories." [12] The 1939 document "Regulation on Special Comfort Works for Morikawa Unit" outlined the use of comfort stations to control soldiers' lust within the confines of a sanctioned program. As stated in this document: "The mission of the special comfort station is to improve morale by controlling and mitigating the murderous spirit of the soldiers. Therefore, promotion of

[9] Chunghee Sarah Soh, "The Korean 'Comfort Women': Movement for Redress," *Asian Survey* (1996): 1228.
[10] Stetz, Margaret Diane, and Bonnie BC Oh, *Legacies of the Comfort Women of World War II* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 7.
[11] Carmen M. Argibay, "Sexual Slavery and the Comfort Women of World War II," *Berkeley J. Int'l l.* 21 (2003): 376.
[12] Argibay, "Sexual Slavery and the Comfort Women of World War II," 377.

violent temper shall be strictly controlled."[13] While the Japanese government encouraged fierce violence on the battlefield, it tried to regulate acts of sexual aggression by providing official outlets. The revised 1942 Japanese Imperial Army Criminal Law further indicated that the "comfort women" system was initiated solely to safeguard the image of soldiers. In discussing this code, historian Toshiyuki Tanaka explains that the rape of women in occupied territories was considered a criminal offense because it "brought disgrace on the name of the Japanese Empire, not because rape itself constituted a serious crime against humanity."[14] This statement highlights the government's primary objective to protect its soldiers over the safety of women who were vulnerable to being abused by them. Ensuring the physical health of soldiers was also of paramount importance, as the Japanese government believed that if soldiers visited comfort stations rather than local brothels, they could avoid sexually transmitted diseases. Lastly, if soldiers only visited "comfort women," military secrets would be secured since the Japanese isolated these women and cut them off from their families.[15] Therefore, in order to protect soldiers and national prestige, the Japanese government devised the "comfort women" system, disregarding the autonomy of women for the sake of the Japanese military.

The "recruitment" of "comfort women" relied on traditional racial, class, and sexual hierarchies that indicate the confluence of gender roles and colonial dynamics.[16] In total, scholars estimate that the Japanese government enslaved approximately 200,000

[13] Soyeon Park, *We Were Sex Slaves of the Japanese Military* (Republic of Korea: Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities, 2007), 152.
[14] Toshiyuki Tanaka, *Japan's Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution During World War II and the US Occupation* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 29.
[15] Argibay, "Sexual Slavery and the Comfort Women of World War II," 377.
[16] Ibid.

women and that only about one-quarter of these women survived to the end of the war.[17] Of these women, about 80% to 90% were from Korea.[18] The Japanese government took the rest of the women from other areas in which it had influence such as China, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Taiwan.[19] In order to obtain women for soldiers, the Japanese government followed a policy of "virgin recruitment," favoring young, unmarried, and poor girls whose absence in their community would not be as noticed and mourned as that of married or elite women.[20] The government employed a number of methods to procure these women. Primarily, they used violence and force to take women against their will, with police and soldiers taking eligible women they could find on public streets or through other chance encounters. Authorities also coerced women to come by issuing threats of violence against their person or their families if they did not comply. Additionally, in *True Stories of the Korean Comfort Women,* Keith Howard notes that another common method was to tempt women by giving them false promises of employment in Japan.[21] By these methods, thousands of women were tricked or forced into sexual slavery.

Colonial attitudes created a disparity between the way the Japanese perceived the sexuality of women from their own country versus those from Korea. The comfort system respected the chastity of Japanese women by involving primarily those who were already engaged in prostitution. In contrast, the sexual purity of Korean women was of little concern, as their inferior status made it culturally acceptable to use them for sexual service even if they had no previous history of prostitution. In fact, anthropologist

[17] Stephanie Wolfe, *The Politics of Reparations and Apologies* (New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2013), 231.
[18] Kim-Gibson, *Silence Broken*, 40.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Howard, *True Stories of the Korean Comfort Women*, 19

Sarah Soh notes that the backgrounds of Japanese and Korean were quite different: the majority of Japanese women (67%) worked in the adult entertainment industry before coming to the comfort stations whereas the majority of Korean women (60%) had no previous involvement in the sex industry.[22] Soh confirms that while Japanese women participated in the comfort stations, this was mostly of their own accord as they had greater control over their own sexuality than Korean women who lacked autonomy. Societal discrimination against Korean women is evident in the testimony of a former Japanese soldier who appeared before the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery. Years after the war, this soldier recalled how he harshly admonished a Japanese "comfort woman" as follows: "Japanese? How can a decent lady come here to be a prostitute? You are a disgrace to Japan."[23] His volatile reaction demonstrates a social structure that held Japanese women to a higher sexual standard than Korean women. This type of hierarchical system is evidenced in other colonial cultures where sexuality both reflects and reinforces the inferior position of colonized people. In *Race and the Education of Desire*, Ann Stoler explains how colonial rule establishes disparate sexual standards for native people and those of the colonizing nation. Within this framework: "Sexual promiscuity or restraint were not abstract characteristics attached to any persons who exhibited these behaviors, but as often post-hoc interpretations contingent on the racialized class and gender categories to which individuals were already assigned."[24] This dynamic is apparent in the comfort system, which devalued Korean women based on the inferior status of their nation in relation to the colonizing authority. Racist views and colonial dynamics justified the large-scale

[22] Sarah C. Soh, *The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 9.
[23] Soyeon Park, *We Were Sex Slaves of the Japanese Military*, 93.
[24] Ann Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's* History of Sexuality *and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 115.

abduction of Korean women and perpetuated cultural tolerance for their sexual abuse.

By belittling Korean women, the Japanese government asserted its political control, an important objective during wartime. Historian Joan Scott explains: "Power relations among nations and the status of colonial subjects have been made comprehensible (and thus legitimate) in terms of relations between male and female."[25] Japan's sexual control over "comfort women" served to bolster its political clout over Korea, thereby initiating "power rape" on a massive scale.[26] The Japanese government controlled the bodies of Korean women, and by proxy, asserted power over their nation.

The Japanese government transported "comfort women" to locations where morale was low or soldiers were heavily concentrated. This method of distribution was intended to maximize their usefulness to the military. The 19 former "comfort women" interviewed in Keith Howard's *True Stories of the Korean Comfort Women* were dispersed over every area where Japan fought. The table below lists areas where these women were deployed for the longest period of time.[27]

Location	**Number**
Manchuria	4
China (except Manchuria)	7
Pacific Islands	2
South Asia	5
Taiwan	2
Japan	2
Korea	1

With the exception of one woman who was placed in Korea, the rest were taken far from their homeland, thus increasing their vulnerability and limiting their opportunity to escape. The method of transporting "comfort women" conveyed their objectification.

[25] Joan W. Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," in *Culture, Society and Sexuality: A Reader*, ed. Richard Guy Parker and Peter Aggleton (London: UCL Press, 1999), 69.
[26] Tanaka, *Japan's Comfort Women,* 177.
[27] Howard, *True Stories of the Korean Comfort Women*, 15.

Tanaka describes the commodification of these women, stating: "The fact that comfort women in transit were often listed in the inventory as 'cargo' clearly demonstrated how the top military officers regarded these women."[28] The system not only displaced "comfort women" but also treated them as military supplies rather than people.

The life of a "comfort woman" was abject and dehumanizing, especially for those who were Korean. The oral histories of survivors attest to the brutal treatment they received on a daily basis. In *Comfort Women Speak*, a collection of testimonies compiled by Schellstede and Yu, former "comfort woman" Kim Dae-il reported: "we were made sex slaves and were forced to service 40 to 50 soldiers each day."[29] Soldiers inconsistently used condoms, and as a result, women often contracted sexually transmitted diseases, which the Japanese treated with a dangerous chemical that also caused miscarriages. Given the inhumane and dangerous conditions in which they lived, it is no wonder that so few of these women survived the war. In fact, Dae-il and other former "comfort women" considered themselves to be victims of "sex slavery."[30] This terminology emphasizes the degradation and restriction of basic liberties that women faced as the Japanese government ruthlessly exploited them.

The treatment of Korean and Japanese "comfort women" differed greatly, indicating how Japan's colonial rule made the plight of Korean "comfort women" particularly miserable. Author Pyong Gap Min states: "Japanese comfort women usually served officers and were paid for their services, while Korean sexual slaves usually served a large number of enlisted men and were treated more brutally than were Japanese

[28] Tanaka, *Japan's Comfort Women,* 173.
[29] Schellstede, Sangmie Choi, and Soon Mi Yu, *Comfort Women Speak: Testimony by Sex Slaves of the Japanese Military* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 2000), 26.
[30] Ibid., 17.

comfort women."[31] Thus, it appears that Japanese women were reserved for higher-ranking officers (indicating their perceived desirability) and were treated more fairly, with better living conditions and the possibility of pay. Making matters worse, the Japanese often sent Korean women to more dangerous areas. In *Legacies of the Comfort Women of World War II,* Sterz and Oh explain: "Japanese women…were sent to more secure areas …whereas other Korean girls were sent to the front lines and housed in makeshift shacks."[32] Racial hierarchies structured all aspects of life for the "comfort women," prioritizing the safety and needs of Japanese women over that of Korean women.

Even though all "comfort women" were dehumanized, Korean women experienced the greatest brutality. Many former "comfort women" describe how soldiers disregarded their basic freedoms and purposely endangered them for entertainment. For example, Kim Dae-il reported a particularly haunting incident where she feared for her safety: "One time another drunken soldier came in and continued drinking in my cubicle. He then stabbed the lower part of my body and shouted, 'Hey, this *senjing* (a dirty Korean) is dying.'"[33] In addition to daily sexual and physical abuse, many Korean "comfort women" experienced emotional abuse because of their ethnicity, indicating the prejudices fueled by the colonial system. Another former "comfort woman" Kim Yoon-shim reported that Japanese soldiers routinely humiliated her: "Verbal abuse from the soldiers was constant and unbearable. They told me 'Chosun' (a traditional name for Korea) people are liars, distrustful, subhumans and have no ancestors. No one cares; no

[31] Min, "Korean 'Comfort Women:' The Intersection of Colonial Power, Gender, and Class," 944.
[32] Stetz and Oh, *Legacies of the Comfort Women of World War II*, 12.
[33] Schellstede and Yu, *Comfort Women Speak*, 26-27.

one can trace if Chosun people are killed, the soldiers said."[34] Tragically, this statement by the Japanese soldiers contained an element of truth. For many years (and in some cases, still today), the abuse experienced by "comfort women" was pushed aside to avoid an international conflict. With regard to this issue, national interests continue to supersede human rights concerns and correcting the collective Japanese memory.

After the war, many "comfort women" experienced re-victimization due to stringent gender hierarchies in Korean society. Alienated from their culture, many had no home to return to. Former husbands and families wanted nothing to do with them due to the disgrace of their sexual impropriety. Numerous "comfort women" were unable to bear children and most were emotionally impacted by the experience, making it hard for them to marry. This posed a dilemma for them due to Confucian values, which structured family relationships. As explained by former "comfort woman" Kim Yoon-shim: "once a girl leaves home, she is not supposed to return to her parents' home, according to our custom."[35] Consequently, many former "comfort women" became economically dependent on the government as they could not marry or work (due to mental and physical injuries). These women experienced violence during the war and then encountered tremendous challenges as they attempted to re-integrate into their own society. In fact, the unequal gender dynamics in Korea hindered the ability of former "comfort women" to step forward and share their testimony for "fear of being branded a 'prostitute.'"[36] Thus, social stigma surrounded "comfort women" when they returned home due to the high cultural value placed on chastity as the determinant of sexual morality - and by extension, personal worth. Social pressures forced these women to confront their past alone. In "History and Memory: The 'Comfort Women' Controversy,"

[34] Ibid., 45.
[35] Schellstede and Yu, *Comfort Women Speak*, 47.
[36] Tanaka, *Japan's Comfort Women,* 174.

Hyun Sook Kim explains this inhibitory process: "In the reconstruction of the Confucian, patriarchal, and paternalistic political order of postcolonial South Korea, the comfort women were effectively subordinated and silenced within the nation."[37] This social silencing demonstrates how gender roles in Korean society contributed to the subjugation of former "comfort women." Sterz and Oh summarize the tragic predicament: "They were chosen for systematic rape, in the first place, because they were seen as worthless and, afterward, defined as worthless, because they had been raped"[38] To this day, "comfort women" continue to be stigmatized and have difficulty rallying support within their own society.

The marginalization of former "comfort women" reflects the way colonialism genders ideas of nationality. Some South Koreans feminize the political state of colonization, wishing to separate themselves from this legacy. Hyun Sook Kim summarizes this notion as follows: "fear of emasculation is in part responsible for the state's silencing of the memory of comfort women in South Korea. The women are living symbols that remind the nation of its patriarchal weakness and paternal failure, namely, the inability of Korean men to protect the lives and bodies of their own wives, daughters, and sisters."[39] Ironically, while some Koreans may not want to address the issue of "comfort women" because it serves as a painful reminder of their colonized status, their reluctance to take a political hardline now reveals the lasting traces of colonial power dynamics. By failing to press Japan on this issue, the Korean government is in essence exhibiting the same deferential stance towards Japan as it did when the women were abducted. Therefore, gender dynamics and colonial hierarchies interacted to victimize

[37] Hyun Sook Kim, "History and Memory: The "comfort women" Controversy," *positions* 5, no. 1 (1997): 93.
[38] Stetz and Oh, *Legacies of the Comfort Women of World War II*, xii.
[39] Kim, "History and Memory," 94.

"comfort women" in their initial abduction and continue to influence the way that they are regarded by Korean society.

Former "comfort women" have also been re-victimized by Japan's refusal to take moral, legal, and financial responsibility for its wartime abuses. Prior to the war, the Japanese government participated in treaties that prohibited the very abuses it later promulgated through the comfort system. In "Sexual Slavery and the Comfort Women of World War II," Carmen Argibay identifies treaties that the Japanese government violated, including the trafficking and enslavement of women. Based upon her report, the following table has been constructed as a summary:[40]

Treaty	**Prohibition**
Trafficking Conventions of 1904 and 1910	-criminalized sexual slavery
Hague Convention (1907)	-criminalized the enslavement of citizens or prisoners of war
War Commission Report of World War I (1919)	-criminalized forced prostitution
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children (1921)	-criminalized the trafficking of women
Slavery Convention (1926)	-criminalized slavery
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1929)	-criminalized the physical abuse of prisoners of war
Convention Concerning Forced Labour (1930)	-criminalized the use of compulsory military service for non-military manner

This list of treaties and convention ratifications indicates that concerns about sexual slavery had been in public discourse since the early twentieth century. Well before the war, the Japanese government took a legal stance by criminalizing the behavior that it later instituted through the "comfort women" system. Rather than recognizing that it acted in violation of international laws, the Japanese government attributed these abuses

[40] Argibay, "Sexual Slavery and the Comfort Women of World War II," 380-382.

to private citizens.[41] Additionally, the government asserted that women participated on a voluntary basis, thereby labeling them as willing prostitutes rather than as enslaved victims. This line of defense assaulted the personal honor and integrity of those who survived the system and were desperate to be validated.[42] However, in January 1992, Japanese historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki uncovered military records proving the national government's direct role in constructing comfort stations.[43] Since this discovery, the Japanese government has consistently made apologies to "comfort women," but its overtures are experienced as insincere and perfunctory by them. After former "comfort women" successfully sued the government in 1998, Hiroshima's High Court overturned the conviction, ruling that "abducting the women to use them as forced laborers and sex slaves was not a serious constitutional violation."[44] In 2006 when the U.S. House of Representatives (H. Res 759) attempted to apply international pressure to the Japanese government to accept formal responsibility for its past actions, Japan successfully circumvented this issue.[45] In essence, the response of the Japanese government may be equated to "legal hide and seek."[46]

Japan's reluctance to assume moral and legal responsibility indicates the lasting traces of colonialism, complete with racialized notions of societal worth. Part of its refusal to compensate Korean women stems from the biased manner in which the Japanese government viewed and continues to view Korea. This mentality is further made evident by the fact that Japan has compensated the select few Dutch women taken

[41] Wolfe, *The Politics of Reparations and Apologies*, 246.
[42] Ibid., 248.
[43] Ibid., 249.
[44] Ibid., 253.
[45] Ibid., 260.
[46] Kim-Gibson, *Silence Broken*, 113.

as "comfort women."[47] Soh believes that this compensation is based on a recognition of past sexual abuse as well as a destabilizing of racial hierarchies. She describes the "racial transgression, the sexual abuse of bourgeois 'white' women by 'yellow' men."[48] As a result of this perspective, post war trials only required the Japanese to compensate Dutch victims, reinforcing a racial hierarchy that further degrades Korean "comfort women."[49]

Above all else, the majority of former "comfort women" seek reparations in the form of official acknowledgement and validation for the abuses they endured. This need is evident by the failed efforts of the Asian Women's Fund, an organization that the Japanese government established to channel private money to former "comfort women."[50] Since these funds were presented as charity rather than as a formal apology, most women refused to take the money.[51] Aggravating this situation, many notable politicians, including Japan's former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and former Education Minister Nariaki Nakayama, have denied that elements of coercion existed in the comfort stations.[52] The Japanese government still refuses to issue a consistent apology to these women, which would include full legal and moral responsibility for their mistreatment and financial compensation through government funds. Instead, Japanese leaders appear to be adopting a "biological solution to the 'Comfort Women' problem," hoping these women will die out before the government will be held accountable for its wartime human rights violations.[53] This lack of adequate responsiveness on the part of the Japanese government keeps feelings of abuse alive even decades after the incident occurred, making it hard for these women to recover from their harrowing past. As stated

[47] Soh, *The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan*, 22.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Wolfe, *The Politics of Reparations and Apologies*, 245.
[50] Ibid., 263.
[51] Ibid., 264.
[52] Park, *We Were Sex Slaves of the Japanese Military*, 200.
[53] Stetz and Oh, *Legacies of the Comfort Women of World War II*, 128.

by Dongwoo Lee Hahm, president of the Washington Coalition for Comfort Women Issues, Inc. (WCCW), the Japanese government is "violating them once again-this time for the world to see."[54] For too many women, the invalidating stance of the Japanese government serves as an extension of the trauma that they initially endured.

Many former "comfort women" long for reparations before they die. In fact, many survivors have protested weekly since 1992 outside the Japanese embassy in Seoul.[55] These women are understandably upset with both the Japanese government for the abuses and the Korean government for failing to protect them in the first place and for now failing to represent them legally. Former "comfort woman" Yi Bok-nyo has stated that she is determined to be recognized and respected: "This rage is still so strong that I will not ever be able to rest in peace before the Japanese government apologizes to me personally for their crime committed against me."[56] Many of these women feel that their dignity is held in the balance while Japan withholds an apology and financial reparations.

The invalidation of "comfort women" exemplifies the way in which both Japan and South Korea shape collective memory to fit their own designs. Despite the public testimony of "comfort women" about their experiences, many citizens and government officials in both South Korea and Japan hold firm to a revisionist history and deny the abuse of these women. In fact, textbooks in both countries gloss over the issue of "comfort women," marginalizing them further.[57] Many of Japan's history textbooks depict this nation as the victim of World War II and thereby demonstrate "organized collective amnesia."[58] The drive to expunge historical textbooks of descriptions of "comfort women" illustrates the far-reaching power of the state to shape collective

[54] Schellstede and Yu, *Comfort Women Speak*, vii.
[55] Kim-Gibson, *Silence Broken*, 104.
[56] Schellstede and Yu, *Comfort Women Speak*, 92-93.
[57] Kim, "History and Memory: The "comfort women" Controversy," 89.
[58] Ibid., 78.

memory and to direct the sympathies of citizens. Therefore, the distorted representation in textbooks is yet another way in which Japan has abused "comfort women" and denied them closure. Shaping historical memory and public discourse is a key expression of state power. In fact, Foucault notes: "relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse."[59] In this manner, the exercise of power is constituted in the control of public knowledge, which explains why Japan is so adamant about promoting its hegemonic view of "comfort women" to the exclusion of other perspectives. This limited framework is connected to Japan's former status as a colonizing nation and its self-perception as a global superpower. In *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives*, Ella Shohat states: "an essential feature of colonialism is the distortion and even the denial of the history of the colonized."[60] Therefore, the prevailing and constructed metanarrative about "comfort women" indicates that colonial power structures are still very much alive and influential today, as Japan and South Korea control public discourse around this issue.

The experience of "comfort women" was shaped profoundly by both gender and colonial dynamics, creating a hostile environment ripe for abuse. Due to their sense of ethnic and political superiority, Japanese officials and soldiers abducted, sexually abused, and enslaved Korean women, dehumanizing them and treating them like any other disposable war material. Even now, decades after the initial victimization of "comfort women," the Japanese government refuses to validate the experiences of these survivors, making the recording of their personal stories necessary so that history does not forget the

[59] Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace, *A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power, and the Subject* (New York: NYU Press, 1993), 3.
[60] Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti, and Ella Shohat, *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 44.

degradation they faced. While the initial procurement of these women may be most attributable to colonial dynamics, and the women's social experiences upon returning home may be most determined by gender dynamics, it is important to recognize that Japan's refusal of legal and moral responsibility is grounded in a reprisal of its colonial power. Thus, colonial dynamics continue to control political events, public knowledge, and collective memory with regard to the experience of "comfort women," politicizing this issue to the detriment of the victims.

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Forced Sterilization and the Racial Politics of "Choice"

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After the Second World War, and with increasing frequency in the 1960s and 1970s, sterilization procedures, often coerced or even forced, were performed on hundreds of thousands of women in the United States with increasing frequency in the 1960s and 1970s. These women were, in a majority of cases, African Americans receiving some form of welfare benefits from the government. As the expansion of the federal government's family planning funds coincided with the expansion of welfare rights to people of color, welfare policy became racialized and sexualized, with black women, in particular, portrayed as promiscuous, lazy, and immoral. This racialization and sexualization of welfare both condoned and perpetuated the sterilization of welfare recipients, while ultimately gave rise to the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) in 1967. A national rights group, made up of welfare recipients and primarily African American women, NWRO addressed sterilization and a multitude of other issues women on welfare faced, largely by addressing the circumstances which caused and perpetuated such difficulties.

The women of NWRO attempted to recast the image of the welfare recipient, and to argue against the assumptions that allowed their poor treatment. Recognizing that it was mainly made up of women fighting for their rights, NWRO declared itself inherently a feminist group, and worked tirelessly to prove both to the broader society and to white middle-class feminists that its issues *were* women's issues, and not simply a circumstance of poverty. Tensions characterized the relationship of the NWRO and other women's groups, though, and these largely revolved around the idea of "choice" and the rights that

welfare recipients were due therein. For many welfare rights activists, the practice of involuntary sterilization highlighted the fact that reproductive rights could mean the right *to* a pregnancy just as much as the women's movement fought for the right to terminate one. This tension also extended to NWRO members' stance on issues of motherhood and work, which often contradicted those of the self-proclaimed liberated middle-class feminist movement. Although the NWRO was founded in response to the societal oppression of African American women receiving welfare, it was the very issues which made them identify themselves as a feminist group that divided them from the larger feminist movement.

In exploring this complex, and in many respects, chilling history of forced sterilization, I will address three inter-connected questions. First, how did the growth of the welfare state make forced sterilization of poor black women widely acceptable? Second, to what extent did the National Welfare Rights Organization emerge from the same forces that perpetuated the widespread adoption of these sterilization policies? And, third, how was the NWRO situated in the wider landscape of feminism and how did sterilization complicate those politics? I will argue that the circumstances which perpetuated and condoned coerced sterilization were often the very same ones the National Welfare Rights Organization was founded in response to. Additionally, it was these same circumstances which convinced NWRO to advocate for itself under a feminist mantle, and attempt to prove, through interactions with white feminists, that "choice" for women should be adopted in the broadest sense.

In the decades following the end of the Second World War, millions of African Americans migrated from the southern part of the country to northern cities, largely in

response to the mechanization of the south.[1] Between 1940 and 1960, more than 3 million African Americans relocated, many of whom would become unemployed and turn to welfare for assistance.[2] Around the same time, thanks in large part to the efforts of the Civil Rights Movement, African Americans throughout the country gained access to welfare benefits that had previously been available only to whites. The proportion of African Americans on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) increased from 31% in 1950 to 48% in 1961, and the federal government shifted their attention from how much welfare people were receiving to *who* was receiving it.[3] African Americans' increased access to welfare also coincided with the federal government's increased comfort supporting sterilization policies and the allocation of federal funds to family planning.[4] Thus the ostensible benefit of access to welfare also meant exposure to sterilization as a function of the institutions from which African Americans had previously been excluded. In her book *Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty,* Dorothy Roberts points out that "the demise of Jim Crow had ironically opened the doors of state institutions to Blacks, who took the place of poor whites as the main target of the eugenicist's scalpel."[5] The rationalization of sterilization in the guise of family planning reflected the racialization and sexualization of welfare that occurred as a result of African American women's increased participation in the program.

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[1] Premilla Nadasen, "From Widow to 'Welfare Queen': Welfare and the Politics of Race," *Black Women, Gender + Families* 1, no. 2 (2007): 56, accessed November 20, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406.
[2] *Ibid*, 57.
[3] Premilla Nadasen, "Expanding the Boundaries of the Women's Movement: Black Feminism and the Struggle for Welfare Rights," *Feminist Studies* 28, no. 2 (2002): 275, accessed November 20, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3178742.
[4] Randall Hansen and Desmond King, *Sterilized by the State: Eugenics, Race, and the Population Scare in Twentieth-Century North America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 237.
[5] Dorothy Roberts, *Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty* (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 89.

The growing numbers of African American women on welfare led both to an increased scrutiny of welfare recipients and policies, and to the politics of welfare being defined largely in terms of race and gender.[6] As more black women signed up for welfare in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the AFDC began to enforce harsher and more unfair practices.[7] Suddenly, "recipients had to prove the soundness of their character, their destitution, and increasingly, their willingness but inability to work."[8] Such stringent policies were much of what the National Welfare Rights Organization responded to in its founding. Dissatisfied welfare recipients originally came together in small groups earlier in the 1960s, and these coalesced in 1967 to form the first national body representing AFDC recipients.[9] The group would reach its peak in 1968 with 30,000 members, all welfare recipients and largely women.[10] Formed to protest and alter welfare policies and the implications such policies had for black women and their families, the NWRO would not only address sterilization, but the circumstances that allowed society to condone and perpetuate such a practice.

More than the actual increase in reliance on welfare, it was the representation of black women that led to both sterilization policies and much of NWRO's work. The idea of black women on welfare soon became synonymous with promiscuity and laziness, and they were often "characterized as not wanting to work, unable to properly raise their children, and engaging in deviant sexual and family behaviors."[11] Such perceptions were only worsened by the stereotype of the "black matriarchy," put forth during this time by politicians, which asserted that black communities were organized along matriarchal

[6] Nadasen, "From Widow to 'Welfare Queen,'" 53.
[7] Nadasen, "Expanding the Boundaries of the Women's Movement," 275.
[8] Nadasen, "From Widow to 'Welfare Queen,'" 60.
[9] Nadasen, "Expanding the Boundaries of the Women's Movement," 275-276.
[10] *Ibid*, 276.
[11] Nadasen, "From Widow to 'Welfare Queen,'" 58-59.

lines, and that such female ascendency had led to the "psychological castration of the black male."[12] This was popularized and legitimized by the release of Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan's report in 1965, entitled "The Negro Family: The Case for National Action," which cited the crumbling of the black family as the fault of its matriarch, preventing black men from becoming breadwinners, and therefore preventing family stability in African American communities.[13] The report was in obvious contradiction to the reality of these women's status and was "replete with historical and semantic inaccuracies."[14] However false it may have been, it had a huge impact on welfare policy, shifting the debate about poverty from structure and economics to culture and values.[15] Endowing "poor Black women—the most subordinated members of society—with the power of a matriarch" was particularly damaging for those black women receiving welfare.[16]

It was precisely this multidimensional, albeit largely racist and sexist, image of the black woman that the National Welfare Rights Organization attempted to recast. In an effort both to legitimize the aid they received and to restructure the system that provided it, the group worked to refashion the portrayal of welfare recipients as worthy mothers engaged in socially significant work. Johnnie Tillmon, a single mother of six who turned to welfare after falling victim to several chronic illnesses, became the president of the group in 1973, and wanted desperately to let people know "that welfare did not pay an adequate income, that most women on welfare did not have children just to get a bigger check, [and] that welfare recipients wanted job training so they could make a living

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[12] Robert Staples, "The Myth of the Black Matriarchy," *The Black Scholar* 12, no.6 (1981): 26, accessed November 20, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41066853.
[13] *Ibid*, 30.; Nadasen, "From Widow to 'Welfare Queen,'" 59.
[14] Staples, "The Myth of the Black Matriarchy," 26.
[15] Nadasen, "From Widow to 'Welfare Queen,'" 59.
[16] Roberts, *Killing the Black Body*, 16.

wage."[17] NWRO worked tirelessly to change the perception of black women receiving welfare and to redress the damaging effects such perceptions led to, one of which was sterilization.

Stereotypes of black women as lazy, harmful, and deviant often allowed state and federal governments to condone their sterilization, in an effort to limit the amount of state assistance they received. By 1970, black women were being sterilized at over twice the rate of white women, and many of them were reliant on welfare, including federally subsidized clinics for their health care.[18] In establishing the qualifications for sterilization, it was no mistake that "sexual behavior, race, and class background constituted major factors in the identification of the so-called feebleminded."[19] In fact, an inability to hold a job and a history of welfare was in and of itself enough to warrant sterilization.[20] The underlying argument was that children trapped women and families deeper in poverty, which had various negative effects on both the women and on society itself.[21] In a piece on abortion written in 1970, Shirley Chisholm argued that in fact "the poor [were] more anxious about family planning than any other group," but as a result of their poverty, severely lacked the resources and knowledge to make good decisions.[22] For poor women of color, sometimes sterilization was the only option offered, as access to

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[17] Stephen Tuck, "'We Are Taking up Where the Movement of the 60s Left Off': The Proliferation and Power of African American Protest during the 1970s," *Journal of Contemporary History* 43, no. 4 (2008): 647, accessed November 21, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40543227.; Deborah Gray White, *Too Heavy a Load: Black Women in Defense of Themselves, 1894-1994* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 224-225.
[18] Jennifer Nelson, *Women of Color and the Reproductive Rights Movement* (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 67.
[19] Johanna Schoen, *Choice and Coercion: Birth Control, Sterilization, and Abortion in Public Health and Welfare* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 76.
[20] *Ibid*, 91.
[21] Robert Self, *All in the Family: The Realignment of American Democracy Since the 1960s* (London: Macmillan Publishers, 2012), 148.
[22] Shirley Chisholm, "Facing the Abortion Question," in *Words of Fire: An Anthology of African American Feminist Thought*, ed. Beverly Guy-Shefthall (New York: The New Press, 1995), 391.

contraceptives and abortions was much less widespread.[23] This procedure, into which women were frequently coerced without a full explanation of the consequences, would not have been necessary if these other options had been available. In fact, "blacks in disproportionate numbers enthusiastically used the few birth control clinics across the country that were available to them," often even more than their white counterparts.[24] It was welfare's racist and sexist tendencies, when combined with its focus on sterilization as a primary form of contraception, that made poor black women so vulnerable to the procedure. It should also be noted that African American women were not the only victims of coerced sterilization. Physicians all over the country pressured Native American, Mexican, and Puerto Rican women into consenting to sterilization, often exploiting their poor English language skills.[25] However, black women comprised the majority of the victims of these policies in the Continental U.S.

Sterilization of black women, which did occur all over the country, was particularly prevalent in the South. In the 1960s and 1970s, many southern states tried to implement some sort of punitive action for welfare recipients, including sterilization, the loss of welfare benefits, the loss of custody of children, the fining or imprisonment of the mother, and various combinations of the above options.[26] These punishments were often distributed on a case-by-case and state-by-state basis, leading to the sort of obsessive oversight against which NWRO protested. Though the legislative implementation of such rules(and specifically attempts at sterilization), occurred in many states, two of the most notable were Mississippi and North Carolina.

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[23] Loretta Ross, "African American Women and Abortion," in *Abortion Wars: A Half Century of Struggle*, *1950-2000,* ed. Rickie Solinger (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 171.
[24] Roberts, *Killing the Black Body*, 81.; Ross, "African American Women and Abortion," 161.
[25] Hansen and King, *Sterilized by the State*, 254.
[26] Julius Paul, "The Return of Punitive Sterilization Proposals: Current Attacks on Legitimacy and the AFDC Program," *Law & Society Review* 3, no. 1 (1968): 78, accessed November 22, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3052796.

In terms of sterilization legislation, Mississippi was described as "the most persistent state in the nation in its efforts to 'solve' the problem of illegitimacy through punitive sterilization."[27] In fact, the procedure was so common that it "became known colloquially as a Mississippi appendectomy."[28] The Mississippi state government considered a number of legislative proposals on the topic, the most contentious of which was House Bill No. 180, introduced in 1964. This bill would have made it a felony for any person to become the parent of a second illegitimate child within the state.[29] Though it originally proposed that punishment for the act be three years in prison, the bill was amended to allow those being charged to opt out of serving time by being sterilized.[30] However, under heavy national pressure, the senate backed down, the sterilization clause was removed and the penalties were greatly reduced.[31] The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), one of the main civil rights organizations at the time, condemned the amendment in a pamphlet entitled "Genocide in Mississippi." In this, they argued that the sterilization clause was "an attempt to reduce the number of Negroes in Mississippi either by destroying their capacity to reproduce, or by driving them from the state."[32] Though this individual amendment did not pass, the debate about House Bill No. 180 exemplified what poor black women were up against in certain states, particularly in the South.

North Carolina was another state that took an increasingly aggressive approach to sterilization. Deemed "the state which appears to be the most thorough and most determined in its pursuit of sterilization," North Carolina actually intensified its program

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[27] *Ibid*, 89.
[28] Self, *All in the Family,* 149-150.
[29] Paul, "The Return of Punitive Sterilization Proposals," 89-90.
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] *Ibid*, 90.
[32] Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, "Genocide in Mississippi," 1964.

in the two decades following the end of the Second World War.[33] In an attempt to pass a similar law to the one in Mississippi, North Carolina proposed that "giving birth to a second or subsequent illegitimate child would be grounds for a hearing before the State Eugenics Board, which could order sterilization."[34] Though this law also didn't pass, North Carolina, unlike other states, explicitly and directly linked its sterilization program to welfare, bringing in questions of race and moral legitimacy. An *Ebony* article in 1973 highlights how "one doesn't need to know too much about involuntary sterilization in North Carolina to detect that racism is involved—and beyond mere racism, some unspeakable wish to control black population growth by force."[35]

It was this larger oppression directly connected to the experience of black female welfare recipients that caused NWRO to form and identify itself as a distinctly feminist organization. The experience of two families affected by coerced sterilization would shape the NWRO's approach to the problem, increase the public's exposure to it, and demand a response from the feminist movement.

Nial Ruth Cox was an eighteen-year-old unwed mother when she was coerced into sterilization in North Carolina. After the birth of her first child, a clinic worker explained to Cox that if she declined the sterilization, she risked losing the welfare benefits that not only supported her, but also her mother and 10 siblings.[36] In a description of this experience, Johanna Schoen explains in *Choice and Coercion: Birth Control, Sterilization, and Abortion in Public Health and Welfare* that "it was Nial's nonmarital pregnancy and her mother's welfare dependency rather than Nial's intellectual

[33] Jack Slater, "Sterilization: Newest Threat to the Poor," *Ebony*, October, 1973, 152.; Hansen and King, *Sterilized by the State*, 241.
[34] Paul, "The Return of Punitive Sterilization Proposals," 92.
[35] Slater, "Sterilization," 162.
[36] Nelson, *Women of Color and the Reproductive Rights Movement*, 72.

capacities that earned her the label of 'feebleminded'."[37] Cox's doctors also told her that the sterilization would "wear off."[38] After agreeing to the procedure in an effort to keep her family on welfare, Cox attempted to get pregnant again later in her life, only to discover the doctors' lie. In an article, Cox spoke out about her experience and the consequences it had on her self-esteem and self-worth. After learning she could no longer have children, Cox explained that she felt "like half a woman. No man wants half a woman. A man is going to look for someone who can give him a child. I don't even look anymore."[39] Cox's heart wrenching statement echoes one by Johnnie Tillmon in an article she wrote for *Ms. Magazine* in 1972. In articulating her position in society, Tillmon wrote, "I'm a woman. I'm a black woman. I'm a poor woman. I'm a fat woman. I'm a middle-aged woman. And I'm on welfare. In this country, if you're any one of those things you count less as a human being. If you're all those things, you don't count at all. Except as a statistic."[40] Both of these statements highlight the experience and identity of welfare recipients as both women and African Americans, and their struggle to gain recognition as victims, in society at first, and then later within the larger feminist movement.

In June of 1973, the sterilization of two teenage sisters, Minnie and Mary Alice Relf, in Montgomery, Alabama brought national attention to the full plight of welfare recipients and their exposure to the procedure. In this case, family planning nurses from Montgomery Community Action Committee paid a visit to the sisters, whose parents were welfare recipients. At the time, the girls' father, Lonnie Relf, a former field hand

[37] Schoen, *Choice and Coercion*, 76.
[38] Roberts, *Killing the Black Body*, 93.
[39] Slater, "Sterilization," 151.
[40] Johnnie Tillmon, "Welfare is a Women's Issue," *Ms. Magazine*, 1972.

who had lost the ability to work because of an auto accident, was not home.[41] The family lived on food stamps, $25-a-month public housing, and $156 a month in welfare checks.[42] Family planning nurses told Mrs. Relf that her daughters needed some shots and asked to take them to the hospital. The girls, who had received birth control shots, called Depo-Provera, previously, did not argue. Mrs. Relf drew an "X" on a form, which she could neither read nor sign her name to, and later said that she had been unaware of the sterilizations, though the nurses claimed to have explained it.[43] Fourteen-year-old Minnie and twelve-year-old Mary Alice were taken to the hospital, kept overnight, and had their fallopian tubes cut.[44]

In an *Ebony* article, the incident is described as "two young black girls were wheeled into a hospital operating room and rendered sexually sterile by tubal ligation because, somewhere in their neighborhood, somewhere on their block, so the authorities said, 'boys were hanging around'."[45] The coerced sterilization led to the filing of a lawsuit on behalf of the Relf family, in which the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) sued the clinic that performed the procedure in *Relf v. Weinberger*.[46] The lawsuit, which charged that this occurred (at least partly), because the girls were African American, also drew much attention to the fact that the younger Relf girl, Mary Alice, was mentally handicapped.[47] In a statement by the SPLC, the family's lawyer noted, "sterilization of

[41] Hansen and King, *Sterilized by the State*, 248.
[42] B. Drummond Ayres Jr., "Sterilizing the Poor: Exploring Motives and Methods," *The New York Times*, July 8, 1973.
[43] Hansen and King, *Sterilized by the State*, 248-249.
[44] *Ibid*.
[45] Slater, "Sterilization," 150.
[46] Hansen and King, *Sterilized by the State*, 248-249.
[47] Ayres, "Sterilizing the Poor."; B. Drummond Ayres Jr., "Racism, Ethics and Rights at Issue in Sterilization Case," *The New York Times*, July 2, 1973.

the retarded had its precedent in Nazi Germany. This whole thing is a horrendous attack on privacy, innocence and the right of motherhood."[48]

This comparison to the Nazi regime proved apt. In his 1974 decision, Judge Gerhard Gesell ruled that the use of federal funds for involuntary or coerced sterilizations was no longer allowed, and concluded that annually, under federally funded programs, "between 100,000 and 150,000 women, most of them poor and/or African American adults, were sterilized without giving their informed consent."[49] This number was actually very comparable to the results of the Nazi sterilization program in the 1930s.[50] However, Judge Gesell's decision could do nothing to reverse the situation of the Reif girls. When asked by reporters after the operation if she wanted to have children, Minnie Relf responded that yes she did, "a little girl."[51]

This case gained national attention, and brought to the forefront more questions about welfare, race, and the rights of such victims. In a piece on the incident, *The New York Times* described how the sterilization "not only raised old questions about racism and government involvement in the population fight, but also raised new questions about constitutional rights, medical ethics and welfare theories."[52] While *Relf v. Weinberger* "exposed the astounding extent of sterilization abuse," it also explicitly connected such activity to welfare recipients, and even garnered attention from the feminist groups at the time.[53] Following the decision of the case, the National Organization for Women began to support the end to forced sterilizations, and Gloria Steinem is quoted as saying "the sterilization issue affects all of us…but especially women, and especially minority

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[48] *Ibid*.
[49] Hansen and King, *Sterilized by the State,* 249.
[50] Roberts, *Killing the Black Body,* 93.
[51] Ayres, "Sterilizing the Poor."
[52] *Ibid*.
[53] Roberts, *Killing the Black Body*, 93.

women."[54] Although the publicity surrounding the Relf sisters put sterilization on the radar of a women's movement fighting for reproductive rights, cooperation between the women's movement and the National Welfare Rights Organization would prove largely ineffectual.

The individual experiences of women like Nial Ruth Cox, Johnnie Tillmon, and the Relf sisters represented the larger struggles of African American women on welfare, and the often dire consequences of that aid; it was this impact on women that led NWRO to declare itself a feminist organization, briefly attempting to join forces with the already-existing women's movement. This was simply an instance in a much longer history, where African-American women had fought for decades to demonstrate connections between race, class, and gender discrimination and injustice.[55] In an examination of the Black Movement and Women's Liberation, it was noted that "we do not live in a democracy, but a complex hierarchy in which race, sex and class are all factors determining status and power."[56] Black women often suffered from a society that was both sexist and racist (not to mention the class discrimination the members of NWRO faced), and articulated their double, and sometimes triple, oppression to their white feminist counterparts.[57] In this particular instance, however, the African American women of NWRO used the demand for welfare rights as a vehicle to address and change feminist theory and action, appealing to the other women's movements as mothers, workers, political activists, sexual partners, and women.[58]

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[54] Slater, "Sterilization," 152.
[55] Nadasen, "Expanding the Boundaries of the Women's Movement," 271.
[56] "The Black Movement and Women's Liberation," *The Black Scholar* 4 no. 6/7 (1973): 1, accessed November 19, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41163790.
[57] Cathy Sedwick and Reba Williams, "Black Women and the Equal Rights Amendment," *The Black Scholar* 7, no. 10 (1976): 24, accessed November 16, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41065957.
[58] Nadasen, "Expanding the Boundaries of the Women's Movement," 272-274.

Tillmon in particular worked hard to convince other women's groups that NWRO was addressing women's issues as well as welfare issues. In her effort to do so, Tillmon linked the sexism of the household directly to the sexism of welfare, claiming it was "like a super-sexist marriage. You trade in a man for the man. But you can't divorce him if he treats you bad. He can divorce you, of course, cut you off anytime he wants…you give up control of your own body. It's a condition of aid. You may even have to agree to get your tubes tied so you can never have more children just to avoid being cut off welfare."[59] In the same article, Tillmon notes that "as far as I'm concerned, the ladies of N.W.R.O. are the front-line troops of women's freedom. Both because we have so few illusions and because our issues are so important to all women—the right to a living wage for women's work, the right to life itself."[60] It was Tillmon's association of the politics of welfare with the sexist politics of the home and society (among other characteristics), which led her to advocate for welfare as a women's issue.

After women officially took control of the National Welfare Rights Organization in 1972, the group took more proactive measures on the topic of forced sterilization of women of color, attempting to connect this to the ongoing fight for reproductive rights, which was dominating the other feminist organizations' agendas. However, many black women argued that white feminists needed to "forge an inclusive reproductive rights agenda that synthesized anti-poverty politics, welfare rights, and access to reproductive and basic health care if they wanted to include women of color in their movement."[61] Among other things, black female activists criticized the narrow focus on abortion in regards to reproductive rights, and felt that "the systematic, institutionalized denial of reproductive freedom [which] has uniquely marked Black women's history" was little

[59] Tillmon, "Welfare is a Women's Issue."
[60] *Ibid*.
[61] Nelson, *Women of Color and the Reproductive Rights Movement*, 57.

acknowledged.[62] Furthermore, the feminist focus on men and the role of gender as the source of reproductive repression ignored the "importance of racism in shaping our understanding of reproductive liberty and the degree of 'choice' that women really have."[63] This issue of "choice" would be the core of what the NWRO and other feminist groups would disagree on, with coerced sterilization playing a large role in that.

For instance, for many of the welfare recipients subject to coerced sterilization in order to maintain federal aid, reproductive liberty meant the ability to have a pregnancy as much as the right to terminate one.[64] Welfare rights activists employed the rhetoric of choice in a distinctly different way from the other feminists—they "demanded the right to choose to be mothers or enter the world of work outside the home; to date and have intimate relationships or to remain single; to have a child or not."[65] Many of these basic requests in reference to choice went against the core platforms the larger women's movement was advocating.

The first issue that brought the two movements into conflict was the topic of motherhood. As noted above, the women of NWRO believed that "every woman had an inalienable right to bear children or limit her childbearing if she chose to do so," regardless of economic status.[66] Welfare rights activists argued for the need to support women's roles as mothers, inherently clashing with other feminists' views of motherhood as a source of oppression.[67] The NWRO also wanted motherhood to be valued properly, recognized as work, and even compensated; this contrasted with the priorities of other organized feminists fighting for the Equal Rights Amendment, which focused largely on

[62] Roberts, *Killing the Black Body*, 4.
[63] *Ibid*, 5.
[64] Self, *All in the Family*, 148.
[65] Nadasen, "Expanding the Boundaries of the Women's Movement," 277.
[66] Nelson, *Women of Color and the Reproductive Rights Movement*, 70.
[67] Nadasen, "Expanding the Boundaries of the Women's Movement," 278.

equal rights outside the home, at the same time.[68] While the latter demanded the right to be recognized as unequivocally equal to men, welfare rights activists "insisted on their right to the resources necessary to mother."[69] This contradiction began with the simple idea of "choice" in reproductive liberty, and would expand to the role of a mother and motherhood in society, reaching to the idea of work's influence on women's lives.

The women of the NWRO also questioned the feminist assertions that employment would lead to women's liberation; again, this reflected divergent perspectives on the concept of "choice." The feminist idea that work would lead to redemption ignored the fact that forcing low-income women (many of whom were already in the labor market), to work was to ignore the socioeconomic circumstances in which such women would likely have trouble earning enough to support their families.[70] In this way, NWRO members were caught between feminism and society, as they resisted the "liberal feminist paradigm that employment meant freedom," but also did not accept the "male breadwinner ideal or trade union definitions of them as outside the laboring class."[71] This resulted in one of the NWRO's conditions demanding a livable minimum wage, but it also complicated the already existing feminist definitions of what liberated women were and what they should want.

Perhaps the most poignant contrast between the women's movement and members of the NWRO relates to the act of sterilization itself, and again, the role choice played in that procedure. As feminists demanded more rights to be able to make their

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[68] *Ibid*, 278-279.
[69] Eileen Boris, "When Work is Slavery," *Social Justice* 25, no. 1 (1998): 37, accessed November 22, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/29767057.
[70] Guida West, "Women in the Welfare Rights Movement: Reform or Revolution?," *Dialectical Anthropology* 15, no. 2/3 (1990): 147-148, accessed November 22, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/29790344.; Nadasen, "Expanding the Boundaries of the Women's Movement," 284.
[71] Boris, "When Work is Slavery," 35.

own reproductive decisions, some white women became pro-sterilization, presuming that it was voluntary.[72] This was in response to the fact that it was, in a painfully ironic twist, nearly impossible for white women to find a doctor who would sterilize them.[73] For instance, many physicians applied something called the "120 rule," which meant that if a woman's age, when multiplied by the number of children she had, totaled 120 or more, she was a candidate.[74] Even then, the woman had to receive the consent of two doctors and a psychiatrist.[75] As a result, some white reproductive activists were arguing for voluntary sterilization. The contradiction between this trend in the white feminist movement and the experiences of African Americans and other women of color caused even more tensions and further weakened cooperation between the movements.

Although both the white and middle-class women's movement and the poor women of the National Welfare Rights Organization had similarities in their feminist goals and approaches, class and racial tensions eroded any alliances they may have had.[76] It was not that the feminist movement was largely racist or classist, but rather that such differences "exacerbated tensions over strategies and issues, even as recognition mounted that welfare was in fact a women's issue."[77] It was their divergent views on work, family, independence, and I would argue, choice, that led to their unsuccessful attempt at cooperation. Opposition to practices that linked reproduction to the provision of welfare benefits, which resulted in the sterilization of hundreds of thousands of poor black women, lay at the heart of the NWRO's agenda. While this was explicitly – and indeed by its very definition – a feminist agenda, it also recognized the intersection of race,

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[72] Nelson, *Women of Color and the Reproductive Rights Movement,* 75-76.
[73] Roberts, *Killing the Black Body*, 95.
[74] *Ibid*.
[75] *Ibid*.
[76] West, "Women in the Welfare Rights Movement," 143.
[77] *Ibid*, 148.

class, and gender. Recall Johnnie Tillmon's description of herself as disadvantaged on multiple fronts: "I'm a woman. I'm a black woman. I'm a poor woman…In this country, if you're any one of those things, you count less as a human being. If you're all those things, you don't count at all."[78] The experience of welfare recipients who were coerced into sterilization is tragic in many ways, not the least of which is that their identity as women was in some sense overshadowed by the fact that they were black and poor. This ultimately undermined the ability of the NWRO to connect its concerns to those of the larger women's movement. It also, perhaps, demonstrates a failure on the part of the women's movement to "count" such welfare recipients, and instead perpetuate their multidimensional discrimination.

[78] Tillmon, "Welfare is a Women's Issue," *Ms. Magazine.*

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21st Century Maoists: Leftist Militancy and the Politics of Anachronism in Postcolonial South Asia

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When Maoist insurgents attacked Indian government troops in the Bastar district of Chhattisgarh on April 11th 2015, many publications—from *The Times of India* to *Economic and Political Weekly*—reported on the events with a palpable sense of exasperation. How is it, the journalists asked, that India's Maoists—referred to colloquially as Naxalites—managed to garner support in light of recent state efforts to improve the living conditions of people in the area? In order to begin answering this question, I posit that the emergence and endurance of Naxalism must be placed within the longer trajectory of attempts made by the postcolonial state to extend its authority into rural areas by incorporating them into its system of economic and political administration. While the effects of these efforts vary according to specific contexts, it seems that, in many cases, the strengthening of state authority in particular areas has exposed poor locals—be they Mundas or Dalits—to new forms of exploitation and subordination.

This paper will examine the spread of Naxalism in light of the divergence between the Indian state's normative commitment to fostering democracy and the results of its pursuit of economic growth through liberalization. In evaluating the implications of Maoist insurgency for the rest of India, this essay will discuss the relationship between Naxalites and the communities from which they emerge, focusing primarily on the conditions of possibility that make insurgent activity thinkable in the first place. Finally, further exploration into the possibilities and limitations Maoist insurgency will ask how

this type of politics can be understood in a historical moment characterized more by the Washington Consensus than by the proliferation of viable alternatives to global capitalism.

History and Origins of Maoist Insurgency

The humble beginnings of India's Maoist insurgency are generally traced to the small village of Naxalbari in the state of West Bengal. During the spring of 1967, peasants organized by the militant wing of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), "staged a violent uprising in which peasants attacked local landlords, forcibly occupied land, burnt records, and cancelled old debts."[1] Following the initial outbreak of violence, state forces responded with repression until, by September, the majority of the movement's leaders had been captured and imprisoned.[2] Within a year, however, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) emerged as an offshoot of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), continuing agitation and organizational efforts in West Bengal in the absence of the movement's original leaders. This time, massive police intervention, along with the lack of support from the CPI-M, resulted in the unified movement's effective dissolution by 1972.[3] In the decades since the repression of the initial movement, the word "Naxalite" has come to function as an umbrella term for the various Maoist insurgent groups that have proliferated in places like Jharkand, Bihar, and Andhra Pradesh, among others. In May of 2009, the Indian government declared Maoists to be terrorists against whom extra-legal measures can be rightfully taken, as well as added

[1] Alpa Shah and Judith Pettigrew, "Windows into a Revolution: Ethnographies of Maoism in South Asia," *Dialectical Anthropology* 33.3-4 (2009): 225-51, 230.
[2] Ajay K. Mehra, "Naxalism in India: Revolution or Terror?" *Terrorism and Political Violence 12.2* (2000): 37-66, 46.
[3] Ajay K. Mehra,, "Naxalism in India," 47.

100,000 troops to existing police and paramilitary forces to quell insurrection in Chhattisgarh, Jharkand, and West Bengal.[4]

While peasant actions of the type seen in Naxalbari have been well documented within particular strains of Indian historiography, the Naxalite uprisings are notable for their explicit incorporation of Maoist principles and tactics.[5] Rather than being merely "pre-political" peasant insurgencies, the origins of Naxalism are implicated in a variety of theoretical debates within the Indian Left, more generally. The initial divergence of the CPI-M and the CPI-ML was the result of a variety of complicated developments, but the issue of whether or not to participate in parliamentary elections precipitated the split in 1967. West Bengali intellectuals like Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal, influenced as they were by the ongoing Cultural Revolution in China, rejected the CPI-M's successes in parliamentary elections and unequivocally advocated an armed struggle initiated by the rural peasantry.[6] These convictions eventually led people like Majumdar to found the CPI-ML in the first place. By locating the basis for peasant insurgency in the theoretical contributions of Mao, the CPI-ML laid the groundwork for armed struggle in India for the ensuing decades—whether or not the descendants of the original Naxalites remain faithful to these principles, however, is another question entirely.

Equally central to the initial debates surrounding Naxalism was the question of whether India's economy should be understood as "capitalist" or "semi-feudal." The furor surrounding this so-called "agrarian question," was rooted in the implications that its answer would have for determining the appropriate modality of conducting class struggle—in other words, would peasants or proletarians be the revolutionary subject of

[4] Shah and Pettigrew, "Windows into a Revolution," 232.
[5] Ranajit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (Delhi: Oxford, 1983).
[6] Shah and Pettigrew, "Windows into a Revolution," 230.

India's history?[7] In recent decades, this question has only grown more difficult to answer, given the coexistence of rapid urbanization and rural impoverishment throughout the country. It is referred to by Akhil Gupta as "the anemic results of Nehruvian economic policies that muddled along not knowing whether the nation-state was capitalist or socialist."[8] While scholarly debates in the 1970s and 1980s seemed to come to the conclusion that India's economy should be understood as "capitalist," Naxalite tactics have, according to Alpa Shah, remained rooted in the assumption that any capitalist development in the countryside cannot be separated from the "semi-feudal base" upon which it is founded.[9] The political implications of this assertion will be explored below.

In its early days, the Naxalite movement was thoroughly enmeshed in debates within the Indian Left about everything, from revolutionary strategy to methods of mass mobilization. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, these discussions about the proper characterization of Indian agriculture and society were of vital importance since they addressed the political implications of the nascent Naxalite movement.[10] Despite the fact that the state considers the recently formed Communist Party of India (Maoist) to be the country's "gravest security threat," its ranks stand splintered and divided by decades of in-fighting and successes of the state's immense counter-insurgency efforts. Given this context, this essay will examine the curious staying power of Maoism in India. While state reports of Naxalite strength are almost certainly exaggerated, it cannot be denied that, in many areas, Maoists have managed to consolidate control and "mimic state

[7] Alpa Shah, "The Agrarian Question in a Maoist Guerilla Zone: Land, Labor, and Capital in the Forests and Hills of Jharkhand, India," *Journal of Agrarian Change* 13.3 (2013): 424-50, 427.
[8] Akhil Gupta, *Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in India* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 4.
[9] Shah, "The Agrarian Question," 427.
[10] Shah, "The Agrarian Question," 425.

practices of governmentality", with surprising degrees of success.[11] In order to explain the peculiar endurance of Naxalism, I will evaluate several theoretical frameworks for illuminating the processes through which one chooses to become a Maoist insurgent, in light of unfolding social and political developments that circumscribe individual agency.

Symbolic Dimensions of Becoming a Naxalite

In his landmark study of peasant insurgency, Ranajit Guha[12] observes that the political character of rural insurrection in India resides in its recognition of its enemy—namely, the alliance between the landlord, the moneylender, and the state official. For Guha, this recognition not only invalidates Marxist elitism toward peasant insurgency, but it also describes the conditions of possibility that enables one to take up arms against oppressors, whether state officials or landlords. Guha's analytical framework, with its emphasis on examining the ways in which peasant insurgency contests the symbolic order that "sacralizes" subjugation[13], illuminates the mobilizing impact of witnessing one's oppressors rendered powerless. In other words, witnessing the overturning of the dominant symbolic order allows the possibility of resistance to seep into the political imagination, given that the veneer of "naturalness" has been stripped from the conditions of oppression. It is at this crucial juncture—in the liminal space between received knowledge and possible futures—where new political subjects are formed.

Guha's analytical emphasis on the symbolic dimensions of peasant insurgency allows us to interrogate further the process through which involvement in Maoist insurgency becomes thinkable. After all, becoming a Naxalite represents nothing less

[11] Nandini Sundar, "Mimetic Sovereignties, Precarious Citizenship: State Effects in a Looking-Glass World," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 41.4 (2014): 469-90, 471.
[12] Ranajit Guha, *Elementary Aspects,* 36.
[13] Ibid., 36.

than "the idea of a total break with the past for the creation of the utopian future in the present."[14] Just as, in Guha's formulation, the overturning of the dominant symbolic order reveals the correlative possibility of overturning a particular form of economic relations, Shah demonstrates the thematic similarities between the figure of the Hindu renouncer on the one hand, and a representation of the ideal Naxalite on the other.[15] The ideal Maoist insurgent makes use of a preexisting social form (that of the Hindu renouncer), at the same time as he imbues it with new meaning, turning the lone ascetic's sacred quest into a collective political project. In adjusting the meaning of a particular signifier, the ideal Naxalite manages to incorporate her political aims into the semantic field that she shares with potential recruits, thus laying the groundwork for others to join her in resisting the encroachments of the Indian state.

In much the same way, Nandini Sundar's discussion of "mimetic sovereignties" illuminates the symbolic dimensions of the conflict between the Naxalites and the Indian state, as each side competes with the other to demonstrate its legitimacy through the performance of its authority.[16] Instead of demonstrating the sort "negative consciousness"[17] that Guha attributes to pre-Independence peasant insurgents, the Naxalites described by Sundar not only define themselves against state authority, they also posit an alternative symbolic order based upon their own principles, evidence of a productive consciousness if ever there was any. From creating monuments for fallen insurgents to institutionalizing the celebration of International Women's Day and Martyrs Week,[18] the Naxalites govern their territories with just as much concern for creating a

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[14] Alpa Shah, "The Muck of the Past: Revolution, Social Transformation, and Maoists in India," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 20(2014):344.
[15] Shah, "Muck of the Past," 343.
[16] Sundar, "Mimetic Sovereignties," 475.
[17] Guha, *Elementary Aspects*, 30.
[18] Sundar, "Mimetic Sovereignties," 476.

particular type of "imagined community"[19] as any recognized nation-state. Rather than merely overturning the symbolic order rooted in the power of the Indian state, the Naxalites create an alternative order based on the principle of egalitarianism. As Sundar's piece demonstrates, the conflict between the Naxalites and the Indian state is not reserved for the battlefield. Instead, it is carried over into the realm of the quotidian, where everyday realities must be reconfigured according to the imperatives of enabling a utopian future.

Despite the fact that, according to some, "as the [Naxalite] movement exists today, it cannot take on the Indian state,"[20] the insurgency seems to have considerable staying power. After all, it survived a discontinuous war with the government lasting more than three decades. Given the difficulties of life as a Naxalite, the details of which are catalogued nicely by Arundati Roy,[21] it seems hard to imagine that the Maoist insurgencies are still able to draw recruits. Yet, according to the headlines that seem to perpetually describe attacks on government troops and police forces, it seems that recruits may not be so hard for the organizations to come by. As previously stated, the strength of the Naxalite movement in India lies in its ability to involve peasants in its utopian political project. According to this interpretation, marginalized peasants and tribals are more than willing to risk their lives for the opportunity to exercise agency and participate in the creation of a new symbolic order. Once Indian peasants become familiar with their own "glorious tradition of heroism,"[22] it seems that neither the fruits of development projects nor the horrors of police repression will be able to placate them. In the next section, this essay continues to examine Naxalism through its relationship to the Indian

[19] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1982).
[20] Mehra, Ajay K., "Naxalism in India," 64.
[21] Arundhati Roy, "Walking with the Comrades," *Outlook India*, March 29, 2011.
[22] Majumdar, Charu, "Char Majumdar," *Charu Majumdar.* Marxists Internet Archive. Accessed 2015.

political economy, paying special attention to the dialectical relationship between expanding state administrative capacities and Maoist resistance.

From Peasants to Tribals

After facing decades of defeat at the hands of state forces in the aftermath of the Naxalbari uprisings, India's Maoist insurgency found itself fragmented and factionalized during the 1980s. Pushed from their initial strongholds in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal, the Maoist groups had retreated into "the dark underbelly of the tribal heartlands" of central and eastern India by the beginning of the 1990s.[23] Far from the Zamindari-dominated plains of Bihar, the Naxalites would be forced to adapt their tactics to their new milieu. In the forests of places like Jharkand and Chhattisgarh, the Naxalites encountered members of India's Scheduled Tribes who "are essentially considered squatters on state land and have no legal claims to it."[24] The situation of tribals in India is, in many ways, even more precarious than that of the Southeast Asian peasants famously depicted by James Scott. In other words, while the peasant could abide by a "safety-first principle…[and] devise a wide array of social arrangements typically operated to assure a minimum income,"[25] the position of the tribal is far more uncertain. This situation presented a heady theoretical dilemma for the Naxalites. What were the Maoists to make of their new environment? Was the tribal to replace the "heroic peasant"[26] as the revolutionary subject of Indian history?

In order to grasp the challenges presented to Maoist ideology by the situation of the tribals, it is helpful to recognize the fundamental differences between the situations of

[23] Pettigrew and Shah, "Windows into a Revolution," 231.
[24] Gupta, *Red Tape*, 288.
[25] James Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale, 1976).
[26] Majumdar, *Charu Majumdar*.

peasants and Scheduled Tribes. While (as Guha has shown), the enemy of the pre-independence peasant was the formidable alliance of the state official (the moneylender and the landlord), the primary foe of the tribal is the state. While state power undoubtedly enforced the claims of the landlord and the moneylender on the surplus of the peasant, James Scott has demonstrated that these claims were often made according to arrangements that the peasant could tolerate.[27] For the tribals however, the encroachment of state authority offered no such respite. The official position of the Indian government "is that there are no indigenous people in the country,"[28] and as a result, tribal land is perpetually liable to government seizure. In recent decades, India's enthusiastic embrace of economic liberalization has meant that the rights too many tribal lands have been granted to foreign companies interested in extracting raw materials from the area. Before that, lands were often seized for national development efforts like the National Highway Development Project, which sought to link India's four major cities with roads that run through areas inhabited by tribal populations."[29] In either case, the state has acted as the primary claimant on the lands of tribal groups. Given the lack of protection granted to these populations by the Indian Constitution, the situation of tribals in India is especially precarious.

In response to the ever-looming threat of state encroachment, tribal groups have adopted a variety of strategies ranging from "hiding" to fighting. The first tactic, detailed extensively by Alpa Shah,[30] is rooted in a fundamental distrust of the state among Mundas in Jharkhand, who experience daily the irrationality and corruption that its policies and development projects bring to the area. Whether they are suffering abuse at

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[27] Scott, *Moral Economy*, 5.
[28] Alpa Shah, *In the Shadows of the State: Indigenous Politics, Environmentalism, and Insurgency in Jharkhand, India* (Durham: Duke, 2010).
[29] Gupta, *Red Tape*, 286.
[30] Shah, *In the Shadows of the State*.

the hands of forest guards or having their crops repeatedly trampled by "protected" elephants, many Mundas experience the state as an external force whose bizarre workings leave them inconvenienced and exasperated. As a result, the Mundas prefer to keep a safe distance from "the exploitative monolith" that arbitrarily intrudes on their lives.[31] In much the same way as James Scott[32] describes the choice to "opt-out" of state authority in Southeast Asia based on the desire to avoid taxation and subjugation, India's tribal populations have oftentimes sought to remain outside of the state's administrative field.

While violent resistance to state encroachment on the part of India's tribal populations has precedents both before and during the colonial period,[33] it is interesting to analyze the contemporary relationship between the Naxalites and the tribal communities from which they acquire recruits and carry out their insurgency. In order to grasp the complexities of this relationship, however, the ways in which tribal communities are understood by the Maoist groups who operate within them needs to be established. In formulating their tactics and aims according to the idea that tribal villages are "semi-feudal", the Maoists identify particular enemies—whether landlords or forest guards—against whom revolutionary violence must be deployed. While these strategies are intended to reflect the objective class conditions within the tribal areas, they are rooted in a fundamental misrecognition of the societies on whose behalf the insurgents claim to fight. In this case, it seems that the Maoist ideology of the Naxalites blinds them to the complicated reality of life in tribal areas, which, frustratingly enough, fails to be easily classifiable as either "semi-feudal" or "capitalist". As a result, tribals, rather than

[31] Ibid., 89.
[32] Scott, *Moral Economy*.
[33] Guha, *Elementary Aspects*.

Maoist insurgents, are the ones best able to identify and subvert the primary source of class differentiation in their society: the state.

Maoist Misrecognitions

If, as orthodox Marxists assume, consciousness emerges from the recognition of the objective character of a particular set of political and economic relations, the Naxalites of Jharkhand are, ironically enough, carriers of a false consciousness. In their desperation to make the social landscape of the tribal areas somehow "legible", the Naxalites have prevented themselves from coming to terms with the economic and social realities of life in rural Jharkhand. The Maoists, guided by Charu Majumdar's injunction to "ceaselessly propagate the politics of agrarian revolution,"[34] are more interested in condemning landlords than they are in addressing the significant role played by the state in the fostering of class differentiation in the region. In this instance, Maoist doctrine becomes an obstacle to the emancipatory aims of the Naxalites, as its dictates encourage insurgents to interpret the world in light of its own *a priori* claims rather than in regards to the economic and political circumstances that they encounter in practice. While the Naxalites understand themselves as the revolutionary vanguard within tribal communities, their failure to implicate the state in class differentiation indicates a weakness not present in the consciousness of the peasants they are supposed to be demystifying.

Given that Maoist groups entered the tribal areas of eastern and central India owing to strategic necessity rather than choice, it makes sense that they initially employed a mode of economic and political analysis better-suited to the zamindari-filled

[34] Majumdar, *Charu Majumdar*.

plains of Bihar than the densely forested hills of Jharkand and Chhattisgarh. The problem, however, seems to be that the Maoists have failed to correct their initial misrecognitions; instead, they have maintained their belief in the supposed similarity of "semi-feudal" India to China in the 1930s. In a place like present-day Jharkhand, where, the state collected and managed land revenue directly as a result of the difficulties in establishing a zamindari tenure system[35] since the mid-nineteenth century, it is hardly surprising that local Adivasis see the state as the source of class differentiation and exploitation. At the same time, the Maoists have relied on a simplified typology of peasant households while, according to Shah, "there is no simple pleasantry here; households are reproducing through a complex mix of farming and wage work in the non-agrarian economy.[36] In refusing to complicate their understandings of Jharkhand's political economy, the Maoists only make themselves more ineffective—not only in relation to the practical issues of governance, but also vis-à-vis their role as a revolutionary vanguard, more generally.

The penetrating insights of Adivasis are not limited to the complexities of the local agricultural economy, however. Instead, as Shah demonstrates among the Mundas of Jharkhand, tribals have a sophisticated, intuitive understanding of the ways in which the state introduces not only class differentiation, but also corruption to the area and its inhabitants. Locals engage in corruption and siphon money from development projects based on the fact that, since projects are inevitably designed in some far-off locale by state employees, they must be incompatible with local conditions.[37] Additionally, poor Mundas typically experienced anxiety over receiving state benefits unless they could be

[35] Shah, "The Agrarian Question," 429.
[36] Ibid., 446.
[37] Shah, *In the Shadows of the State,* 78.

extended to everyone in the community.[38] In both instances, the ways in which Munda interactions with the state are regulated by local forms of sociality can be seen. While the misappropriation of development funds or the rejection of state benefits are both examples of strategies enabled by local morality, they are also rooted in a political mistrust of the state—a mysterious entity whose attention the Mundas would generally like to avoid. In either case, we can observe the fundamental recognition, made on the part of tribal people, of the corrosive effects of state administration. For tribals the state is, at best incomprehensible, and at worst divisive.

The failure of Maoist groups to adapt their analytical framework to the realities of life in tribal areas calls into question not only the vanguardism through which the movement is supposed to mobilize the rural masses, but also the fundamental premises on which the insurgency is supposed to operate. How can the rural masses be the privileged subject of Indian history if their knowledge cannot be placed in the service of what is, supposedly, their own emancipatory political project? In illuminating the weaknesses in the consciousness of Naxalite insurgents, tribal narratives that cast the Indian state as the primary enemy of the rural masses manage to offer a more insightful appraisal of the "agrarian question" than the Maoism of Majumdar and Sanyal. In the next section, I will discuss the possibilities and limitations of India's Maoist insurgency as a progressive political project, with a special emphasis on deducing the significance of the movement for a historical moment seemingly bereft of viable alternatives to global capitalism.

[38] Ibid., 70.

The Politics of Anachronism

While the Indian press is usually much more likely to deride the brutality of the country's Maoist insurgency than it is to emphasize its positive efforts, the movement certainly offers benefits to those who live within the areas that it controls. For instance, upon arriving in a previously unoccupied area, the Maoists generally "set their own rules for the use of the forest so that free grazing [is] allowed everywhere, firewood for household consumption is no longer prohibited, and village communities are allowed to give permission to procure wood for building houses."[39] In this reversal of the arbitrary tyranny of the forest guards, the Maoists grant the local community the right to benefit from the natural resources that it holds in common. Importantly, it seems that the Maoists provide a potentially crucial platform through which marginalized peasants and members of Scheduled Tribes can "voice"[40] their opposition to the Indian state. The necessity of this platform for registering the grievances of marginalized populations is rooted in the same logic as Hirschman's observation that, "the role of voice [will] increase as the opportunities for "exit" decline."[41] According to this logic, since many of the groups involved with the Naxalites are excluded from the growing prosperity of India, they are forced to "voice" the difficulties of their position to the Indian state through their participation in armed insurgency. In any case, the most encouraging aspect of the Naxalite project seems to be the way in which it manages to formulate a political project that disempowered populations—from small-holding peasants to tribal groups—can participate in. This is almost certainly more than can be said for the development efforts

[39] Shah, "The Agrarian Question," 447.
[40] A. O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1972).
[41] Ibid., 34.

led by the Indian state, which, as Alpa Shah demonstrates, oftentimes end up being used to reproduce social inequities.[42]

Perhaps the most disturbing critique of India's Naxalite insurgency—apart from accusations that its Maoist ideology prevents it from understanding the realities of tribal political economy—is the idea that its participants operate without real regard for their principles. If this is the case, the violence of the insurgency begins to seem nihilistic and generally ill-advised. In her critique of the activities of the Maoist Communist Centre in rural Jharkhand, Alpa Shah demonstrates the contradictory ways in which the activities of the insurgents are implicated in the reproduction of existing social inequalities,[43] just like the government development projects. According to this interpretation, the support given by local tribals to Maoist insurgents is rooted in fear or a desire to obtain material benefits; both cases, however, seem to fall quite short of the emancipatory politics espoused by the Naxalites themselves. If, as Shah asserts, the influence of the MCC in rural Jharkhand can be attributed solely to its control of a market of protection from violence, then it seems that the Naxalite insurgency fails to distinguish itself convincingly from any other type of protection racket, whether mafias or states. In any case, Shah's critique raises the possibility that, in its current manifestation, the Naxalite insurgency fails to offer meaningful political alternatives to the groups that it claims to represent. Without the ideological justifications for the violence it enacts, the Naxalites would be reduced to merely another armed faction competing for influence and resources, oftentimes employing "terror"[44] to achieve its aims.

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[42] Shah, *In the Shadows of the State*.
[43] Shah, *In the Shadows of the State*, 65.
[44] Ajay K. Mehra, "Naxalism in India," 61.

While the character of India's Maoist insurgency is undoubtedly ambiguous, there is something fascinating about the possibility of its existence in the first place. Given the supposed "end of ideology" that accompanied the triumph of global capitalism near the end of the twentieth century, the idea of a Maoist insurgency operating deep in the mountains of central and eastern India seems particularly exotic and intoxicating. In potentially demonstrating the possibility of radical change, India's Maoists, through their existence alone, function as symbols of an alternative to "the single global system of the free market."[45] The significance of the Naxalite movement, then, lies in the implications it has for our political imagination. By disrupting the narrative of free-market triumphalism with its very existence, India's Maoist insurgency introduces the possibility of resistance in much the same way as, for Guha, the contestation of the dominant symbolic order can enable new forms types of political action and affiliation. In this way, the seemingly anachronistic character of the Naxalite movement becomes an irreplaceable facet of its appeal; after all, in locating elements of the past in the circumstances of the present, we can attune ourselves to the contingencies of the current state of affairs. If nothing else, the fascination with India's Maoists indicates a longing for the sorts of political agency that, for whatever reason, have come to seem outmoded or somehow impossible in a contemporary context.

In this paper, the Naxalite movement in light of the efforts of the Indian state (or lack thereof) to foster equality amongst its citizens has been thoroughly examined. Despite the Indian government's stated commitment to these goals, its consistent pursuit of economic liberalization in recent decades has inhibited their realization. In this context, India's Maoist insurgency, with its theoretical focus on the rural masses, has

[45] Shah, "Muck of the Past," 339.

come to represent an alternative to the inequities propagated by the Indian state. While the merits of certain aspects of the movement remain ambiguous, Naxalism has, undoubtedly, contributed to the formation of new political subjectivities in postcolonial India through the challenges it has posed to the dominant symbolic order that renders inequality "sensible."[46] While the seemingly anachronistic Maoist ideology of the insurgents can have unfortunate implications for the movement's effectiveness, I posit that the strength of Naxalism's challenge to the dominant symbolic order is derived from this very anachronism. If nothing else, India's Maoist insurgency demonstrates the potential possibility of resistance to global capitalism, even decades after the "End of History."[47] This seems to be an achievement in itself, given the difficulty of imagining viable alternatives to the developmental trajectory that India has embraced. In any case, the Naxalite movement's significance can traced to its empowerment of groups—whether tribal groups or small-holding peasants—who have been excluded from the prosperity of Indian democracy since its inception.

[46] Jacques Ranciere, *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible* (London: Continuum, 2004).
[47] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free, 1992).

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Playing with a Purpose on the Home Front Stage: A Study of the Social Functions of Theatrical Performance in London during the First World War

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To most theatre historians, the plays, musical comedies, and musical revues that filled the London stage during the years of the First World War, 1914-1918, deserve little to no comment. The theatre made during this time is written off as being propagandistic, escapist, or belligerently nationalist (or even a bit of all three) and thus unworthy of serious academic analysis. This paper introduces an alternative to that prevailing academic opinion by using this material as social and economic evidence to improve the modern understanding of the contemporary tastes and aesthetic needs of Londoners of that time. It performs a study of the shows that producers, astute individuals primarily concerned with their own financial success, chose to mount during the First World War in order to better understand what they thought would best meet the social and emotional needs of their audiences, which were London's broad lower and middle classes. Those needs were many, various, and dynamic throughout the course of the war. An examination of the histories of these productions illustrates whether or not their producers were right in their judgments of the popular temperature. Though it is impossible as a modern historian to assert what audiences felt upon witnessing these various performances without drawing extensively on eyewitness accounts and personal narratives, a modern analysis of the texts of the plays in context with social and historical factors can allow the historian to postulate what functions theatre was performing for contemporary audiences.

This paper will focus on four particular pieces of performance – the short play *God Save the King* (1914), by Edmund Goulding; the musical comedy *Chu Chin Chow* (1916), with book by Oscar Asche and music and lyrics by Frederic Norton; the short spy play *For Those in Peril* (1916), by John Gordon Brandon; and the anti-Pacifist play *Loyalty* (1917), by Harold Owen. These productions show four different sets of functions the theatre attempted to execute for those at home: providing reassurance for ambivalent feelings about the war, galvanizing individuals to patriotic sentiment, presenting an unthreatening escapist world, showing the comfortable resolution of contemporary fears about the war, and making a political argument against Pacifism. Each of these theatrical works was or was expected to be a major hit with commercial audiences, and so they are worthy pieces to study when seeking to make conclusions about London home front society. In studying both what these theatrical works were structured to do and how home front audiences responded to the works, we can come to better understand the nuanced emotional needs of the greater theatergoing London society over the years of the war.

God Save the King, a short play from the very start of the war, was successful because it fulfilled two functions. Firstly, the play presented a British family in which each member expressed personal sentiments beyond their patriotic sentiments; put simply, it showcased realistic characters. This had the potential to make the audience feel comfortable with their own conflicting personal and patriotic sentiments about the war. The play's second half, however, was structured to rally the audience into patriotic sentiment by literally calling upon them to rise as a unit and sing the national anthem, serving the social function of uniting them into a community. The commercial success of this play indicates that, at the start of the war, audiences wanted to be reassured of their own anxieties as well as be inspired to rise above those anxieties and serve their country.

Chu Chin Chow, which premiered a few years later in 1916, served a very different social purpose. An Orientalist musical comedy inspired by the story *Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves, Chu Chin Chow* provided flashy escapist entertainment that was sensual, visually stunning, and intentionally devoid of serious subject matter. Oscar Asche, the producer, director, book-writer, and lead actor, so designed the show as to provide its audience with a retreat into a fantasy version of the British territories with a familiar plot and ever-impressive visual effects. *Chu Chin Chow'*s unprecedented commercial success – it was the longest-running show of the war era with 2,238 performances over five years – was a testament to how well the show's combination of visual indulgence, a familiar plot, and Orientalist exoticism was designed to delivered emotional reassurance, escapist entertainment, and the feeling of moral superiority to Londoners in the mid to late-war era.

For Those in Peril, a popular spy play also from 1916, served yet a different function: it was designed to inspire and comfort by presenting on stage a positive resolution of some of the audience's deepest fears. The story followed a Mother Superior who foiled the dastardly plot of an English traitor and his German liaison, and its text explicitly glorified the Mother, who, though an unlikely hero, was able to serve her country and save the day. John Gordon Brandon, the playwright, designed the drama of the play to resonate most strongly with a home front audience that was deeply afraid of the specter of the "spy among them" when he made the enemy a spy within the walls of the convent. The tone of the play was overwrought and melodramatic, the diction florid and unnatural, and the characters more like caricatures, but these exaggerated facets of the play did not detract from the inherent relevance of the play for contemporary audiences. The high drama of the work was also less likely to bother contemporary

viewers as opposed to modern readers because *For Those in Peril* was a music hall play, and it was written to entertain any given audience only a few times.

Lastly, this paper examines Harold Owen's 1917 Anti-Pacifist play, *Loyalty*, which attempted to convince its audience of a political message as well as provide it with dramatic entertainment. The work was accepted, produced, and mounted in haste, only to be closed after only three weeks of performances. The tone of the play was strongly rhetorical and the characters represented figures in modern British society. The audience's unenthusiastic response, contrasted with the high enthusiasm of the producers to mount the play, can give the modern historian insight into British society in 1917. *Loyalty* was written and produced with an insufficient understanding of the functions that British audiences required from the theatre in 1917. Though producers counted on the idea that the political themes of Owen's play would be popular, the text of Owen's play weighed the importance of the political message over the creation of deep, multifaceted characters. The weak critical reception and fast close of *Loyalty* shows that it was ineffective in fulfilling the primary social and emotional function London audiences sought from the theatre in 1917: the need for entertainment.

Before launching into a more thorough examination of performance during the era of the First World War, it is helpful to first perform a basic overview of the most popular forms of theater in London before the war began. Theatre in 1914 could be divided into two major categories, which then branched off into many individual and distinct forms. Firstly, there was the "legitimate" theatre, which included the works of playwrights like Shaw and Ibsen and was attended by the middle and upper classes. One example of this "legitimate" theatre would be Harley Granville-Barker's productions of Shaw and Shakespeare, which earned great critical acclaim for their modernist dramatic style that,

in the words of historian David Thomson, left far behind "the clumsy realism of earlier fashion."[1] There was a fierce national backlash against this form of theatre directly after the outbreak of the war as being "un-British," unpatriotic, and unfit for production on British stages.[2] Modern or avant-garde drama was criticized for being too influenced by German schools of performance, and was openly reviled in the press. Within a few short months, productions closed, famous contemporary playwrights of the directly pre-war era stopped generating new material, and modernism more or less disappeared from the West End stage.

The other major class of theatre in 1914 was common theatre: the music hall, the musical revue, and the musical comedy. This theatrical tradition had a long and popular history in London, and, after the silencing of the modernists, became the exclusive form of performance on the West End stage from 1914 until well after the end of the war. The culture associated with this popular performance was more universal than that associated with legitimate theatre. There was a literary and academic culture established around the legitimate theater, created by the upper and upper-middle class audiences who attended it, but this culture was fairly small and both economically and socially exclusive. The culture created around common theater, on the other hand, contained audiences from the middle, lower middle, and lower social classes, and was therefore broader than at almost any prior moment in British history.[3] Using popular theatre from this time as a source of information about the social and emotional needs of Londoners during the war yields insights that extend across class distinctions and can apply generally to Londoners as a whole.

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[1] David Thomson, *England In the Twentieth Century* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), 29-30.
[2] George Robb, *British Culture and the First World War* (Houndmills [England]: Palgrave, 2002), 156.
[3] Robb, *British Culture and the First World War*, 312.

Of the three major forms of common performance, the music hall was the one that was most popular historically with the lower classes. The music hall came from a legacy of variety performance and featured a high degree of audience participation. A selection of songs, comedic sketches, and pantomimes would be performed in rapid succession, and the audience would cheer and boo to indicate their pleasure or displeasure with each one. This form of performance was not regarded seriously by critics, as can be seen in the London publication "The Musical Times," which, in commenting on the performances that occurred between June 3 and 9, 1918, wrote, "We will say nothing of the doings at the music halls, at which, we may mention, for the information of the future historian, very little music that deserves notice is ever performed."[4] Though it may not have been high art, it is worth acknowledging that the music hall was the prime source of entertainment for many Londoners. Because tickets were priced to be affordable even for members of the lower classes, wartime conditions of austerity did little to squelch Londoners' demand for music hall entertainment; audience attendance remained high throughout the war. Moreover, the breadth of music hall culture meant that many songs that had their start in music halls, such as Lena Guilbert Ford's *Keep the Home Fires Burning* (1914), went on to become integral and highly lauded parts of national British culture.[5]

The second major form of common theatre, the musical revue, developed out of variety theatre. In many ways it resembled the music hall, but it had more of the illusion of structure – each performance had a title and there was a chorus that was performed between many of the pieces. The substance of the show was still a compilation of speeches, songs, dances, pantomimes, and pastiches, but they were all tied together with a

[4] "A Week's Music in London in War-time: June 3 to 9," *The Musical Times* 59 (905), Musical Times Publications Ltd.: 324–24, http://www.jstor.org/stable/909327.
[5] Susan R. Grayzel, *The First World War: A Brief History with Documents* (2013), 92-93.

quintessentially British satirical tone and with the pretext of a unifying theme.[6] The brilliant nature of a variety show was that it could fulfill multiple functions for the audience in a single evening – there could be sentimental songs and love ballads, which amused and distracted the audience from their everyday lives. There were also spy plays and rousing anthems to the war effort, which served to entertain as well as unify the audience under the communal sentiment of patriotism. The role of the chorus in the musical revue was also significant because it was a form of sexualized entertainment, with performers acting as eye candy for the audience.

The musical comedy, the third major form, distinguished itself from the musical revue by having a single cast of characters and a unifying central plot device, though the plot was often tenuous and little more than an excuse for various song and dance numbers. The most common theme of the musical comedy in the early 20th century was the celebration of the modern – of the modern woman getting the man as they both vacationed by the sea, or of the modern man rising above his situation to gain wealth, fame, and the girl of his dreams. The celebration of the changing contemporary world as a theme was not as popular during the First World War, when the largely middle-class audiences were searching for more stability, not more change. Audiences increasingly favored escapist farces, fantasies, romances, and adventures – shows like *The Maid of the Mountains*, *The Boy, Kissing Time,* and, of course, *Chu Chin Chow.*[7] These were musical spectaculars of song and dance, flashy pieces with elaborate costuming, sets, and special effects that could help the audience forget the anxieties of life during war for a few hours.

It is important to note that all forms of theatre before, during, and directly after the war were subject to royal censorship from the Lord Chamberlain's office. Censors

[6] Collins, *Theatre at War, 1914-1918,* 204.
[7] Len Platt, *Musical Comedy On the West End Stage, 1890-1939* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 140.

could make specific requests for changes in subject, for alterations of a specific character, for adjustments within a play's plot, or could reject a play from being published altogether. This was not a new development during the First World War – this power dated back unofficially to the 16th century and officially to the Licensing Act of 1737 and the subsequent Theatres Act of 1843.[8] However, the outbreak of war brought about an expansion and development of power for the Lord Chamberlain's censors on a scale that had not been seen in recent history. The Defense of the Realm Act, passed on August 8, 1914, gave the King the power to put on trial and punish those who attempted to communicate with the enemy or spy on the English. In 1916, this power was expanded to state that,

> no one should either by word of mouth or in writing… spread reports or make statements intended or likely to cause dissatisfaction, or to prejudice recruiting or training, or to produce any play or film that would do any of these things.[9]

Ultimately, censors had complete control of what could be produced on the London stage. However, this condition does not preclude the possibility of a modern historian doing serious analysis on the material that was produced during this time. Every play in London had gone through the censors before it could be chosen, and so a contemporary analysis of the choices of producers remains equally valid. All producers were burdened with the same condition of having to choose from what they were permitted to work with the pieces they believed would be successful with contemporary audiences. One of the first plays to receive approval from the censors and then be accepted for production after the declaration of war was *God Save the King*, and an examination of the text and

[8] Phyllis Hartnoll, *The Oxford Companion to the Theatre,* 3rd ed. (London: Oxford U.P., 1967), 248.
[9] Samuel Hynes, *A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture* (London: Bodley Head, 1990), 80.

reception of this play reveals much about how the playwright and theater manager who selected it understood British society at that moment.

God Save the King

When Britain declared war on Germany on Tuesday, August 4, 1914, in response to the declarations of war by Austria-Hungary and Germany in the days preceding, well over half of London's theatres were dark – on break for the summer.[10] Those that were still open were uncertain about how to respond. The musical revue and musical comedy were popular attractions for both London residents and for foreign tourists, and managers were initially unwilling to put on large patriotic displays for fear of losing the latter's business. Moreover, the decision to declare war had been a highly politically contentious one, and it was not clear that a majority of audiences would appreciate or even agree with an outright patriotic stance presented on stage. However, it took little more than a week for producers to resolve in favor of patriotism. They adjusted to the new wartime climate by scheduling patriotic concerts, poetry readings, and short play performances. *God Save the King,* written by Edmund Goulding, was one of the first short plays to be performed in the wake of the declaration of the war. It had the distinction of being known as the first "war play," and was notable not only for its absurdly short production timeline but also for its content, use of multimedia, and structured audience participation. The play was written in such a way to firstly reassure audience members of their unclear sentiments about the war and, secondly, urge them to adopt a corporate sentiment of patriotism.

God Save the King opened as one part of a musical revue at the London Palladium on August 14, 1914, ten days after Britain entered the war. The Palladium was being

[10] Collins, *Theatre at War, 1914-1918,* 6.

managed at this time by Charles Gulliver, who had held the role of managing director since 1912. His original technique to make the Palladium successful was to trade on the popular appreciation for the exotic and current – his revue was the first to feature images of Captain Walter Scott's "Dash to the South Pole."[11] Gulliver, however, was a producer who traded on the news of the moment, and was quick to adapt his contemporary strategy to a wartime audience. His first bill after the declaration of war included Goulding's play, Henry Bedford and company in the "great patriotic, military episode, "Gentlemen, the King!" and Leo Stormont reciting a patriotic poem, "England's Honor."[12] Edmund Goulding, the playwright, was an actor on the West End stage when the war began, starring as Louka in Edward Knoblauch's play *My Lady's Dress* at the Royalty Theatre. When that play was suspended because of the war, Goulding went home, wrote *God Save the King*, and quickly submitted it for performance.[13] The play ran a week at the Palladium, a week at the Holbourn Empire, and played a full year on various stages in and out of London.[14] Though this may not at first glance seem like great commercial success, it was according to the metrics for success for plays in musical revues. A play in a musical revue was part of an evening of topical, of-the-moment performance, and so would rarely be performed in the same theatre for longer than a week before being exchanged for a new play or scene. We can infer from the fact that this play continued to tour for a full year that some producers thought it would resonate with audiences, and that they were confirmed in their opinion as more producers chose to mount the same play.

God Save the King opened in the kitchen of the Murray family, on a scene in which the members of family were preparing their younger son Harry to go off to fight in

[11] Ian Bevan, *Top of the Bill: The Story of the London Palladium* (London: F. Muller, 1952), 40.
[12] Bevan, *Top of the Bill: The Story of the London Palladium*, 43.
[13] Edmund Goulding, "God Save the King," in *British Literature of World War I Vol. 5,* Andrew Maunder and Angela K Smith (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2011), 2.
[14] Goulding, "God Save the King," 2.

the war. Harry said his goodbyes, and it was clear that his mother, Mary, was sad to see him go. His father, John, however, a veteran of the Boer War, was proud to have him fighting in the British armed forces. This scene also introduced Edmund, Harry's older brother, a middle-class seemingly unpatriotic figure and the breadwinner for the family. In this scene, it was revealed that Edmund had just attempted to enlist but had been rejected because of his weak constitution, and that Mary was suffering from even poorer health. The audience also learned that the family was nearly impecunious, just barely getting by with Edmund's earnings and a small income made from renting one of one of the family's rooms to a German lodger. The German lodger soon attempted to convince Edmund to spy on England in order to make the money necessary to save his mother's life. Edmund acknowledged that he would do anything for his mother, the only person in the world he loved, was convinced, and left the stage.

At this point, the structure of the play became more interesting. A sheet was lowered in front of the stage and unto it were projected a series of photographs of icons of British citizenship. These included some heroes from military engagements like Earl Roberts, V.C., who led British troops during the Indian Mutiny, and some figures simply known to the common ear, like Philips, the radio operator on the *Titanic* who continued communicating distress signals until he could not escape and died of hypothermia. After the sixth picture was shown, a voice was projected from the back of the theater, saying, "God save the King will now be played. The audience are invited to join in."[15] The stage directions in the text indicate that a picture of the Union Jack was to be projected on the screen. When the anthem was almost finished, a spotlight appeared on Edmund, who was then present in the audience. Appearing deeply moved, he shouted, "God save the

[15] Ibid., 18.

King!," rushed onto the stage, and declared to the German spy, "They played God Save the King. It was enough."[16] Edmund and the spy fought and the spy was killed. At this moment, Edmund's weak heart gave out and he died, just after having stolen money from the spy that was sufficient to obviate his family's financial struggles. Over the sound of knocking from the set's exterior door, the band played "Britons never never never shall be slaves" and the lights dimmed.

The text of this play is fascinating because, in the first half, the British characters were described with honest nuance and remained sympathetic to the audience even when they expressed opinions that were not wholly patriotic. For example, when Mary said goodbye to Harry, she lamented, "Oh, I s'pose it's right that you should go to the war, but if you could only stay one more day with us."[17] She acknowledged her patriotic duty but still aired her personal wishes. Later in the scene when John, the father, returned home and reported that the British had had another victory, Harry commented, "Seems awful, doesn't it, to think of brave men being killed." Harry was about to go off to war and serve his country, and yet Goulding wrote him so that he feels empathy for the brutality of war. John responded, saying, "It's the most wonderful thing in the world – war is. When you've got right on your side and a King like we've got..." When he remarked that women like his wife don't understand how wonderful war is because, "[they] weren't made to fight," Mary responded, "Perhaps we fight in another way." Though it would seem that John was the exemplar for good patriotic opinions, speaking in wholehearted favor of war, his lack of understanding for the role that women play in the war effort could have had the effect of making him less sympathetic to the audience. Mary, on the other hand, spoke against a purely positive view of the war, which was vaguely

[16] Ibid., 19.
[17] Ibid., 5.

unpatriotic, but her words also validated the role of women in supporting the war effort, which seemed to be patriotic. No member of the family was written as a straightforward paragon of British patriotism—they all seemed far too realistic to be attempting to serve a propagandistic function.

Surprisingly, of all the characters in the family, the most un-propagandistic one was the play's hero, Edmund. The text gives him a contradictory set of motivations, and it is difficult to determine from reading the play whether he was intended to be a sympathetic or unsympathetic figure. He was dressed in a superior manner to his family and was described by Goulding in the stage directions to be a "pale, strong-faced youth – typical of the City – furtive – decisive… obviously a thinker in a middle-class way." Goulding described him with both positive and negative attributes, making it ambiguous how he, the author, felt about the character, and making it all the harder for the audience to determine how to judge him. When John began to deride Edmund for his lack of patriotic sentiment, Edmund responded, saying, "I've worked and drudged for four years and done by duty to you all when you needed it… then along comes the rotten vulgar war – business stopped."[18] Though Edmund did not openly advocate patriotic opinions like his father, he was a responsible son to his family and his role as the provider made him partly sympathetic for the audience. His concerns about being able to provide for himself and his family were at once legitimate and selfish, and the impetus was put on members of the audience to decide how to interpret his character. Edmund was not a straightforward character, but a complex mix of motivations that make him realistic and make his character, as seen in the first scene, fairly realistic.

[18] Ibid., 11.

The fact that the sympathetic British characters were presented with doubts about the war effort is reflective of the uncertainty of real members of the British home front community, who, though willing to be patriotic, on August 14, 1914 were still unsure as to what the war was going to be, how long it was going to last, and what the fighting was going to be like. The use of realistic characters can also be read in a manner that attributes less conscious intent to Goulding. Goulding was writing a war play before such a genre existed, so his use of the previous standard of realistic characters can be read as an unconscious artifact of his moment in theater history. Yet, regardless of Goulding's degree of intent in writing realistic characters, the effect of seeing realistic characters - British men and women with conflicting personal and patriotic motivations but who still rallied towards serving the nation – served the function of providing reassurance for the audience member who also had unclear sentiments about the war effort.

The second half of the play served a different function for the audience. In the first half, Goulding created a cast of characters with decently complex motivations, which had the potential to make the audience feel comfortable, as audience members could empathize with the characters' dilemmas of resolving their competing interests of serving their country and being uncertain about the war. In the second half, Goulding put Edmund into the path of German temptation, had him succumb, stopped the plot of the play to use multimedia elements that incorporated the audience, and then had Edmund rise above his temptation. The cumulative effect of this was to create for the audience a clear idea of what it meant to be patriotic and what it felt like to be part of a strong corporate entity.[19] If the realism of the first half served the social function of reassuring an audience with uncertain feelings about the war, the fantastic, patriotic second half

[19] Len Platt, *Musical Comedy On the West End Stage, 1890-1939,* 179.

served a more proscriptive function: teaching the audience whose example to follow, what to say, how to act, and what to feel in order to be more better and more patriotic than they were at that moment.

Using the images of various national heroes at this moment in the play – from leading scientific explorer Captain Oates to army legend General Gordon from the Sudanese War – had the function of reminding the audience of the grandeur of British accomplishments. The diversity of heroes pictured also served the function of defining what it meant to be loyal to one's country in a broad sense. These images could inspire and convince an audience member that one could serve Britain whether on a foreign front or at home, as a soldier or simply as a citizen. The play also served the function of physically making an audience member part of a whole greater than his or herself when it urged audience members to stand and sing "God Save the King" together. The audience was essentially required to declare its patriotism by standing and singing when requested to do so. This declaration was of paramount importance to the structure and plot of the play because Edmund was so moved by the audience's words as to change his mind and stay true to Britain, becoming a hero. By illustrating for the audience what it could do with its agency as a patriotic unit, the play served the social function of encouraging everyday patriotism and of inspiring the home front citizen to serve his or her country in whatever way possible

The two major scenes of *God Save the King* served different but interconnected functions for home front audiences at the very outset of the war. Firstly, by showing realistic characters with conflicting personal and patriotic views about the war effort, the play provided reassurance for audience members that could have had similarly conflicting views. Secondly, by projecting a series of images of national heroes and then

urging the audience stand and sing the national anthem, the play illustrated for the audience the power of patriotism. It demonstrated for its audience that their patriotic agency could yield change, as they watched Edmund convert before their eyes from treachery to righteousness. Though Edmund died at the end of the play, the use of patriotic music had the potential to make the audience feel the nobility of his sacrifice. This play emerged on the stage at a transitional moment; London's theaters were determining how they should respond to the war and what mix of realist drama and patriotic presentation was appropriate. Though it is unclear how conscious Goulding was of balancing this mixture when he was writing, his completed play's commercial success is proof of the resonance of its dual themes for audiences at the very start of the war. British society was at crossroads, and so appreciated both the reassuring effect of the realistic, internally divided characters seen at the start of the play and the patriotic, galvanizing effect of the propagandistic second scene.

Chu Chin Chow

If *God Save the King* served an important function for Londoners at the start of the war by making them feel comfortable with their complicated feelings about the war and then making them feel patriotic about the war effort, *Chu Chin Chow* served the function of helping those war-weary citizens forget the war entirely for a few hours. By 1916, the initial optimism and light-hearted enthusiasm for the war that had dominated popular culture had dulled, and had been quietly replaced with an oppressive sense of its interminability. The war's deadliness had also become increasingly clear — more than half of the British Expeditionary Force of 90,000 men who fought at the Battle of the Marne in September 1914 were killed. The loss of so much life made it impossible to

treat themes around military service with the same levity that had been used just two years earlier.[20] By 1916, as the need for fighting men became more pressing, the standards for recruitment were lowered: the maximum age was raised from 35 to 40 and then 45, and the minimum height was lowered from 5'8" to 5'5" and then even to 5'3".[21] Conscription was put into effect, and men who met the conditions of age and ability were no longer encouraged but required to enlist in the army. In the midst of this growing somberness, *Chu Chin Chow* arrived on the stage and provided London's broad middle and lower classes an opportunity to escape from the frightening realities of wartime.

Chu Chin Chow was the brainchild of Oscar Asche, an Australian émigré who came to England to make his fortune on the stage. After acting with relative distinction in a Shakespearean company for several years, he transitioned to becoming a writer and a producer, working on shows like the 1911 play *Kismet* by Edward Knoblauch. In 1916, Asche was inspired to write a musical comedy based on the story of *Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves*. It took him only two weeks to write the book, at which time he hired Frederic Norton to write the music, Joseph Harker to do the scenic design, and Percy Anderson to make the costumes.[22] It was highly important for Asche to hire his designers early on in the process, as his vision – to create an escapist phantasmagoria on a massive scale – necessitated the most lavish set and costume designs possible.

Asche quickly formed his own production company with his wife and theatre manager Beerbohm Tree, and put the show, in which he and his wife played the starring roles, together after only six weeks of rehearsals.[23] *Chu Chin Chow* opened at His Majesty's Theatre on August 31, 1916, and within seven weeks the production had

[20] Collins, *Theatre At War, 1914-18,* 5.
[21] Ibid., 6.
[22] Brian Singleton, *Oscar Asche, Orientalism, and British Musical Comedy* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 111.
[23] Singleton, *Oscar Asche, Orientalism, and British Musical Comedy,* 111.

earned more than 50,000 pounds. At the height of its popularity, *Chu Chin Chow* was running 10 sold-out performances a week. The show went on to run to five years, and when it closed on July 22, 1921, it had played over 2,238 performances. Over 2,800,000 tickets had been sold by 1921 and the box-office receipts were in excess of 3.5 million pounds.[24]

The approach that Asche took to interpreting the Ali Baba story into *Chu Chin Chow* was to create an Orientalist musical comedy spectacular on a scale that had hardly yet been seen on stage. In terms of plot, he ensured there was something for everyone: murder, intrigue, romance, ambition, revenge, and violence.[25] In terms of the scale of the cast, the original book called for 17 principals, a chorus of 34 men, a chorus of 29 women, 8 children, a camel, a donkey, and various other animals.[26] When it came to sex appeal, there also Asche pushed boundaries. The musical comedy had the reputation of being less sensual and revealing than the musical revue, but Asche's spectacular emphasized the female body and actively sold itself on its erotic exoticism.[27] Use of the setting of the mystic Orient was highly important for this production, as it served the function of triggering the imagination and creating an alternate fantasyland that was disconnected from the realities of the war. The vast majority of Londoners knew little more about the Orient than that it was part of the British Empire and that it was completely unlike their European world. This allowed the playwright to justify to the audience that in the Orient the emotionally overwrought and eroticized events of the play were commonplace, and to tacitly reassure British audiences of their moral superiority over such a society.

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[24] Ibid., 112.
[25] Ibid., 109.
[26] And because of Asche's continual additions over the course of the run, there were even more principal roles by the time the show closed.
[27] Singleton, 121.

Asche's business strategy was absolutely conscious to this historical moment. Aware that visitors to the city of London during the war years could not be relied upon as a steady customer base for a musical comedy, *Chu Chin Chow* was marketed to repeat local patrons. Every six months or so, the sets, costumes, and some of the scenes would be overhauled and the change would be highly publicized. Asche attempted to make *Chu Chin Chow* an event a Londoner would go to see again and again by ensuring that there was nothing to disturb or offend and always something new to entertain. If *Chu Chin Chow* served as escapist theatre, it was most successful because it changed and adapted itself to be a new escape every few months.[28]

Asche was also adaptable to the actual wartime conditions of air raids. When a show would fail to start on time because of air raid delays and was likely to end after the state-imposed curfew, Asche would stop the show halfway through and ask the audience how they wanted to finish their evening. He would then perform the audience's requested songs and dances, disregarding plot.[29] This strategy kept the audience happy and comfortable even in a situation where there was the greatest potential for panic, and also allowed Asche to perform market research on the most-loved parts of the play. During set, costume, and scene revamps, this consumer feedback critically shaped what parts of the plot or kinds of scenes Asche increased. Asche's adaptability in performing *Chu Chin Chow* allowed him to ensure that his show would continue to deliver comfort and escapist diversion even during air raids. His dogged commitment to the audience entertainment experience made *Chu Chin Chow* the most popular spectacle on the West End for five years.

[28] Ibid., 110.
[29] Ibid., 112.

The diction of the play was somewhere between King James Biblical English and Elizabethan dialect.[30] The effect of the formalized diction was to further emphasize the otherworldliness of the play's events. Though the characters were technically speaking English, which was the audience's language, they were not speaking like any real English people did, and so distanced themselves from the world of reality. The heightened diction served the function of rendering one of the few recognizably English elements of the play – the language – exotic and foreign, and bringing the audience further away from the everyday, frightening European world.

The substance of *Chu Chin Chow* loosely followed the Ali Baba story. A Middle Eastern trader, Kasim Baba, and a Chinese trader, Chu Chin Chow, were trying to meet to exchange goods, but Kasim was plotting to double-cross Chow. Shortly after the opening, the play introduces Zahrat, one of the slave women in Kasim's harem, who wished to escape from Kasim to become the wife of Ali Baba, Kasim's brother. The events of the play lead to a scene at a slave bazaar,[31] which provided Asche ample opportunity for showing as much eroticized female flesh as possible, then to the cave hideout of the spy Abu Hasan (pretending to impersonate Chu Chin Chow), where his gems and jewels were represented the female chorus in scanty bejeweled costumes.[32]

The plot of *Chu Chin Chow* is not truly worth noting much further, except to say that it was particularly effective because it was already decently well known. Many audience members were well acquainted with the story of *Ali Baba and the Forty*

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[30] Ibid., 117.

[31] At one point during the song in which the female slaves were being sold, they all turned upstage and dropped their cloaks, revealing their naked backsides to the audience. This piece of staging was designed to kindle sexual desire through the sight of so much flesh and by the thought of what was facing upstage, not being seen. Singleton, 120.

[32] "*Chu Chin Chow*, as the pantomimic bosom to an England in peril, weaves a path to the overthrow of tyranny through succoring the nation with a comfort tale of childhood and titillating it with its exotic erotica. *Chu Chin Chow* very swiftly became a theatrical mother and a whore." Ibid., 121.

Thieves, and went to see the show specifically because the story was familiar. In times of austerity, attending a musical based on a story that was already known and liked was a surer purchase than attending an unknown show. The story was also, in some ways, reassuring. India and "the Orient" more generally belonged to the British Empire, so setting the musical in the Orient tacitly affirmed the strength of Britain in a time when the realities of war had brought British strength into question. Audience members could also be reassured of their personal superiority and strength by witnessing the wiliness and lustfulness of members of the Orient. Asche could deliver an evening of entertainment during which the audience could imagine their territories in exciting ways and be affirmed in their own moral superiority, and he could promise that the audience would not have to think – simply relax, smile, and appreciate. *Chu Chin Chow* was successful because it was original and unique, in terms of the scale of the production, the lavishness of the costuming, and unabashed use of eroticism, and yet also fundamentally unsurprising and comforting, because the plot was already well known and the setting was within the borders of the Empire.

When the Armistice between the Allied powers and Germany was signed at Versailles on November 11, 1918, Asche, always conscious about keeping *Chu Chin Chow* responsive to the historical moment, incorporated a final tableau after the ending of the play – "The Allies and the Dominions." The piece consisted of Asche, in British dress, leading a parade of English women in white, toga-like costumes carrying banners of the Allied nations. The superiority of Britain over the other nations of the world was further reinforced when the Dominions appeared on stage represented by a blacked-up boy in a turban. At the end of this presentation, Asche's wife and the leading lady Lily

Brayton came out dressed as Britannia.[33] As the practical effect of the Armistice on the home front was a massive population influx of soldiers returning to their families, their homes, and their jobs, this tableau served the function of keeping *Chu Chin Chow* current and topical for new audiences in the directly post-war era. With increased soldiers in the audience, staying current and topical meant creating a celebration of their achievements.

Oscar Asche wrote and developed *Chu Chin Chow* into a musical comedy spectacular that would serve the function of entertaining and distracting the audience as thoroughly as possible. Wartime audiences in 1916 were particularly in need of an escape, as enthusiasm and optimism about the war effort began to flag and the dark reality of the war's deadliness became more apparent. Asche met the audience's needs by using a story that was familiar, *Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves*, in a setting that was entirely unknown but regarded as wild and inferior as an excuse to display visually stunning bodies, sets, and costumes. *Chu Chin Chow* was able to continue to deliver material that stunned by its novelty and beauty for five years because Asche did a design overhaul of the show every six months. When the Armistice was declared, Asche recognized that his show could also be serving a celebratory function, making the audience feel proud to be a member of the winning side of the war. The wild commercial success of the *Chu Chin Chow* illustrates how well Asche understood British society, and how important the escapist, affirming, and celebratory functions of theater were for British citizens during the mid-war years.

[33] Ibid., 133.

For Those In Peril

Whereas shows like *Chu Chin Chow* attempted to provide their audiences a place to forget the anxieties of life on the home front, spy dramas like *For Those in Peril* sought to inspire patriotism and comfort the audience's deepest fears by bringing the drama as close to home as possible. The success of the spy play – and they were very successful: fifty original spy plays were produced in London between 1914 and 1916 – lay in the personal resonance audience members felt with the drama on stage.[34] Londoners lived in fear of attack even when away from the battlefield because, starting in 1915, the Germans had started to run Zeppelin raids over major British cities like London, Kent, and Essex, dropping bombs on munitions centers and high-impact civilian centers. Between 1915 and 1918, 52 raids were conducted by Zeppelins and 59 by aircraft.[35] Curfew hours were established and air raid signals and procedures were put into place. The lack of safety, even on the home front, increased the common wartime suspicion of covert espionage by German spies. Those living in London worried that no space was safe, and that every German could potentially be "the enemy among us."[36]

At this moment, John Gordon Brandon, another Australian who moved to London around the turn of the century, wrote *For Those in Peril*. Brandon produced a staggering amount of published work over the course of his life, mostly short stories and short plays, and all of it was characterized by its polemical patriotic tone and violent anti-Germanism.[37] His style of writing followed in the tradition of British melodrama, and was dramatically successful in that it capitalized on contemporary anxieties to create high-stakes situations on stage with which the audience could engage. Furthermore, he

[34] Robb, *British Culture and the First World War,* 159.
[35] Mauger and Smith, *The British People, 1902-1968,* 51.
[36] Ibid.
[37] John Gordon Brandon, "For Those in Peril," in *British Literature of World War I Vol. 5,* Andrew Maunder and Angela K Smith (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2011), 152.

resolved audience fears by having the British beat the Germans every time. *For Those in Peril* premiered as part of a mixed bill at Collin's Music Hall in Islington on February 7, 1916 and ran for six days at that theatre before going on tour. The play was performed in London for several weeks and then moved from major city to major city throughout England for the next few months of the year.

The action of *For Those in Peril* was melodramatic and violent. The plot followed Mother Mary Theresa, the Mother Superior of a convent on the Highland coast, and her brother, Lieutenant Graham Winfield. Winfield informed his sister, in the strictest confidence, that the English government was bringing over thousands of Irish troops that night. She was required to keep this fact a close secret, because there were German submarines in the waters trying to intercept British signals, and if the Germans found out about the troop movements they would torpedo the transporters. Also present in the convent was Vargo, an Iago-like retainer and the traitor within the British ranks, who had been communicating with the German submarine captain Von Hoeler. Von Hoeler snuck into the convent that night to confer with Vargo and determine when the English were planning to transport the Irish so that he could appropriately signal the submarines. Mother Mary Theresa, having overheard the two villains, crept to the window and signaled so as to ensure that the German submarines would be gone that evening for the crossing. When she was ultimately discovered, Von Hoeler was furious, and he threatened to rape and then shoot her for having ruined his plans. He decided to first attempt to head off the German submarines, and, as he was climbing out the window, Mother Mary Theresa cut his rope ladder and sent him plunging to his death. The play ended with her in prayer and the sound effect of bells beginning to toll. The plot of *God Save the King* served the social function of allaying the audience's deepest fears by

illustrating the most extreme case of the danger of spies, and then presenting the best possible resolution of that danger by having the British nun defeat the evil German officer.

The diction of *For Those in Peril* was overwrought and large, and served to make the British defeat of the Germans seem all the more epic in scale. When Winfield learned that his letters to his sister, in which he had been passing classified information, had not been received, he exclaimed – "By God! There is some fiendish treachery here."[38] Later in that scene, having realized the importance of the room in which he was standing as a position from which to signal, he asked his sister not to leave at any cost, saying, "It may be a hard task – but for the sake of thousands of brave lives – you must do it."[39] She responded in the same exaggerated rhetorical style, saying, "I will for I have absolute faith in God." These characters were pastiches, speaking in grand style that heightened them from a world of realism and elevated them to the status of symbols. Mother Mary Theresa and Lieutenant Winfield were more than two individuals living in the Scottish Highlands; they were the forms of the ideal British citizens. Von Hoeler, for his part, was the symbol of the brutish Germanic figure. His lines were written in the script in a heavy-handed fake German accent, his tone was simple and aggressive, and his character was savage, tyrannical, and misogynistic. Brandon characterized him as isolated and completely lacking in humanity: von Hoeler responded to Mary Theresa's plea that he think of the women in his life before taking hers by saying that he had no women in his life, and that "if I had it would be just the same."[40] The characterization of him as utterly evil also put him into the realm of the representational. The creation of this archetypal, Manichean war between evil and righteousness, which came from the plot as well as the

[38] John Gordon Brandon, "For Those in Peril," 164.
[39] Ibid., 165.
[40] Ibid., 176.

heightened language and exaggerated characters of the play, served the play's ultimate function of reassuring the audience and engendering patriotism in them. The play was structured so as to confirm the righteousness of British individuals like Mother Mary Theresa and to reiterate the evilness of German enemies like Von Hoeler.

The play was saved from being a complete caricature by the resonance of the plot for the audience. Even though the characters, diction, special effects, and even stage pictures indicated by the stage directions were all executed on an exaggerated scale, they conveyed a plot about spies on the home front that the audience could very easily imagine.[41] The very real anxieties of home front audience members about the danger of German covert attack made the nearly absurd situation of *For Those in Peril* conceivable, and the comforting effect for audiences, when the British proved victorious over the Germans, all the stronger.

Upon first glance, *For Those in Peril* appears to be a far less successful play than *Chu Chin Chow*, which had such an extensive run at His Majesty's theatre. However, commercial success for a short play in a music hall had a similar standard to that of a play in a musical revue. Like *God Save the* King, *For Those in Peril* was successful along the metrics of its form. Music hall theatre sought to delivery a variety of performances – to always be providing something new and yet-unseen – so no singular music hall was likely to keep a show of such a common genre as the spy play longer than a week before exchanging it with new material. *For Those in Peril* continued to tour English theatres for several months after it initially opened, and that made it a commercial success.

Audience appreciation for *For Those in Peril* informs the modern historian's understanding of the theatrical and social needs of British society in 1916. Terrified of

[41] Collins, 185.

the specter of espionage at home and discouraged by the length and brutality of the war to that point, British audiences went to the music hall for entertainment and to be comforted by seeing their greatest fear, home front espionage, be soundly defeated. Spy plays like *For Those in Peril* attempted to entertain by creating high-intensity dramatic situations that were set on the home front, with heroes that looked like the audience members. The melodramatic style of this play made obvious the dualism between the good patriots and the evil Germans, helped heighten the drama of the piece, and made the victory of the British over the Germans all the more significant and comforting. *For Those in Peril* attempted to entertain, reassure, and also serve the generally political function of encouraging patriotism, as anyone could be like Mother Mary Theresa, and anyone could stop "the enemy among us."

It is interesting to juxtapose *For Those in Peril* with *God Save the King*, because both plays dealt with a spy who was flouted by the good British citizen and both served the function of rallying the audience to patriotism, but did so in different ways that reflect their historical moments. *God Save the King* established a realistically complex character, placed him in a heightened dramatic situation, and encouraged the audience to contribute through song to urge him to the patriotic choice. The play was dramatically successful because the audience connected with the central character. *For Those in Peril* instead established simple, unrealistic characters placed into a heightened dramatic situation, and had the characters make patriotic choices in order to undermine the evil Germans. The play was dramatically successful because it was designed to have the audience connect with the plot more than the characters—the realities of life under Zeppelin attack made even a plot about spies that a modern reader would consider absurd not only acceptable but popular.

Loyalty

The fourth and final play that this paper will examine, *Loyalty*, by Harold Owen, attempted to both entertain its audience and fulfill an explicitly political function: as Owen wrote in the introduction of the 1918 published text: "[the play's] purpose was to expose Pacifism, and its object was to smash it."[42] The play was accepted to the first management company to which it was submitted, and a week later it went into production. The show had only three weeks of rehearsal before it opened at St. James' Theatre on November 21, 1917.[43] Against the wishes of the producers, Vedreene and Eadie, *Loyalty* was produced with the playwright's name kept anonymous. This led to two cycles of comment from the press: the first was the rush to attribute it to various politicians and dramatists, and the second was the backlash that the anonymity was only a press stunt, and that the author was actually a person of little consequence. Owen's rationale, as explained in the introduction to the published text of the play from May 1918, was that his previous work had come from such a different genre that it would bias viewers of this play into making comparisons.[44] All the same, what function producers were trying to have this play fulfill was initially unclear, and this blunder in marketing could have had a part in the play's ultimate commercial failure.

Loyalty opened with a scene of employees of the left-leaning publication "The New Standard" in the days just before the outbreak of the war. Stutchbury, the editor, was a poorly dressed intellectual who supported the pacifying policies of politician Sir John Scrunt and Sir Andrew Craig. Mildmay, the diligent, hard worker in the office, seemed to object to Stutchbury's opinions but said nothing. Also working in the office was Frank

[42] Harold Owen, *Loyalty: a play in four acts* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1918), xxi.
[43] Owen, *Loyalty: a play in four acts*, 1.
[44] Ibid., x.

Aylett, a clean-shaven man who was in favor of a firm military policy in response to the German rearmament. Over the course of the play, war was declared and Aylett broke with Stutchbury, striking off on his own successful political campaign against Sir Andrew and his band of Pacifists. Aylett rousingly argued for an aggressive, military stand against Germany. He ultimately won his political campaign, but gave up his seat to go fight in the armed forces instead. He later returned, having been injured in battle, to run for office again. The play ended with Sir Andrew announcing that, having seen the horrible way in which British prisoners of war were treated in a German camp, he had seen the error of his ways and had decided to recant Pacifism. Aylett and Anthea, Sir Andrew's daughter, were finally united, having earlier declared their love but having been separated by the war. The major social function of *Loyalty*'s plot was to make a political point – it was, of course, also intended to entertain, but the political purpose was paramount.

The diction of *Loyalty* was highly rhetorical and political. Though there was a love plot between Anthea and Aylett, it existed more or less superfluously to the political heart of the play. It was indicative of the tone of the whole piece when Stutchbury said in the first act, "Always keep principles in mind, Mildmay. Principles!"[45] Aylett spoke in like rhetorical tone, arguing against Stutchbury,

> People have ceased to think – they simply jump to conclusions.
> People no longer form opinions – they let opinions form *them!*
> Political principles have become unlike any other set of principles –
> merely an excuse for shirking truth….[46]

It is not hard to imagine these characters speaking from soapboxes in a city square or on political platforms in Parliament, and this style of political rhetoric dominated the text of

[45] Ibid., 7.
[46] Ibid., 36.

the play. The diction of the play was also littered with explicitly political terms. When Aylett was later in Sir Andrew's drawing room, confronting the various Pacifists before him, he explained his political stance in the most straightforward terms possible, saying, "I'm a great nationalist – English nationalist. Every other country has its nationalist party. I want to see a nationalist party in England."[47]

The vast majority of the characters in *Loyalty* were written in a slightly exaggerated style whereby they became an example or a type. It is clear from Owen's introduction that he not did see his characters as unrealistic or caricatured, but as representative of a kind of person to be found in modern British society. Wellcome and Pfall, a Canadian and German, respectively, who were introduced in the first scene, filled the roles of the type of the good Ally and the deceptive German. Stutchbury was the type of ill-kempt, ivory tower intellectual who advocated Pacifism because of his ignorance of the world. Aylett was the type of the good military patriot who, having been abroad before and previously served in the armed forces, opposed Pacifism on practical grounds and fought for his country when the war called for him to do so. The various members of Pacifist groups that were introduced in the second act – Ephraim Borer, Albert Stapleton Dunt, John Brown, David Macfarlane, and Evan Williams – represented the diversity of individuals who identified at that time as Pacifist. Macfarlane was a Scottish radical, Williams was a Welshman in favor of disarmament, and Brown was a member of the Labor party, who opposed military armament because it could lead to worse conditions for home front working men. No character had much more depth than their one or two defining characteristics, which can make the piece feel like a morality play or parable to a modern reader. Owen wanted these symbolic characters to serve the function of making

[47]Ibid., 78.

the dualism between good, patriotic characters and dangerous, misguided Pacifists clear, and while a similar effect was used in *For Those in Peril* with relative success, the result over the course of a four act play was to make the dialogue predictable and monotonous.

Commercially, *Loyalty* was not a great success, closing after only three weeks of performances. It was later performed at the desire of the Queen for her and Queen Alexandra of Russia at the Haymarket Theatre on July 2, 1918, but this performance does not tell the historian as much as about social reception to the play as the original production.[48] Reviews of the original production of *Loyalty* complimented it on the contemporary relevance of its themes, but made little comment on the general quality of the text.

Loyalty was attempting to serve the function of entertainment and instruction for its audiences, but the play's commercial failure illustrates that it was unable to do so. Myriad factors could have contributed to this, from the misguided decision to keep the writer's name anonymous to the text of the play, but in examining the choices Owen made in context of 1917 British society we can come to understand which elements of the play were likely to have made it unsuccessful. The major choice that undermined *Loyalty'*s success was that it was written to be a full-length play – not a short play in a music hall or a musical revue, but a full two-hour dramatic work. This meant that Owen had time to develop thorough arguments against the dangers of Pacifism and completely execute the function of proving a political point. However, for an audience to find a two-hour-long play entertaining they would need more substantial characters. Heavy political dialogue from archetypical forms of social figures without developed personal characteristics for that length of time prevented the play from fulfilling its basic social

[48] Ibid., 1.

function: to be entertaining. Though political plays became increasingly popular in the late years of the war, as the question of freedom versus government control became more topical, *Loyalty* did not follow in the general trend of those plays' commercial success.[49] By prioritizing the thoroughness of the political message over nuances in structure, plot, and character development in *Loyalty*, Owen created a play that was unable to fulfill the most basic social function audiences in 1917 required from the theater – entertainment.

Conclusion

The undertaking of this paper has been an analysis of four select sources in order to illustrate the multifarious functions that London theatre was attempting to fulfill during the First World War. The primary function that all commercial wartime performance sought to fulfill was to entertain the audience, either by creating moments of high drama or by providing a moment of escape from the intensity and tragedy of the real world. Yet there were additional functions, too. At the start of the war, plays like *God Save the King* tried to make the audience feel comfortable by presenting realistic characters, and also attempted to rally the audience to a corporate patriotism through the use of images of national heroes and the singing of the national anthem. *Chu Chin Chow* attempted to make its audiences feel entertained, reassured of their moral superiority, and distracted from the anxieties of home front life for a few hours. Later, when the Armistice was declared, *Chu Chin Chow* also sought to make the audience feel patriotic – proud to be part of the heroic tableau of the war's victors. *For Those in Peril* tried to comfort its audience by presenting on stage the neutralization of German espionage, and to inspire its audience to simple heroism by showing that any British citizen could fight spies on the

[49] Hynes, 216.

home front. As for *Loyalty,* it attempted to fulfill the function of educating its audiences on the dangers of Pacifism to the war effort. Audience response to the latter play proved the primacy of the function of entertainment during this era. *Loyalty* emphasized its political message over creating a dramatically complex cast of characters with which the audience could engage for the length of the play, and so was not successful.

In conclusion, I argue that performance on the London stage during the First World War is a goldmine for historical inquiry. A study of the plays, musical revues, music hall shows, and musical comedies produced in this era – of their texts and of how they were received by audiences – can help inform historians' understandings of the social and emotional needs of Londoners on the home front. Popular culture can provide ample opportunities for academic study, and this paper has endeavored to illustrate how that can be true in one specific instance: London performances during the First World War.

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International Image and the Abolition of Slavery in Brazil

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From the early 1500s until 1888, slavery was a legal institution in Brazil. By the time colonial rule ended and the Brazilian Empire rose to power in 1824, a slave in Brazil was a person either brought directly from Africa or the descendant of a person brought from Africa whose labor, life and liberty were owned by another individual. Studying the abolition of slavery in Brazil, the last country in the Western Hemisphere to abolish slavery, is key to understanding the potential for international reputation to shape domestic policies in countries for the betterment of their inhabitants. This paper primarily draws on translations of the writings of Joaquim Nabuco, Brazil's most prominent abolitionist, as well as previous scholarship, especially the work of Robert E. Conrad, Thomas E. Skidmore, Katía Mattoso, and Emilia Viotti da Costa. The work of these eminent scholars forms the basis of this analysis of the factors that resulted in slavery lasting so long in the Brazilian Empire, with a focus on how Brazil's international reputation played a role in its abolition. International image played an important role in the abolition of slavery in the Brazilian Empire, as abolitionists, most notably Joaquim Nabuco, argued that slavery was preventing Brazil from becoming a modern country and that the abolition of slavery would allow Brazil to become a true European country for Europeans. Yet, the Brazilian public would not allow a complete abolition of slavery until the new laws, created as an answer to international pressure, resulted in the decreasing power of the infrastructure of oppression, leading to mass work stoppages of the slaves themselves coinciding with the arrival of alternative sources of labor.

Even as late as 1883, many abolitionists feared that abolition would not be achieved in Brazil until the 20th century because for nearly 400 years slavery was an integral part of life for every Brazilian. The classic story of slavery in the New World is that of slaves working backbreaking labor, sunrise to sunset, on large plantations growing the crops that would make their masters wealthy. This of course did happen in Brazil. To start, agricultural exports served as the basis of the Brazilian economy. For example,

> In his *Letter to the Gentlemen Electors of the Province of Minas Gerais,* Vasconcelos opposed government aid to industries and argued that Brazil should export what she could produce best – sugar, cotton, tobacco, cacao – and should receive in return the manufactured products she could not produce competitively. These ideas were to become the fundamental doctrines of the empire.[1]

This excerpt comes from Emilia Viotti Da Costa's *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories*. Her work focuses on how individuals, not just economics, throughout the era of the Brazilian Empire, shaped the empire's destiny. Although she does include excerpts that talk about how economics shaped Brazil, she considers the earlier Marxist historiography of Brazil too simplistic, and believes that it does not do enough to explain the creation and interaction of the different social and economic classes in Brazil. In the excerpt, the "gentlemen electors" Vasconcelos refers to are the wealthy elite who owned enough land to qualify to shape the policies of the Brazilian Empire, and obviously these policies would be in their favor. While most of the world saw promoting internal industries as a way to keep their country's money within their country, Brazil's elite ruling class felt confident that it could rely on trade with the rest of the world in order to gain the variety of goods that the Brazilians could not or would not produce at home. Brazil's agricultural exports were profitable enough and had been profitable enough for a very long time, so although Brazil was dependent on the rest of the world, they did not feel or

[1] Emilia Viotti Da Costa, *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 126.

worry about being dependent on the rest of the world. These same wealthy elites relied on slave labor to run their plantations and would therefore continually, throughout Brazil's history, come to the institution's defense. Ending slavery in Brazil would require convincing these elites that slavery was not in their best interests. Therefore, it is not surprising that the majority of appeals for abolition would be directed at these elites.

The power of the plantation owners in Brazil is well documented. Robert E. Conrad, scholar of Latin American history, describes the difficulties of gaining support for the Brazilian abolitionist movement, "The slaveholder was still an awesome force in the early 1880's to the inhabitants even of large cities like Rio, Salvador and São Paulo."[2] This description comes from Robert E. Conrad's *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, 1850-1888*, a work that tells the story of the abolition of slavery in Brazil after the end of the slave trade in 1850, focusing on the social, political and economic factors that worked to end slavery. The fact that these rural slaveholders had power even in distant cities demonstrates how reliant the entire country was on their agricultural products. Additionally, the urban inhabitant's fear of the plantation owners illustrates how much power they had not only in controlling the lives of their slave population but in shaping the lives of free Brazilians as well. Popular support for the abolition of slavery could only begin under the guidance of forces more powerful than the ruling class.

Another enormous obstacle to the cause of abolitionism in Brazil was that, from the cradle to the grave, slavery touched the lives of every Brazilian. For Brazilian elites, their first experience with slavery was often as a baby with a slave wet nurse. When they could afford to, a Brazilian mother would purchase a wet nurse, a practice common

[2] Robert E. Conrad, *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, 1850-1888* (Malabar: Krieger Pub. Co, 1993), 100.

enough that there were guidebooks dedicated to the topic.[3] The availability of guidebooks shows that families that could afford to buy or at the very least rent a human being for such a specific task as breastfeeding their children. Furthermore, the elites felt confident that they could trust people they brutally exploited on a daily basis with their own children. This trust accentuates how ingrained the slave society was in the Brazilian Empire.

However, contrary to popular depictions of slavery, not all slave owners were rich. In fact, "Even the poorest family owned at least one slave"[4] This account comes from Katia Mattoso's *To Be a Slave in Brazil*. Mattoso wrote this book because she felt that the stories and experiences of slaves themselves had been too often neglected in earlier accounts of Brazilian history. Originally published in 1986, this book was written to provide a general Brazilian audience with information about the experiences of slaves in Brazil, with a definite focus on the lives of slaves in Mattoso's home state of Bahia before slavery's abolition. Although to say that all Brazilians owned slaves was certainly an exaggeration, here Mattoso emphasizes the fact that even poor Brazilians owned slaves and therefore shows how widespread slavery was in Brazil within different segments of the population. This detail also demonstrates that for most of the era of slavery in Brazil, slaves were very affordable and very much available to anyone who wanted to own another human being. There is no doubt that the abolition of slavery in Brazil could only begin when slaves became a more expensive and increasingly difficult to acquire source of labor.

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[3] J.B.A. Imbert, "Guia medica das mães de familia, ou a infancia considerada na sua hygiene, suas molestias e tratamentos," in *Children of God's Fire: A Documentary History of Black Slavery in Brazil* trans. Robert E. Conrad, ed. Robert E. Conrad (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 135.

[4] Katia M. de Queirós Mattoso, *To Be a Slave in Brazil: 1550-1888*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1986), 108.

The sheer amount of slave ownership in Brazil is further illustrated when examining Afro-Brazilian slave ownership. Abolition was never just a matter of inciting the slaves to rebel against their masters, as slaves were not a uniform group and were often not against the institution of slavery but rather their place within it. For example, Mattoso described how "It was common...for a slave without legal status to own one or more slaves."[5] Despite the fact that they experienced the horrors of slavery firsthand, certain slaves owned other slaves. These slaves, while undoubtedly upset by their own status and treatment, accepted the institution of slavery and morally accepted the idea of owning another person. If slaves themselves could believe that the institution of slavery was both an acceptable and necessary system of labor in Brazil, the task of convincing the European descended Brazilian population, especially those in positions of power, was going to prove very difficult.

When fighting slavery, abolitionists had to tackle the fact that slaves served as more than just agricultural laborers and domestic servants. Newspaper advertisements found in a 1921 Rio newspaper show a lot about the diversity of the experiences of Brazilian slaves. Slaves for sale are advertised based on their skills such as baking, cooking, comb making and shoemaking.[6] This advertisement was found in *Children of God's Fire,* a collection of primary source documents translated into English ranging from the origins of African slavery in Brazil in the 1500s to the abolition of slavery in 1888. Robert E. Conrad, also the author of *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery*, chose the documents for the amount and detail they could provide on a variety of aspects of life in Brazil for both African and European descended members of the population during the

[5] Mattoso, *To Be a Slave in Brazil*, 115.
[6] "O Diario do Rio de Janeiro," in *Children of God's Fire,* ed. Robert E. Conrad, trans. Robert E. Conrad (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 111-115.

age of slavery. These advertisements demonstrate that most of Brazil's skilled craftspeople were enslaved. Chances are, for most Brazilians, the clothes they wore, the shoes on their feet, and the bread they ate, all were the products of slave labor. It is not hard to imagine that even in death, a Brazilian was most likely buried in a coffin that was made by slaves. These advertisements further demonstrate how dependent the overall society was on slave labor. Mattoso describes this phenomenon best when she writes

> It is exciting to decipher conditional manumission documents, because doing so helps make clear exactly how the slave system worked: the slave was dependent on the master, but the master was dependent on the slave. The men and women who owned slaves knew that they could not survive without the help of their servants.[7]

Throughout *To Be A Slave in Brazil*, Mattoso argues and provides evidence against the commonly held belief that slaves in a slave society were completely powerless and depended entirely on their masters for survival. She specifically argues that this one-sided relationship could not exist because Brazilian society was dependent on slaves. She connects how this mutual dependency between slaves and slave masters was the basis of many Brazilian policies.

The reliance of Brazilian society on slave labor is further exemplified by the amount of effort taken to control the enslaved. For example, the majority of advertisements in the 1821 newspaper are descriptions of runaway slaves.[8] In *Children of God's Fire*, Conrad hoped to provide English-speaking researchers with direct evidence to challenge the idealistic and positive portrayals of slavery that were characteristic of: earlier Latin American historiography, specifically targeting Gilberto Freyre and Frank Tannenbaums' hypothesis that Brazilian slavery was less damaging to slaves than slavery practiced other parts of the New World. The volume of advertisements for runaway

[7] Mattoso, *To Be a Slave in Brazil*, 188.
[8] "O Diario do Rio de Janeiro," 111-115.

slaves shows that throughout the age of slavery in Brazil slaves resisted their fate and sought to emancipate themselves. However, the violent ways in which they were recaptured and punished demonstrated both to themselves, their fellow slaves, and the overall Brazilian population the dangers of going against the established slave society. These advertisements disprove the idea of a milder form of slavery in Brazil with the simple fact that people who are content with their way of life do not run away, especially in spite of the great dangers they knew they would face. These actions make it clear that slaves did not accept their condition of slavery and quite often negotiated for freedom even before the abolitionist movement rose in Brazil.

During the 19th century, the world seemed to be aware of the barbarity of Brazilian slavery as abolitionists argued that Brazil's use of slavery made them look uncivilized and unsympathetic to the world at large. On the one hand, Brazil was an enormous country filled with diverse groups each with different interests and the maintenance of the system of slavery allowed them to come together for a common goal of maintaining stability for their overall well being. For example, when describing the suppression of the 1835 slave uprising in Bahia, when a group of slaves and freedmen, united by a shared faith in Islam, inspired a mass urban revolt that was only stopped by a betrayal from a fellow slave and the intervention of the armed forces, Reis writes,

> Cultural and national ties brought the most powerful and the most abject Brazilians together against African-born slaves. It did not even matter that some of them had no slaves, or that some were slaves themselves.[9]

Reis wrote *Slave Rebellion in Brazil* to place the events of the 1835 Bahia uprising in the proper context focusing on the political, economic and social climate of the early years of the Brazilian Empire. The Brazilian government used slave revolts as an opportunity to

[9] João José Reis, *Slave Rebellion in Brazil: The Muslim Uprising of 1835 in Bahia*, trans. Arthur Brakel (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 232.

prove to a skeptical population its ability to protect their interests from internal threats, such as armed rebellious slaves. Moreover, the government tried to unite the population in ending the revolt and punishing the perpetrators. This source shows how that Brazilian government struggled to legitimize its power and this fragility of government would continue to be a problem for Brazil throughout the rule of the empire.

By the late 19th century, maintaining slavery became such a part of the Brazilian identity that going against slavery was considered un-Brazilian. For example,

> According to *O Corsario* of Rio de Janeiro, Nabuco had chosen abolition as a way to gain recognition in foreign countries after suffering personal and political setbacks, including his failure to marry a wealthy woman.[10]

This article from a pro-slavery Rio de Janeiro newspaper accuses Joaquim Nabuco, leader of the Brazilian abolitionist movement, of putting his need to be accepted by foreigners ahead of the needs of the Brazilian people. Abolition is portrayed as a demand only made by foreigners, demonstrating the amount of foreign criticism Brazil received for continuing to practice slavery. The controversy of abolition is illustrated when the article author directly attacks Nabuco's character in a broadly read paper simply for holding beliefs that he did not agree with. Additionally, this article makes it clear that with an economy based on exporting products to foreign countries, Brazil was well connected with the rest of the world by the late 19th century.

However, the slavery associated with Brazilian identity was not the reality of people living in squalid conditions working day and night often nearly beaten to death. Instead,

> Pictures of the faithful slave and the benevolent master – pictures fixed in Brazilian literature and history – represent not so much the actual behavior

[10] Conrad, *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery*, 116.

> of slaves and masters, but myths created by a slaveholding society to defend a system which that society regarded as indispensable.[11]

This description comes from Emilia Viotti Da Costa's *The Brazilian Empire Myths and Histories*. Da Costa takes a different approach against the argument that Brazilian slavery was relatively benign by focusing on how this belief originated. This book was translated into English by the author herself for an American audience unaware of how historical myths, the stories created to justify the actions of those in the past, shape identity in Brazil as well as to force readers to consider how myths shape identity in general. The perpetuation of the lie of mild slavery demonstrates the lengths that Brazilians went through to justify their continuation of the use of slavery, as they were very aware of their dependence on slave labor. This image of slavery, as being a mutually beneficial relationship to both slave and master, was the image of slavery that Brazil presented to the world through its own writings, both literary and legal.

In fact, the hardships of slavery are seldom mentioned in the official documents of the Brazilian Empire. For example, the famed abolitionist, Joaquim Nabuco, writes of how

> The rest of our fundamental law makes no mention of slavery, in fact, its organizers did not want to spoil their work or to reveal its iniquitous character. With the inclusion of Article 179, which guarantees the inviolability of private property, even one small reference to slavery anywhere in the Constitution would have turned it into a monstrosity.[12]

This excerpt comes from Robert E. Conrad's translation of Nabuco's masterpiece of pro-abolitionist propaganda, *Abolitionism*, published in 1883. In *Abolitionism*, Nabuco urges his fellow Brazilians in power that the institution of slavery is the cause of Brazil's failure to become an enlightened Western nation and that they must continue to fight for the

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[11] Da Costa, *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories,* 137.
[12] Joaquim Nabuco, *Abolitionism: The Brazilian Antislavery Struggle*, trans. Robert E. Conrad (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977), 43.

complete abolition of slavery. Nabuco argues that the writers of the 1824 Brazilian Constitution were ashamed of the fact that slavery was still occurring in Brazil even at this time. The fact that the basis of the government itself, the constitution of 1824, barely mentions such an important institution in Brazilian life, is telling as to how the Brazilian Empire wanted those who read their constitution to think of them.

The dangers of being viewed by the world as uncivilized became very clear in the struggle to end the slave trade in Brazil. Specifically, "The slave trade had ended only after three decades of British pressure which culminated in a virtual blockade by the Royal Navy in 1850."[13] This blockade demonstrated that only direct intervention from the British Empire could stop people in Brazil from buying slaves transported directly from Africa. Moreover, the issue of the slave trade had allowed the British Empire to directly challenge the sovereignty of the Brazilian Empire by enforcing its own policies in Brazilian waters. Brazil's difficulties in controlling its territory are acknowledged by Nabuco as well. He writes,

> Only in one sense was the Aberdeen Bill less than honorable to England. As stated at various times in the British Parliament, Britain did to a weak nation what she would not have done to a powerful one. One of the last slave cargoes to Brazil, that of the so-called Africans of Bracuí interned in 1852 at Bananal in São Paulo, was transported under the flag of the United States.[14]

The Aberdeen Bill was the specific law that resulted in the blockade of Brazil's ports by the British Empire. Here Nabuco criticizes the British Empire for refusing to intervene in the policies of the much more powerful United States. This criticism, however, acknowledges both the weakness of the Brazilian Empire in world affairs and an

[13] Thomas E. Skidmore, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought*. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 19.
[14] Nabuco, *Abolitionism*, 68.

awareness that Brazil was not considered a powerful enough country for its sovereignty to be respected.

By the late 19th century, slavery severely damaged Brazil's reputation abroad. Nabuco complains in *Abolitionism* of how,

> Charles Darwin (I have used this example more than once), could find no words than these with which to take leave of a country whose admirable nature ought to have had the greatest possible effect upon his creative mentality: 'On the 19th of August we finally left the shores of Brazil. I thank God, I shall never again visit a slave-country.'[15]

Throughout *Abolitionism*, Nabuco stresses the shame he feels in Brazil's inability to measure up to the standards against slavery imposed by the rest of the world. Similar to most wealthy well-educated Brazilians, Nabuco read the works of prominent Europeans with great interest and admiration. That is why that he is so upset that when his heroes come to visit his own country they cannot see past the horrors of slavery still occurring there. Moreover, Nabuco is frustrated that his beloved country is still being defined in terms of its lesser advancement compared to Europe.

It is clear that Nabuco hoped for Brazil to become more aligned with the antislavery policies of the rest of the world. He wrote,

> True patriotism – that which reconciles this country with humanity – no longer claims that Brazilians had the right to go with their flag, in the shadow of international law created to protect and not to destroy mankind, to steal human beings in Africa and ship them to our shores.[16]

Nabuco argues that Brazilian citizens are acting against the best interests of humanity itself by continuing to be involved with slavery. Nabuco implies that if Brazil wants to be a respected country in world affairs it needs to respect the established rules, which are created by the more powerful states of the world. Nabuco believes that it is important to

[15] Nabuco, *Abolitionism*, 162-163.
[16] Nabuco, *Abolitionism*, 72.

be part of the global community and that slavery is putting Brazil on the fringe of acceptable society. Adding to this, Nadelmann describes,

> But even among the laggards, especially among the laggards, the consciousness of being perceived as primitive and deviant surely weighed heavily in the decisions of local rulers to do away with slavery.[17]

This quote comes from Ethan Nadelmann's article "Global Prohibition Regimes" which includes a detailed description of the abolition of slavery throughout the world. Nadelmann is not a historian; in fact, he has served as the Executive Director of Drug Policy Alliance and this article was written to provide parallels between the modern day "War on Drugs" and historical bans that have united different global forces such the worldwide abolition of slavery during the 19th century. The imperial government had to balance its desire to follow international law with the demands of the planter elite that ran the country. This policy of appeasement was in part why abolition took so long to accomplish despite increasing demands to be rid of the institution of slavery, both from abolitionists at home and abroad.

After the serious enforcement of the ban on the slave trade in 1850, slavery had begun to die out as an institution in Brazil. The policies toward slavery in the Brazilian Empire are best described when Conrad writes, "What was needed was a change in the slave system sufficiently impressive to satisfy foreign and native critics without too much immediate harm to the powerful at home."[18] This description explains the actions toward gradual abolition taken by the government of the Brazilian Empire. For example, Nabuco writes,

> The initiative taken against slavery in Paraguay by the Count d'Eu, husband of the Imperial Princess, as Commander in Chief of our army, was another commitment made before the world. How could the world

[17] Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes," 497.
[18] Conrad, *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery*, 49.

> believe that the Brazilian general, in demanding the abolition of slavery in the conquered nation, did not commit the conqueror to the moral obligation of achieving the same thing in his own country?[19]

In this passage, Nabuco references the other promises made personally by the Brazilian emperor Dom Pedro II, specifically his promise made to foreign abolitionists to rid the country of slavery. The hypocrisy of the Brazilian emancipation of Paraguayan slaves shows how although the Brazilian emperor told the world he was committed to abolishing slavery he was too afraid of losing the little power that he had to take serious action at home. This and his vague promises demonstrate that initially the emperor was more concerned about pleasing foreign critics than answering abolitionist movements at home. By freeing the Paraguayan slaves, the government of Brazil was able to show the world that they were serious about abolition without actually changing the lives of the millions of slaves still in their own territory. The freeing of Paraguayan slaves allowed the Brazilian Empire to take a stand against slavery that would not greatly anger all of Brazil's slave owners.

Similarly, the government's fear of the wealthy slave owners' power was demonstrated in the weak enforcement of the reforms they eventually passed. For example, Mattoso describes how "Slaves were generally unaware of the laws. They rarely benefited from favorable laws unless they had the support of free men."[20] The slave's' inability to take advantage of the new laws demonstrates how much respect the majority of the people in Brazil had for these laws and their enforcement. The fact that the slaves needed the support of free men to take advantage of the new laws reflects how slaves were dependent on free people in order to gain any type of place within Brazilian society.

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[19] Nabuco, *Abolitionism*, 51.
[20] Mattoso, *To Be a Slave in Brazil*, 158.

Brazil's policy of passing reforms against slavery without changing the status quo is demonstrated in the passage and enforcement of the Rio Blanco law. Nabuco describes this as "The law did *not attend to the present generations;* but it was made in their name, was wrought by the compassion and concern which their fate aroused inside and outside the country, which spread the news to the world that Brazil had freed her slaves."[21] Here Nabuco refers to how in 1871 the government of Brazil passed the Rio Blanco law, also known as the law of the free womb, which said that the children of slaves were free. However, this law allowed slave owners to keep the children of slaves in the same conditions as slaves and work as slaves. This law was clearly more beneficial to the slave owners who gained the guaranteed labor of not only their slaves but their slaves' children. Yet this law was portrayed abroad as conforming to the new global standards of expanded freedom for all people, despite the the use of these laws within the country to maintain the slave system. Similarly, after the sexagenarian law was passed in 1885 that freed older slaves,

> Late in October it was learned that the Portuguese Havas news agency had informed the world that Brazilian slavery had been abolished…In contrast to the information received in foreign countries, Brazilian newspapers were running advertisements threatening to prosecute persons who sheltered slaves.[22]

Although this law had the potential to free some slaves, the main part of the law enforced was the part that made it illegal to help runaway slaves. This is yet another example of the Brazilian government exaggerating the extent of its actions to end slavery in order to win the approval of the world at large. The outcomes of the passage of both the law of the free womb and the sexagenarian law exemplify the difficulty of ending slavery in Brazil and how even legislature that was supposed to help the slaves ended up being used to

[21] Nabuco, *Abolitionism*, 60.
[22] Conrad, *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery*, 170.

strengthen the slowly dying institution. These laws also show, that even as late as the 1880s, Brazil had yet to find a globally, domestically acceptable alternative for labor that would maintain their agricultural economy.

Brazil's misrepresentation of itself to the world went beyond slavery. It was clear that Brazil wanted to appear to the world as a European country that just happened to be in South America. For example, Nabuco writes in a way that appeals to his presumably European audience, incorporating racist ideas popular in Europe into his arguments. For example, he argues that "Many of the effects of slavery can be attributed to the black race, to its backward mental development, to its still barbarous instincts, to its crude superstitions."[23] Nabuco's writing about the inherent inferiority of the African descended population of Brazil, while not surprising for a European-Brazilian during this time, is perplexing for many reasons. His statement about Africans seems to contradict all of the effort he went through in order to ensure the freedom of this very population. Growing up in Brazil, a country dependent on Europe and shaped by the policies of Europe, it is clear that Nabuco accepted, and incorporated into his writing, many ideas from Europe. However, unlike many of his contemporaries in Europe, and even Brazil itself, he does not deny that Afro-Brazilians deserve humane treatment.

Nabuco's racist commentary is made more confusing considering the fact that he worked with Afro-Brazilians in order to fight for the abolition of slavery in Brazil. For example,

> Despite the indifference of many former slaves toward the fate of those still in bondage, many were attracted to the movement, particularly those who like Luiz Gama, a lawyer in São Paulo, José do Patrocíncio, a journalist in Rio and André Rebouças, an engineer also in Rio, had climbed the social ladder.[24]

[23] Nabuco, *Abolitionism*, 102.
[24] Da Costa, *Brazilian Empire*, 162.

This quote illustrates that although racism did exist in Brazil there were still opportunities for Afro-Brazilians to become important members of Brazilian society. This further illustrates that Nabuco's racist language was an example of him attempting to appeal to a foreign audience by using their language and terminology to describe his situation. However, the fact that Nabuco used racist terminology in his arguments, despite working with Afro-Brazilians in the struggle for abolition, demonstrates how Afro-Brazilians were not considered a part of the mainstream Brazilian society.

Ironically enough, in the struggle for the abolition of slavery in Brazil, the needs of the Afro-Brazilian community were not very often addressed. The place of Afro-Brazilians in society is illustrated when Mattoso writes,

> It is as if Brazilian society, which used manumission much more frequently than other slave societies in the New World, did so in full awareness, even certainty, that the distinction between slave and freed man was in the end, a sham, a matter of semantics, a gold star awarded to good workers.[25]

This quote shows that freedom for the formerly enslaved did not guarantee a dramatic change in their way of living because most of society still considered them by their former slave statuses. It is true that even during the era of slavery, slaves could gain their freedom; nonetheless, this freedom did not guarantee treatment as equals with the European descended population of Brazil. This problem is further explained when Da Costa writes,

> Since abolition had been the result more of a desire to free Brazil from the problems of slavery than of a wish to emancipate the slaves, the dominant classes did not concern themselves with the black man and his integration into a class society.[26]

[25] Mattoso, *To Be a Slave in Brazil*, 183.
[26] Da Costa, *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories*, 170.

The overall lack of concern for the fate of the former slaves demonstrates the limited inclusion of Afro-Brazilians into the overall Brazilian society during the late 19th century.

Clearly there was no room for Afro-Brazilians in the identity Brazil wanted to show the world. For example, although from 1891, in a book written by a Brazilian in French for the purpose of convincing French knowledge workers to come to Brazil, Skidmore describes the author,

> He frankly admitted that 'although my country is very large, my country has never been able to gain the serious attention of Europe.' Until recently, his 'French friends' knew little more than 'in our country there were Negroes and monkeys along with half-a-dozen whites of dubious color'[27]

This excerpt comes from Thoman E. Skidmore's *Black Into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought*, which examines the history of race relations in Brazil primarily focusing on the years after the abolition of slavery in the late 19th century and early 20th century. This book was written to challenge the common belief that racism did not exist in Brazil and that race was not a source of conflict in Brazil. This book examines how Brazilians interpreted racist thought from Western countries they admired, and negotiated it further with their own identities. The author of the excerpt makes it clear that he cared a lot about what Europeans thought of him and his country because Europe had not only workers, but also knowledge and capital that would greatly benefit Brazil's development. This hope for recruitment of Europeans is also telling because is portrayed as more important than developing a self-reliant Brazilian population.

Nabuco further attempts to portray Brazil as a European country by comparing it to other non-western countries. Specifically, Nabuco writes, "twenty more years of slavery would mean a stain upon Brazil's name during the entire time, its identification

[27] Skidmore, *Black into White*, 128.

with the name of Turkey."[28] Nabuco makes it clear that he wants the Brazilian Empire to be identified with Europe and not with the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was another part of the world where slavery still occurred. During the late 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was often used in European writing as a counterexample of what a civilized European country should look like and what it meant to be European. Nabuco appropriates this usage of the Ottoman Empire to further illustrate that by abolishing slavery Brazil would become a more Western nation.

Brazil's elite would come to believe that European immigration could solve both of Brazil's problems, needing people to work in the plantations as well as a desire to make Brazil a more European country. Nabuco describes his ideal Brazil as "…where European immigration, attracted by the openness of our institutions and by the freedom of our system, will endlessly send to the tropics a current of lively, energetic and healthy Caucasian blood which we can absorb without danger… "[29] The mention of Caucasian blood alludes to scientific racism theories popular in Europe at the time. Within the context of scientific racism, the emphasis on the strength of Caucasian blood contrasts with the idea of weak African blood, a reference to the inability of the slave population to maintain its size without continuous importation of slaves to Brazil from Africa that created labor shortages across the country. This reference to Caucasian blood demonstrates the belief that the key to Brazil's future is creating a population that is demographically more European. This is just one of many of the instances in *Abolitionism* where Nabuco stresses the importance of European immigration in creating a better Brazil. Nabuco believed that the abolition of slavery would make Brazil an attractive place for European immigrants to settle and start new lives. He also believed

[28] Nabuco, *Abolitionism*, 145
[29] Nabuco, *Abolitionism,* 171.

that new European immigrants would change the demographics of Brazil to make the country more European.

However, European immigration did not turn out to be as important in the abolition of slavery as the abolitionists had argued. One international event that seemed to serve as a catalyst for the abolition of slavery in Brazil was the abolition of slavery in Cuba in 1886. To start, Conrad argues that it was no coincidence that the biggest blow to slavery came in 1886 when "the General Assembly, under pressure from abolitionists and the example of Cuba, abolished corporal punishment, the key to the slave system."[30] Conrad believes Brazil's status as the last remaining stronghold of slavery in the New World fueled the passage of this law, the first act of gradual abolition that did not benefit the slaveholders. This was the first law that truly committed all parts of the nation to the abolition of slavery as it prevented the local government from intervening by maintaining the slave system through violence.

The abolitionist movement was correct in that legislature was key to abolishing slavery. Specifically, the 1886 law had a huge effect on ending slavery in Brazil. Conrad describes how without the guaranteed support of the police and military, "with a sudden awareness of a new state of things, whole plantation work forces, encouraged by Bento's 'underground movement,' were setting off for some nearby forest, or distant city or entirely unknown destination".[31] The new law sparked the greatest mass exodus of slaves in Brazilian history, leaving uncompensated plantation owners desperately scrambling to find new sources of labor. In the excerpt, Bento refers to Antônio Bento, an abolitionist who began a movement whose members infiltrated plantations and helped slaves free themselves. This was much easier said than done and required collaboration from a

[30] Conrad, *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery*, 174.
[31] Conrad, *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery*, 183.

variety of groups in Brazilian society. Conrad describes how "the men who joined Bento were drawn from all classes and every political party. They included black members of the brotherhood of Nossa Senhora dos Remedios and the provincial intelligentsia, ex-slaves as well as former masters and the sons of masters." [32] As slavery became less affordable, less enforceable and less common, it became less sympathetic to large swathes of the Brazilian population. Clearly a new attitude toward slavery, the one factor that once united the Brazilian people, had taken root. Organizations such as Bento's showed how the abolition movement became a new unifying force in Brazilian society, bringing people of various backgrounds together to fight for a cause that seemed more and more logical.

This is not to say the abolitionist promotion of immigration was completely irrelevant. For example, "The two events were interlocked, but it was the flight of the slaves more than the presence of the Italians that at last convinced the masters of São Paulo that the time to liberate had come."[33] This illustrates that European immigration did help fill the shortage of labor that began with the initial gradual abolition laws. This demonstrates that planters became more convinced that the abolition of slavery would not result in the complete destruction of the economy. After all, realizing that slavery would never return to Brazil, many slaveholders freed their slaves unconditionally. One such planter turned abolitionist was Paula Souza, who in a letter to a fellow planter, describes how although his former slaves are no longer tied to the land, they and his new other new freemen immigrant and European Brazilian workers rely on him to purchase food and

[32] Conrad, *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery*, 180.
[33] Conrad, *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery*, 191

pay rent to live where they lived before.[34] Desperate to maintain their power, the planters hijacked the abolitionist movement to fit their interests. Through sharecropping methods, as described by Souza, planters found creative solutions that allowed them to maintain the status quo without breaking any of the new laws. The abolition of slavery required agreement from the most powerful planters in order to be accepted by Brazilian society. However, it is clear that the actions of Afro-Brazilians themselves in taking control of their destinies played a much larger role in the abolition of slavery in Brazil than did European immigration.

On May 13th, 1888, Princess Isabel passed the Golden Law which completely ended nearly four hundred years of slavery in Brazil with no compensation for slave owners. Between the end of the slave trade in 1850, the passage of the law of the free womb in 1871 and this law, much changed in Brazil. Abolition showed the world that Brazil was a truly free country that was ready to become a modern Western nation. Abolition as a popular movement had replaced slavery with freedom as a force that united the Brazilian people. And of course, after limiting the means for maintaining the slave system, slaveholders quickly learned to adapt to life in a world without slavery as their slaves abandoned their plantations. However, one does not simply erase nearly four hundred years of a system based on violence, dehumanization and inequality in a few short sentences. Although the abolition of slavery was a victory for human rights in Brazil, it did little to end the poverty and dependence of the Afro-Brazilian population on the European descended population. Abolition reflected the realization of the dangers of depending on a world that views their country as weak and inferior. Despite these efforts,

[34] Paula Souza, "'Hours of Bitterness and Terror': A Planter's Account of the Ending of Slavery," in *Children of God's Fire*: *A Documentary History of Black Slavery in Brazil*, trans. Robert E. Conrad, ed. Robert E. Conrad (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 476-480.

Brazil could never and would never be considered a fellow European country that happened to be located in South America.

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From Lord Lugard to Mohammad Yusuf: The Development of Nigerian Views toward Western Biomedicine, 1900-2015

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On February 8, 2013, armed gunmen rode into the northern Nigerian city of Kano on motorbikes and shot nine female health workers to death. These personnel had been preparing to administer door-to-door poliomyelitis vaccinations as part of Nigeria's Polio Eradication Initiative (PEI), itself a subsidiary of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), which began in 1988. Witnesses claimed members of *Jama'atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda'awati wal-Jihad* ("People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad"), known colloquially as *Boko Haram* (literally, "Western education is forbidden"), had carried out the assaults. President Goodluck Jonathan was quick to condemn "the dastardly terrorist attacks … which claimed the lives of health workers who were dutifully engaged in vaccinations to protect and save the lives of Nigerian children."[1]

Boko Haram, however, did not orchestrate these attacks within a sociopolitical vacuum: not every northern Nigerian holds the same views toward vaccinations as Jonathan. This became clear three days after the attacks, when Kano police arrested four producing journalists of a Hausa radio program called "Sandar Girma." The Thursday before the shootings, these journalists had used the program to voice criticism about the manner in which the Kano state government was conducting its polio vaccination campaign.[2] The Boko Haram attacks, the journalists' criticism of a governmental health program and the Kano state government's reaction to that criticism all have something

[1] Abdulsalam Muhammad and Ben Agande, "Jonathan condemns killing of female health workers in Kano," *Vanguard News*, 8 February 2013, accessed 27 April 2015,
[2] Lawan Adamu, "How Attack on Polio Workers Landed Kano Journalists in Court," *Daily Trust* (Abuja), 17 February 2013, accessed 27 April 2015.

important to say about Western biomedicine in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram's stance on Western medical knowledge reflects an aversion towards Western medical practices that is common among northern Nigerian Muslims. As particularly demonstrated by the Kano police's handling of the "Sandar Girma" journalists, such antipathy is as much attributable to governmental failings as to religious ideology.

Since Boko Haram's acts of terrorism against health workers are a manifestation of views towards Western biomedicine held by a large portion of northern Nigerian Muslims, one must examine these acts within a number of different contexts. The first of these is the complex relationship between Islam and medicine. Religious ideology, however, is only part of the story. The repeated failure of Nigerian government actors to demonstrate a meaningful and sincere commitment to developing adequate public health infrastructure has proven just as critical. In this regard, one must consider the impact of colonial administrators on Nigerian medicine, the politics of Nigerian healthcare, and government collaboration with recent Western biomedical interventions, namely Nigeria's PEI.

The "Bio-Politics" of Boko Haram, 2002-2015

In order to contextualize Boko Haram's acts of terrorism against health workers within the history of Western biomedicine in Nigeria, it is first necessary to examine the rationale behind such acts. Stuart Elden neatly defines this rationale as the "bio-politics" of Boko Haram:

> In terms of the reaction against health workers and health programmes there is something peculiar going on here with a group that is seeking control of territory, and control of law over that territory, also seeking to control the bodies that are within it, their health, and the medicines that they have access to. A related reading could be made of the kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls and of the group's more general targeting of women. One thing that the programmes and the

> resistance to them shows is that geopolitics and biopolitics need to be understood together, bodies in place and places embodied.[3]

Elden is right to point out the interrelationship between geopolitical and bio-political factors in Nigeria, especially considering Boko Haram's stated aims to create an Islamic theocracy in Nigeria, or at least in the country's majority Muslim north.[4] As can be seen from Figure 1, twelve northern Nigerian states have successfully adopted *sharia* law since 1999. Boko Haram, however, wants to further ensure this *sharia* conforms to Islamic orthodoxy. The jihadists thus desire to challenge the secularity of the Nigerian state, which implies that the group needs control over people as much as it needs control over institutions. Boko Haram members refuse to accept Western biomedicine, and target health workers implementing Western biomedical programs, in part because doing so allows them the control over human beings that *sharia* law demands.

Figure 1. Nigerian States under *Sharia* Law

Source: Elden, "The Geopolitics of Boko Haram," 415.

Yet this explanation in itself does not do enough to capture the complexities of Boko Haram's attitudes toward Western knowledge in general, and toward its *materia medica* in particular. The nickname Boko Haram has adopted ("Western education is

[3] Stuart Elden, "The Geopolitics of Boko Haram and Nigeria's 'War on Terror'," *Geographical Journal* 180 (2014): 421.
[4] Daniel A. Tonwe and Surulola J. Eke, "State Fragility and Violent Uprisings in Nigeria," *African Security Review* 22 (2013): 235.

forbidden") indicates their aversion to Western education. By relying upon the literal translation of this name, however, Western intellectuals have fallen into the age-old trap of simplifying the African narrative. The word *boko* has a wider connotation than simply "Western education." Encompassed within it are Western values and civilization as a whole; in a more localized northern Nigerian context, it has come to signify "those who take Western money and do not act charitably towards the normal people."[5] Given the prevalence of corruption within the Nigerian government at both national and state levels, it is not difficult to perceive how Boko Haram members could have included government officials within this latter category. Boko Haram's view of government agents as *boko* engenders skepticism and resistance to governmental programs, including public health campaigns.

By expanding their understanding of the word *boko*, Western scholars can take a new approach to studying Boko Haram's contempt toward Westernization. An integral part of this *haram* ("forbidden" or "sacrilegious") Westernization is biomedicine. The founder of Boko Haram, Mohammad Yusuf, emphasized the status of the physical and applied sciences as fundamentally un-Islamic.[6] His position on vaccines in particular was especially condemnatory:

> For Yusuf modern vaccines are not better than Prophetic medicine, adding that 'black seed', the water from the Zam-zam well near the Ka'ba in Mecca, and olive oil are 'Islamically' proven medications. He also stated that he had read on the Internet that modern vaccines have side effects; hence prophetic medicine is better than modern vaccines. Here Yusuf seems to be echoing the rejection of polio vaccination by some Muslims. Yusuf grandly declared these concepts and theories contrary to Qur'an and Sunna; learning them [or using them] is thus haram [forbidden].[7]

[5] Elden, "The Geopolitics of Boko Haram," 415.
[6] Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos *et al*., *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria* (Enschede, Netherlands: Ipskamp Drukkers, 2014), 17.
[7] Anonymous, "The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter-Radicalism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 42 (2012): 125.

The Prophetic Medicine of which Yusuf spoke consists of a compilation of *Hadith* (sayings of the Prophet) and portions of the Qur'an relating to illness, which emphasize the power of prayer in both prevention and healing. The basic message of *The Prophetic Medicine* is that for every ailment, God will provide a cure.[8] This message represents a continuity with the tenets of Islamic ideology: there has long been a perception among many Muslims, particularly in northern Nigeria, that both health and illness can only be given from Allah.[9]

However, in order to determine the degree to which Boko Haram's aversion to Western biomedicine is based in its Islamist roots, and to what degree it is based on a fundamental distrust of the Nigerian government, it is necessary to go deeper. Although Yusuf categorized the physical and applied sciences as *haram*, he was not religiously mandated to do so. In a 2006 debate with Sheikh Isa Pantami, another northern Islamic cleric, Yusuf stipulated Muslims could adopt knowledge derived from Western education so long as that knowledge did not call into question the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed. He even went so far as to assert "we can teach these subjects to our own children in our own schools, so long as they do not contradict Islamic teachings. If they do, then we should discard them."[10] Yusuf's assertion reflects a truth which helps examine the relationship between Islam and medicine: where religion is ambiguous on Western biomedicine, other factors take precedence in shaping northern Nigerian views on the subject.

As Elden noted in his description of Boko Haram's bio-politics, and as Boko Haram's singling out of female health workers in the 2013 Kano attacks illustrates, part

[8] Elisha P. Renne, "Parallel Dilemmas: Polio Transmissions and Political Violence in Northern Nigeria," *Africa* 84 (2014): 474.
[9] I. Ghinai *et al*., "Listening to the Rumours: What the Northern Nigeria Polio Vaccine Boycott Can Tell Us Ten Years On," *Global Public Health* 8 (2013): 1142.
[10] Montclos *et al., Boko Haram*, 17.

of the group's strategy concerns the targeting of women. Boko Haram's uniquely extreme position on gender segregation sets it apart from other northern Nigerian Muslim reformist movements, such as the Shi'ite *'Yan Uwan Musulmi* or the Wahhabist *Izala.* Boko Haram demands both an absolute rejection of Western education and the complete withdrawal of women from contact with the outside world.[11] By combining these two aims, the jihadists have significantly restricted northern Nigerian women's access to basic health services.

This has been especially true since 2009, when President Jonathan's aggressive crackdown on Boko Haram members engendered the full-scale violence that has since swept through northeastern Nigeria. Musa Babakura, a surgeon at the University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital, described the impact of the uprising on female and child health: "the rate of maternal and infant mortality is bound to rise in the [Borno state] as a result of complications arising from poor transportation facilities to hospital."[12] Boko Haram, however, has had additional, indirect effects on women's health. According to Nigeria's 2008 Demographic and Health Survey, "a woman's likelihood of seeking antenatal care and delivering her baby with a skilled birth attendant present is closely correlated with residence, level of education, wealth, and level of empowerment within her household."[13] Since Boko Haram opposes co-educational learning and facilitates the disempowerment of women, group members further reduce the likelihood mothers will get the medical attention they need. By forcing many health implementers to shut down

[11] Steven Pierce, "The Public, the Private, and the Sanitary: Domesticity and Family Regulation in Northern Nigeria," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 14 (2013): 13.
[12] "Healthcare services collapse as doctors, nurses flee Borno," *Vanguard News*, 9 March 2014, accessed 2 May 2015, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/03/healthcare-services-collapse-doctors-nurses-flee-borno/.
[13] Jennifer G. Cooke and Farha Tahir, *Maternal Health in Nigeria: With Leadership, Progress is Possible,* Center for Strategic & International Studies Global Health Policy Center, January 2013: 6.

in northern Nigeria, and by enforcing gender segregation in the territories under their control, Boko Haram members pose a serious threat to maternal health gains made in northern Nigeria over the past few decades.

Islam and Western Biomedicine

Figure 2. Ethnic Diversity in Nigeria



Source: "Nigeria Elections: Mapping a Nation Divided," BBC News, 9 February 2015, accessed 5 April 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31101351.

Although Boko Haram members have adopted a stance on Western biomedicine that is extreme even by northern Nigerian standards, their views are still, at least in part, a product of local conditions. One such condition is the prevalence of Islam in northern Nigeria. As can be seen from Figure 2, Nigeria's north is generally dominated by Muslims of Hausa and Fulani ethnicity. The biopolitics of Boko Haram are in themselves nothing new; it is the violent tactics the group is using in its campaign against Western *materia medica* which represent a definite break with northern Nigerian norms. Northern Nigerian Muslims have molded local Islamic ideology into something far more than a religious doctrine. In a region where the religious becomes inextricably entangled with the ethnic, Islam has become an integral

part of local Nigerians' identities.[14] Since "medical systems are both social and cultural systems," northern Nigerians' acceptance of Islam as an integral part of their daily lives structures the ways in which they view Western biomedicine.[15]

Despite what its pervasiveness in northern Nigeria may suggest, Islam is not native to the region. Islam came to Hausaland only in the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century, and Islamic medicine gained predominance over traditional (i.e. indigenous) Hausa and Fulani conceptions of health only after the nineteenth century Fulani jihad.[16] This chronology is important because, as Ismail Abdalla argues:

> By the time Islam and Islamic medicine came to Hausaland … Islamic medicine in *dar al-Islam* had already passed its high days, and lost, accordingly … its empirical approach to disease and cure. It was impregnated with religious and para-religious ideas that emphasized the curative property of divination, numerology, and prayer, especially prayer in traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad.[17]

The Islamic medicine that northern Muslim Hausa and Fulani adopted stressed Allah's role in granting all health and illness - "to complain of ill-health is to lodge a complaint against Him–which is almost unthinkable."[18] By embracing this tenet, many northern Nigerian Muslims turned away from Western *materia medica* and its emphasis on biomedical disease prevention and cure.

By adopting the belief that all health and illness is given by Allah, Hausa and Fulani Muslims created a cultural context in which northern Nigerians often stigmatize attempts to mitigate disease via medicines other than those the Qur'an approves. This

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[14] Ghinai *et al*., "Listening to the Rumours," 1140.
[15] Arthur Kleinman, *Patients and Healers in the Context of Culture: An Exploration of the Borderline between Anthropology, Medicine, and Psychiatry* (Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 1980), 26.
[16] Abdalla Ismail Hussein, *Islam, Medicine, and Practitioners in Northern Nigeria*, (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1997), 19.
[17] Ibid., 13.
[18] M. Last, "Religion and Healing in Hausaland," in T. Falola (Ed.), *Christianity and Social Change in Africa: Essays in Honour of J. D. Y. Peel* (North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2005), 4.

particular interpretation of Islam affects other health-care related practices, such as the tendency for northern Nigerian Muslims to trust only other Muslims with health-related matters. This tendency represents a continuity with the ideology of Abdullahi Dan Fodio, one of the leaders in the 1804 Fulani jihad which largely succeeded in bringing native Hausa and Fulani medicinal traditions in line with Islamic religious orthodoxy.[19] In his treatise *Masalih al-Insan al-Muta*^{c}*alliqa bil-Adyan wal 'Abdan* ("Important Considerations for Man Relating to Religion and Health"), Dan Fodio makes clear "other religions and non-Muslim practitioners … have no place in the scheme of medical care he advocates" and that he trusts only other Muslims with the health care of local communities. [20] Because Westerners are often non-Muslim, Dan Fodio thus helped to engender a bias against Western medical interventions in northern Nigeria that persists to this day.

It is important to note, however, not all prominent Islamic intellectuals share this bias. In 2006, Muslim scholar Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi expressed his disappointment at the *fatwa* issued by Islamic scholars in Kano state forbidding the vaccination of children against polio. "The lawfulness of such vaccines in the point of view of Islam," al-Qaradawi stated unequivocally, "is as clear as sun light."[21] Together with the Islamic Fiqh Council, an international group which serves as a forum for intellectual interpretation and reflection (*Ijtihad*) on Islam, al-Qaradawi issued five statements regarding the legality of child vaccinations.[22]

The first of these invoked the Islamic juristic ruling that harm is to be warded off as much as possible, while the second insisted upon the responsibility of parents to

[19] Abdalla, *Islam, Medicine, and Practitioners*, 14.
[20] Ibid., 114.
[21] On Islam, "Preventing Child Vaccinations – Permissible?" 1 January 2006, accessed 5 April 2015.
[22] I. Ghinai *et al*., "Listening to the Rumours," 191.

protect their children against harm and disease. Concurrently, the third statement directed that people in authority needed to enact laws which would protect the population against disease, the fourth that the polio vaccine should not be labelled impure unless scientists discovered otherwise, and the fifth that no outstanding Muslim scholar had spoken out against the polio vaccine in all the other Islamic countries where it had been successfully administered.[23] Al-Qaradawi's ideological stance, bolstered as it was by an internationally recognized group of Islamic intellectuals, belies Western assumptions of Muslims as a monolithic entity. The basic reality remained, however, that a large portion of northern Nigerian Muslims shared an aversion toward Western biomedical practices not administered by fellow Muslims.

Through their advocacy of traditional, i.e. orthodox Islamic, medicine, *malam* practitioners in northern Nigeria have created a third cultural context: distrust of public hospitals. The title of *malam* is granted to any person versed in the Islamic sciences, and the *malamai* have become increasingly prevalent among the Hausa and Fulani. *Malam* practitioners only suggest a hospital trip if Islamic cures prove repeatedly unsuccessful; this usually means an illness is particularly difficult to cure, and hospitals are often unable to administer effective treatment. "Hospitals," Abdulla argues, are thus "stigmatized in public opinion because they are usually blamed for the deaths of those patients who go there as a last resort." [24] This phenomenon is not unique to northern Nigeria. During the 2014 Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone, so few of the victims taken to hospitals ever returned that the infected often hid from health workers.[25] Since Ebola is a

[23] On Islam, "Preventing Child Vaccinations."
[24] Ibid., 30.
[25] "Ebola Outbreak," *Frontline* video, 27:26, 9 September 2014, accessed 26 April 2015, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ebola-outbreak/.

contagious disease, the ramifications of hospital stigmatization proved more severe, as the infected usually hid in their homes and spread the disease to family members.

The particularities of Islamic medicine in northern Nigeria have thus created a cultural context in which local Muslims tend to distrust public health institutions. This distrust is exacerbated by the fact that "over 90% of [northern Nigerian Muslims] are not personally satisfied with the arrangements in [their] hospitals. These [arrangements] do not take cognizance of our religious values."[26] Opinions such as these illustrate a fundamental disconnect between government implementation of Western biomedical practices and government recognition of local conditions which necessarily structure how northern Nigerian Muslims will view such practices.

Differences between the western and Islamic definitions of polio demonstrate the divide between the two ways of thinking about health. According to Maryam Yahya, these definitions are almost irreconcilable. She states that "in biomedical terms, polio is caused by a virus and is preventable through scientific methods of immunization. In Hausa culture, *Shan-inna* (the Hausa word for polio) is an ailment of the spirit world."[27] Many Hausa Muslims in northern Nigeria believe *Shan-inna* to be a powerful female spirit who consumes the limbs of human beings, leading to the paralysis symptomatic of polio. Whereas Western biomedicine emphasizes the role of vaccination in polio prevention, indigenous Hausa medicine emphasizes the role of rituals performed by traditional healers.[28]

Keeping in mind the status of medical systems as both social and cultural entities, it should be unsurprising that the Hausa have articulated "disease, misfortune, and cure in

[26] Abdullahi Abdullahi Ginya, "Hospitals and Religious Values [Opinion]," *Daily Trust* (Abuja), 11 April 2010. Accessed 2 May 2015.
[27] Maryam Yahya, "Polio Vaccines – 'No Thank You!' Barriers to Polio Eradication in Northern Nigeria," *African Affairs* 106/423 (2007): 196.
[28] Ghinai *et al*., "Listening to the Rumours," 1141.

culturally meaningful idioms."[29] Nor are they the only ethnic group to have ever done so: during the 2000-2001 outbreak of Ebola in northern Uganda, the Acholi people utilized three explanatory models to conceptualize and respond to the outbreak: *yat* (a poison that enters the body and causes illness), *gemo* (a bad spirit which appears suddenly and affects many people), and the biomedical model of Ebola's spread.[30] In Acholi culture, *jok* (spirits or gods) are responsible for both *yat*- and *gemo*-induced illnesses.[31] By expressing a sensitivity toward Acholi explanations of Ebola and by incorporating "indigenous epidemic control measures" such as isolation and suspension of greetings into their efforts, health workers were able to make a real difference in mitigating the outbreak.[32] If Nigerian government actors and Western PEI officials show the same willingness, it is likely that they would be better equipped to work with local Hausa and Fulani Muslims to eradicate polio in northern Nigeria.

The Boko Haram jihadists demand full adherence to orthodox *sharia*, which prescribes both the "strict regulation of public and private" and unequal citizenship between Muslim and Christian, man and woman.[33] Islamic law both forms and legitimates Boko Haram's ideology. . Abubakur Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram since Mohammad Yusuf's death in 2009, demonstrated this in a 2012 video message: "Since you [Nigerian security forces] are now holding our women, just wait and see what will happen to your own women, to your own wives according to *Sharia* law."[34] Although Boko Haram's stance on gender segregation and its use of gender-based violence are

[29] Abdalla, *Islam, Medicine, and Practitioners*, 25.
[30] Barry S. Hewlett and Richard P. Amola, "Cultural Contexts of Ebola in Northern Uganda," *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 9, 10 (2003): 1242, 1244.
[31] Ibid., 1243.
[32] Ibid., 1247.
[33] Montclos et al., *Boko Haram*, 58.
[34] "Sako Zuwa Ga Duniya (A Message to the World)!" YouTube video, 8:59, posted by "Abba Ibrahim," 30 June 2012, accessed 2 May 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txUJCOKTIuk&sns=em.

extreme even by northern Nigerian standards, its ideology is underpinned to some degree by the legal status of women in Islamic law.

Islam's penetration into northern Nigeria has also had more indirect implications for the status of women within the region. Islamic intellectuals, for example, emphasize writing as the primary means by which to pass knowledge down from generation to generation. By replacing the Hausa tradition of orality in the sciences, "literacy effected a division of labor according to sex in medical practice."[35] Since men have always dominated the art of writing in northern Nigeria, changes in localized health systems which prioritized the verbal led to the increasing replacement of female *bori* practitioners with male *malamai*. Since *sharia* law and cultural norms both dictate only women can treat women, the loss of female practitioners in the region entails fewer options for northern Nigerian women in need of medical assistance.

Another indirect manner in which the Islamization of northern Nigeria undermined women's health in the region is through the emphasis Muslim medical writers place on diseases and problems associated with men. These authors, the most famous of whom is jihadist Muhammad Tukur, placed special emphasis on issues such as male sexual virility, marginalizing matters such as pregnancy, birth, nursing, and menstruation. The entirety of Tukur's publication *Mucawanat al-ikhwan* ("Help to Brethren with Regard to Their Relationship with Women"), as characterized by Abdalla, "is nothing but a collection of recipes for strengthening men's virility."[36] Such prioritization by male Muslims and for male Muslims again entails fewer skilled medical workers able to adequately treat Muslim Hausa and Fulani women.

[35] Abdalla, *Islam, Medicine, and Practitioners*, 148.
[36] Ibid., 149.

These two effects represent long-term trends in female access to public health services in northern Nigeria. By again taking polio as a specific example, the implications of the relationship among Islam, medicine, and gender become clearer. During the ongoing PEI, there have been multiple occasions in which health workers have immunized Nigerian children without parental consent, and sometimes over parental objections. Since mothers often have the most control over children within a family, such immunizations represent a blatant disregard for the right of women to make decisions regarding vaccinations according to their own beliefs.[37] In this respect at least, Western biomedical interventions have proven to diminish rather than enhance female empowerment - a result quite the opposite of stated goals.

This example is also important because it illustrates that not all women view Islam unfavorably. To a large portion of the region's female population, the Islamic religion is an integral part of their identities as Hausa or Fulani Muslims. These women thus desire the ability to make choices regarding Western biomedicine which adhere to Islamic tenets, or at least to a localized version of Islam. Just as Boko Haram is not a monolithic entity with one unified purpose, Muslims in northern Nigeria are not one single unit who all interpret Islamic ideology in the same manner. Western scholars should thus be careful not to transform Muslim Hausa and Fulani women into perpetually passive victims. Moreover, gender-based violence is not unique to Islam or northern Nigeria but rather transcends religion, ethnicity, and national borders. [38]

[37] Elisha Renne, *The Politics of Polio in Northern Nigeria,* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), 106.
[38] Jacob Zenn and Elizabeth Pearson, "Women, Gender, and the Evolving Tactics of Boko Haram," *Journal of Terrorism Research* 5 (2014): 47.

Colonial Administrators and Colonial Legacies, 1900-1960

The manner in which northern Nigerian Muslims conceptualize the interrelationships among Western *materia medica*, Islamic medicine, and traditional Hausa-Fulani therapeutic techniques partially informs their aversion to Western biomedicine. Government actors, however, have proven just as critical in propagating distrust of Western biomedical interventions since the outset of British colonial rule in Nigeria. From 1900 until 1960, British administrators monopolized control of Nigerian medicine, and a large portion of northern Nigerian Muslims still perceive Western biomedical practices to be a continuation of this colonial legacy.

Contemporary Nigerian government actors are unable to shake this perception in part because it was colonialists who initially brought disease to the country. In this regard, Abdalla is right to note "western medicine has been struggling…to remedy a bad epidemiological situation which colonialism helped bring about."[39] For Nigerians, it makes little sense to trust Western *materia medica* when Westerners were the ones to create an unfavorable disease environment in the first place. Disease accompanied British colonialists because, as Timothy Mitchell noted in his analysis of Egypt's 1942 malaria epidemic, disease moves with the changing movements of people.[40] British administrators facilitated, and often coerced, such changing movements by building transport infrastructures like railways and roads, by altering patterns of susceptibility and immunity to disease, and by forcing populations to move from healthy to unhealthy environments.[41]

[39] Abdalla, *Islam, Medicine, and Practitioners*, 29.
[40] Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 23.
[41] Reid, *History of Modern Africa,* 196; 214.

Although colonial administrators brought contagious diseases such as smallpox, cholera, and plague to Nigeria at the outset of the twentieth century, they addressed the effects of these diseases only selectively. Lord Frederick Lugard, who served as high commissioner of Northern Nigeria from 1899 until 1907 and then as Governor-General of Nigeria from 1912 until 1918, implemented medical policies typical of such inconsistency.[42] In order to meaningfully assess Lugard's policies, it is first essential to understand his doctrine of the dual mandate for British colonial rule. In his 1922 treatise on the mission of British imperialism in Africa, Lugard wrote:

> To the twentieth century belongs the heritage of the tropics and the task of their development. Two decades have already passed and wonderful progress has been made, not only in the improvement of the quality and quantity of the material output, by scientific research, by organised method, and by the expenditure of capital, but also in methods of administration for the welfare of the subject races, education, free labour, taxation, and other similar problems.[43]

The principle of the dual mandate implied British administrators were responsible to the colonial peoples for their material well-being and moral advancement.[44] Despite his fervent belief in both the dual mandate and his success in realizing it, however, Lugard did little during his tenure as Governor-General to meet Nigerian health needs.[45] This had much to do with Lugard's conviction that Africans were inherently inferior to Europeans. For example, Lugard cancelled plans for a badly-needed Lagos maternity home in 1914 after learning Africans insisted it be staffed with indigenous workers.[46]

Lugard's deep-seated racism indicates another structural problem within the British colonial medical system: healthcare administrators did not meaningfully engage

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[42] Thomas S. Gale, "Lord F. D. Lugard: An Assessment of His Contribution to Medical Policy in Nigeria," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 9 (1976): 632.
[43] Frederick D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (London, UK: William Blackwood and Sons, 1922), 6.
[44] Gale, *Lord Lugard*, 634.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.

African medical personnel. Even among other British governors in Africa, Lugard's stance on the "color bar" for entry into the West African Medical Staff was extreme.[47] Despite his stated belief in the duty of colonial governors to advance African development, Lugard's firm conviction in the inferiority of African health workers compelled him to exclude them from the emerging medical sector. Such exclusion has had two repercussions for northern Nigerian views toward Western biomedicine. The first is that, through his refusal to engage Nigerians as active partners, Lugard missed the opportunity to create a healthcare system able to meet the needs of ordinary Nigerians. In so doing, Lugard propagated a legacy of distrust in the Nigerian federal government. This distrust underwrites northern Nigerian aversion toward and skepticism of federal health programs involving Western biomedical techniques.

The second repercussion of Lugard's segregationist policies has been to engender Nigerian resistance toward top-down governmental health campaigns. Through his failure to utilize indigenous Nigerian personnel, Lugard participated in creating a colonial legacy which has encouraged such resistance because, as Richard Reid notes, "medicine is power."[48] By refusing to share this power with native workers, Lugard and his successors gained unprecedented control over the health and the bodies of Nigerians.[49] Contemporary public health programs such as the PEI represent this same loss of bodily autonomy, due largely to the manner in which the Nigerian government conducts them.

Health and government officials, for example, have attempted to suppress opposition to the PEI by threatening to arrest non-compliant parents, by closing down contradictory media outlets, and by using security agents to question known anti-PEI

[47] Gale, *Lord Lugard*, 635.
[48] Reid, *History of Modern Africa*, 215.
[49] Ibid.

individuals.[50] Local Nigerians have noted the counterproductive and suspicious nature of government attempts to promote vaccinations via intimidation. As Aisha Yusuf put it:

> If there is really nothing questionable about the current polio campaign, then all sceptics and those questioning the safety of certain batches should be allowed to air their views while the federal ministry of health and other government agencies should do all that is necessary to allay their fears.[51]

People's bodies are the only entity fully under their own control: by failing to respect this, Lugard, his successors, and post-independence Nigerian leaders contributed to negative views toward Western biomedicine.

Since Western biomedicine is part and parcel of Western education (*boko*), British colonialists also engendered distrust toward Western ways of thinking about health through their education policies. These policies prioritized preservation of the status quo and production of a small number of Western-educated elites over the creation of a widespread and participatory public education system.[52] Through their espousal of indirect rule and co-opting of local emirs, colonial administrators also "allowed the north to protect its Islamic culture from missionaries at the expense of western schooling."[53] In so doing, these administrators ensured male dominance within the northern Nigerian medical profession. This dominance continues to have implications today, as Muslim women in the region face a shortage of adequately skilled female health workers.

Colonial administrators undermined women's health in northern Nigeria in more indirect manners as well. As a mark of respect to local emirs, "colonial officials

[50] Elisha P. Renne, "Parallel Dilemmas: Polio Transmissions and Political Violence in Northern Nigeria," *Africa* 84 (2014): 467.
[51] Aisha Umar Yusuf, "Polio - Intimidation Can Only Boomerang," *Daily Trust* (Abuja), 20 April 2013, accessed 5 May 2015.
[52] Montclos et al., *Boko Haram*, 11.
[53] Tim Cocks, "Rage over Bad Governance Fuels Boko Haram," *Daily Trust* (Abuja), 7 February 2013, accessed 5 May 2015.

acquiesced to women's complete disenfranchisement from the public sphere."[54] They thus enabled community leaders to marginalize female health concerns: just as males came to dominate the medical profession during the colonial era, male concerns came to dominate the public health agenda. Even when colonial administrators addressed women's health and education, they did so in a manner which de-emphasized female autonomy. In an effort to cut down on costs, for example, officials attempted to expand women's education by encouraging female enrollment in co-educational programs at boy's institutions rather than by building new all-girl schools.[55] These administrators thus failed to respect the beliefs of mothers and fathers alike, and few parents proved willing to enroll their daughters in such programs. By refusing to treat female education and maternal-child health care provisions as important in their own right, British colonialists facilitated both disempowerment and the creation of new barriers to healthcare for women in northern Nigeria.[56]

By choosing to govern by indirect rule in order to spare themselves expense, colonial administrators missed the opportunity to engage northern Nigerians in the creation of a quality education system integrating Western knowledge with existing Islamic ways of thinking. These administrators thus engendered an aversion toward and fear of *boko*. In declaring such *boko* to be *haram*, Yusuf simply built upon an existing historical narrative.[57] Aversion toward Western education is as old as colonialism; what is new is Boko Haram's violent reaction against it. Since Western biomedical techniques are included within Western education, the same holds true for Boko Haram's stance on Western *materia medica.*

[54] Pierce, "Public, Private, and Sanitary," 13.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Montclos et al., *Boko Haram*, 12.

Intervention and Resistance, 1996-2015

Through their unwillingness to expend adequate funds and their inability to engage Africans as equal partners in nation-building, colonial administrators deferred responsibility for creating an adequate healthcare system to Nigeria's post-independence leaders. These statesmen, however, have proven equally incapable. By chronically underfunding the public health sector and exhibiting endemic corruption in managing it, Nigerian officials have instilled within northern Nigerian Muslims a fundamental distrust toward their government. Since "citizens' trust in their government…underwrites their support (or subversion) of government efforts," this distrust begets skepticism of and resistance toward Nigerian public health campaigns.[58] Such skepticism and resistance exacerbates an existing bias against these campaigns, since the Nigerian government normally works in tandem with Western agencies in implementing them.

Nigerian officials themselves created the most significant obstacles in the way of quality public health infrastructure, by propagating a system of institutionalized corruption that "channels public money into the pockets of a few Nigerian[s]" and that prioritizes "personal relationships over institutions."[59] The problem with public health is thus less a lack of funds than a matter of how government officials choose to spend them. These officials have often decided against investing this money in primary healthcare, which is demonstrated by the prevalence of "community health clinics … without water or electricity and with a shortage of trained medical staff."[60] The decline in healthcare within northern Nigeria has been even more pronounced because "the kinship and patron-

[58] Renne, "Parallel Dilemmas," 467.
[59] John Campbell, "Nigeria's Battle for Stability," *National Interest* 1 (2012): 32.
[60] Renne, *Politics of Polio*, 8.

Figure 3. Female Access to Health Care, Northern Nigeria

Reported Problems Accessing Health Care, Women 20-34 (%)	
At least one problem accessing care	73
Getting money for treatment	56.4
Concern no drugs available	41.4
Distance to health facility	35.3
Having to take transport	33.1
Concerned no provider available	33.5
Concerned no female provider available	20.3
Not wanting to go alone	15.7
Getting permission to go for treatment	13.3

Source: DHS 2008.

Source: Cooke, *Maternal Health in Nigeria,* 6.

clientelism" ingrained within healthcare structures favor southern Nigerians at the expense of their northern peers.[61]

To understand how deeply the politics of public health matter, it is necessary to take the "often neglected view from below."[62] By failing to protect the physical health of its citizens, Nigerian officials have incited an intense dissatisfaction with federal and state government among northern Muslims and southern Christians alike.[63] Oyewale Tomori expressed this dissatisfaction when he asserted that Nigeria's "national health system has become the greatest obstacle to achieving health care for all Nigerians."[64] Government actors have most directly and most significantly impacted the lives of ordinary northern Nigerians through their repeated failure to make accessible healthcare services a reality: accordingly, they have created a culture of discontent towards governmental health administration.

This is especially true in the case of northern Nigerian women, who lacked access to primary healthcare long before Boko Haram turned to violent tactics in 2009. As can be seen in Figure 3, in 2008 seventy-three percent of women between twenty and thirty-

[61] Ghinai *et al*., "Listening to the Rumours," 1142.
[62] Andrew Apter, "Things Fell Apart? Yoruba Responses to the 1983 Elections in Ondo State, Nigeria," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 3 (1987): 489.
[63] Renne, "Parallel Dilemmas," 471.
[64] O. Tomori and B. O. Osunkaya, *Politics and Disease Control in Nigeria* (Ibadan, Nigeria: Archives of Ibadan Medicine, 2006).

four years of age in the region reported a problem in accessing health services. In consistently failing to meet the health needs of northern Nigerian women, government officials have eroded female confidence in their abilities and thus in the disease eradication programs they espouse. Since mothers are often the ones most directly in control of their children, this lack of confidence has prevented the success of the PEI in eradicating polio in northern Nigeria.

Figure 4. Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) and WPV Cases in Nigeria, 1999-2000

Year	AFP cases reported	Non-polio AFP rate	AFP cases w/adequate specimens (%)	Total confirmed polio cases	Wild-virus confirmed polio cases	Vaccine-derived confirmed polio cases
1999	1242	0.5	26	981	98	—
2000	979	0.7	36	638	28	—
2001	1937	3.8	67	56	56	—
2002	3010	5.7	84	202	202	—
2003	3318	6.0	91	355	355	—
2004	4814	8.0	91	782	782	—
2005	4836	6.3	85	831	830	1
2006	5175	6.5	88	1143	1122	21
2007	4277	5.9	94	353	285	68
2008	5538	6.6	93	861	799	62

Source: Renne, *Politics of Polio*, 3.

After their success in eradicating smallpox, the World Health Assembly voted in 1988 to implement a campaign to eliminate polio by 2000.[65] Tellingly, Nigerian government officials approved the assembly's decision unilaterally – they did not seek input from either local governments or communities.[66] A large portion of northern Nigerians thus perceive the PEI, the Nigerian eradication initiative which began in 1996, as a continuation of the mandatory health measures first executed under colonialism. Since the beginning of the GPEI, health workers have succeeded in eradicating the wild polio virus (WPV) in all but three areas of the world: northern Nigeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.[67] As can be seen from Figure 4, officials have had varied success in their vaccination drives in Nigeria, with the number of WPV cases declining in 2007,

[65] Renne, "Parallel Dilemmas," 466.
[66] Ibid., 469.
[67] Renne, *Politics of Polio*, 9.

increasing in 2008, and then dropping again in 2009. Persistent resistance to immunization among northern Nigerians, however, has prevented this number from dropping to zero. Such resistance is symptomatic of the aversion toward Western biomedicine many northern Nigerian Muslims share. Nor is this aversion completely unjustified given the history of recent Western biomedical interventions in northern Nigeria. In 1996, for example, the New York-based pharmaceutical company Pfizer Incorporated conducted a trial of an experimental meningitis drug, Trovan, on patients after the outbreak of a cerebrospinal meningitis epidemic centered in Kano state.[68] During this trial, practitioners at the Infectious Disease Hospital in Kano administered the oral form of Trovan to approximately one hundred children brought for treatment of cerebrospinal meningitis, despite the fact the drug had never been approved for children's use.[69] Several children died as a result of the trial, which was also conducted "without licence, ethical approval or informed consent."[70] In this regard, the Pfizer trials differed little from the top-down, mandatory disease eradication campaigns characteristic of Nigeria's colonial past.

Northern Nigerians have not relegated this episode to history; it continues to reverberate among local communities, especially in Kano state. Pfizer, for example, has yet to adequately compensate the Kano Trovan Victims Association, despite the fact that courts have tried and retried the Association's case against the company.[71] Northern Nigerians' experiences during the Pfizer trials thus reinforced more general skepticism toward Western pharmaceutical companies and Western biomedicine alike.[72] This

[68] Yahya, "Polio Vaccines," 189; Renne, *Politics of Polio*, 107.
[69] Renne, *Politics of Polio*, 108.
[70] Ghinai *et al*., "Listening to the Rumours," 1142.
[71] Ismail Mudashir, "Kano Trovan Victims Want Buhari to Review Case," *Daily Trust* (Abuja), 27 April 2015, accessed 5 May 2015.
[72] Renne, *Politics of Polio*, 108-109.

skepticism, however, was not limited to Western agents. Northern Nigerians also blamed their government. As one Kano man put it years later, "'we cannot trust the white man or our Federal government because … they were in partnership when they brought medicine to poison our people."[73]

Northern Nigerians have extended their distrust of both Western biomedicine and their own government to polio immunization. This is best evidenced by the northern Nigerian oral polio vaccine (OPV) boycott in 2003. Between July 2003 and August 2004, five northern Nigerian states suspended the use of OPV: Zamfara, Kaduna, Bauchi, Niger, and Kano. The first four rejoined National Immunization Days within a few months, but Kano state authorities did not allow vaccinations to resume for over a year.[74] Kano citizens sustained the boycott by questioning polio as the federal government's eradication target and by propagating rumors that OPV was an American conspiracy to spread HIV and cause infertility among Muslim girls.[75]

Many northern Nigerian Muslims distrusted the PEI because they did not understand why World Health Organization (WHO) officials would utilize such a disproportionate amount of resources in attempting to eradicate polio when polio caused relatively few deaths in the region. Western agencies' focus on polio yields resentment because the PEI neglects to address other vaccine-preventable diseases with higher death tolls. Between February and May 2001, for example, 100,000 measles cases broke out nationally. "In the face of this," Yahya writes, "the polio campaign met with even more ridicule as it went from house to house to administer polio vaccines as parents mourned the deaths of their children from measles."[76] In this regard, the PEI failed to meet the

[73] Ghinai *et al*., "Listening to the Rumours," 1142.
[74] Ibid., 1139.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Yahya, "Polio Vaccines," 201.

needs of ordinary Nigerians. It thus serves as a prime example of Laurie Garrett's lament that "advocacy, the whims of foundations, and the particular concerns of wealthy individuals and governments drive practically the entire global public health effort."[77] In diverting Nigerian funds toward polio eradication, PEI officials also exacerbated the structural problems within the nation's primary health care system.

Kano state officials also sustained the OPV boycott by disseminating rumors that the vaccine spread HIV and caused sterility in Muslim girls. These rumors were legitimated in the eyes of many northern Nigerians after two separate tests were conducted on OPV: the technical committee established by the federal government declared the vaccine to be safe, while the team chaired by Muslim professor Haruna Kaita announced the discovery of traces of estrogen in the vaccine which could act as an infertility agent.[78] As Jan-Bart Gewald pointed out in his discussion of rumors surrounding the lack of rain in Botswana in 2000, however, it matters little whether rumors have basis in fact. What matters is that "people clearly saw the world and current issues in terms of these rumours."[79]

Many Westerners attributed northern Nigerian belief in these rumors to a lack of education. By portraying northern Nigerian Muslims as victims of ignorance, however, these journalists propagated an overly simplistic narrative. As one local Muslim scholar pointed out in rejection of this narrative, "it is as a result of education that we ask questions as to what medicine is being brought into the country, what it contains and how it will affect us."[80] Nor did all northern Nigerians believe OPV spread HIV and infertility. "Rumors," writes Elisha Renne, "do not always represent literal beliefs, but

[77] Laurie Garrett, "The Challenge of Global Health," *Foreign Affairs* 86 (2007): 23.
[78] Ghinai *et al*., "Listening to the Rumours," 1146.
[79] Jan-Bart Gewald, "El Negro, El Niño, Witchcraft, and the Absence of Rain in Botswana," *African Affairs* 100 (2001): 555-556.
[80] Yahya, "Polio Vaccines," 195.

rather they may serve as vehicles for the airing of broader discontent."[81] Many northern Nigerians used the rumors as a means by which to express their dissatisfaction with the PEI's diversion of resources from more pressing medical needs, with the top-down nature in which the federal government conducted the eradication campaign, and with health officials' failure to respect either their bodily autonomy or their religious beliefs. Through these failures, government actors have treated northern Nigerian Muslims as "passive victims or even potential enemies" rather than as "trusted and active partners."[82] In so doing, local and federal officials have sustained and exacerbated the aversion toward Western biomedicine shared by many northern Muslims and taken to its violent extreme by Boko Haram.

Development in Africa: Conclusions

Although Boko Haram's violent efforts to eliminate Western biomedicine in northern Nigeria are radical, its views on Western medical knowledge are anything but. Nigerian colonial administrators and post-independence leaders alike cultivated the aversion toward Western ways of thinking about health, which inform the biopolitics of Boko Haram. They did so by implementing externally designed, top-down public health programs which fostered resentment and skepticism rather than the trust so critical to the success of disease eradication programs.

The failure of government actors to engage Africans as meaningful partners is a phenomenon unique to neither biomedicine nor to Nigeria. Western agencies' development of Nigeria's oil resources are a prime example of this. Since Nigerians first discovered large oil reserves in southern Nigeria in the mid-twentieth century, "foreign

[81] Renne, *Politics of Polio*, 49.
[82] David Miliband and Peter Piot, "Fighting Ebola requires a culture change in the west, as well as west Africa," *The Guardian*, 3 March 2015, accessed 26 April 2015,

oil companies have extracted hundreds of millions of barrels of oil, which have sold on the international market for hundreds of billions of dollars, but the people of the Niger Delta have seen virtually none of the benefits."[83] This is due largely to the fact that oil companies hire few indigenous personnel and share little technological expertise with Nigerian corporations. Western oil operations in Nigeria are instead self-sufficient and isolated entities, and so they fail to benefit the wider Nigerian economy.

Stand-alone infrastructure is also a problem within global public health more generally. As Garrett points out, most HIV/AIDS-related funding goes to isolated programs such as HIV testing sites, hospices, orphanages, anti-retroviral (ARV) dispersal stations, and the like.[84] Such isolated programs do little to benefit, and often divert resources from, indigenous healthcare systems. The history of HIV in Africa also has more to say about the top-down nature of Western development in the continent. During the colonial period, administrators contributed to the disease's initial spread by implementing mass, externally designed medical campaigns. For example, in southern Cameroon, southwestern Central African Republic, and Gabon, colonial public health officials utilized unsterile medical procedures during interventions between 1910 and 1960 and thus accelerated HIV transmission within these countries' populations.[85]

The biggest issue with Western development projects in Africa, however, is that they are not compatible with the incentives of local communities, largely because project leaders do not engage community members as active partners. The best example of this is the Kibera slum-upgrading project conducted jointly by the Kenyan national government and the United Nations in 2007. As Silva Adhiambo, a Kibera resident, said

[83] John Ghazvinian, "The Curse of Oil." *The Virginia Quarterly Review* 83 (2007): 2.
[84] Garrett, "Global Health," 23.
[85] Tamara Giles Vernick, Ch. Didier Gondola, Guillarme Lachenal and William H. Schneider, "Social History, Biology, and the Emergence of HIV in Colonial Africa," *Journal of African History* 54 (2013): 24.

in regard to this project, "what they want is different than what the community wants."[86] By failing to take into consideration the needs of the Africans they supposedly seek to aid, Western developers have eroded the local trust critical to the success of development projects. If international agencies truly desire to help Africans, they need to reverse this trend.

As Frederick Cooper put it, "the history of development is a history of changing expectations."[87] Western agents and African national leaders alike need to change their expectations of what external, top-down measures can achieve. In so doing, they can mitigate the distrust of foreign agents and government actors, which underwrites the anti-Western stance so central to Boko Haram's violent brand of biopolitics.

[86] "Good Fortune," directed by Landon Van Soest and Jeremy Levine, 2010, PBS, DVD.
[87] Frederick Cooper, "Writing the History of Development," *Journal of Modern European History* 8 (2010): 2.

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Kashmiriyat: The Disputed Identity of a Disputed Territory

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Introduction

If Partition was the earthquake that shook South Asia in 1947, then the insurgency in Kashmir was the aftershock that followed forty years later. In terms of violence, economic downfall, and the complete unraveling of the social fabric, militancy in Kashmir brought a decade of instability to what was once a relatively peaceful region. One can consider Kashmir to be a loose-end of Partition and a final bone of contention between India and Pakistan. The spike in violence and the heavy militarization that followed pushed Kashmir to the forefront of inter-regional politics, and in turn, opened up the Kashmir question to international debate. All questions stem from one overarching dilemma: Who does Kashmir belong to?

The ties between "belonging" and identity are central to the discussion of Kashmir's place in subcontinental politics, and raise several pertinent questions. Who defines Kashmiri identity? How fluid is this identity? Has it changed in response to foreign rule? Has it changed in response to militancy? Most importantly: how do the politics of a disputed territory and the identity of a disputed people play off one another?

Historiography has played a central role in defining the political contours of the subcontinent. Partition came partly as a result of the distorted way the British rewrote South Asian history to be a black-and-white narrative of "Muslims versus Hindus," "conquerors versus the conquered." By relying on the British to dictate their own history, Indians surrendered enormous power to their colonizers and made themselves pawns to divide-and-rule tactics. A failure to understand its own history proved fatal to India. The

Muslim League used the Muslim vs. Hindu narrative as a springboard for the Two Nation Theory, and ultimately the nation was Partitioned along religious lines in 1947.

I mention the partial role of historiography in bringing on Partition to illustrate the potential consequences of having writers who lean completely towards either accession to Pakistan, or integration to India narrate to Kashmiris the history of their own Kashmiri identity. In this paper, I outline the differences in interpretations of *Kashmiriyat* of two factions, those who support Kashmir's accession to Pakistan versus those who support its integration with India, to show how their respective imaginings of Kashmiri identity serve to bolster their own nationalistic agendas. After reviewing their opinions and using them to provide political context, I will then examine the works of Kashmiri natives, both Hindu and Muslim, to illustrate how their more nuanced interpretation of their own identity and history stands in stark contrast to the dichotomous narratives of pro-India and pro-Pakistani writers. I will challenge the perceived rise and fall of the tolerant aspects of *Kashmiriyat* in an effort to counter not only these black-and-white imaginings of *Kashmiriyat*, but to challenge the interpretation Kashmiri nationalist leader Sheikh Abdullah put forth as well. Finally, I will argue that *Kashmiriyat* is not a fixed concept, and that commitments to maintaining religious pluralism fluctuated throughout the 20th century. As the influence of events and parties external to Kashmir shifted, so did corresponding sentiments about self-identification within the Valley, and understanding this will help all three sides of the conflict in forming more comprehensive solutions to the Kashmir question.

Definition of Kashmiriyat

In its most idealistic form, *Kashmiriyat* refers to the ethno-regional and linguistic identity of Kashmiris, and downplays their religious differences. It has been interpreted as both "a unique cultural sensibility shared by the region's Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and Buddhists"[1] and "a shared communality in social practices, dietary habits and clothing, and the centrality of the Kashmiri language, without any explicit reference to religious difference."[2] *Kashmiriyat* plays to a collective memory (justified or unjustified) that Kashmiris are an inherently secular people with a rich history of tolerance and understanding between the Muslims and Hindus of Kashmir. Kashmir, often referred to as the "Valley of Saints" and the "cradle of Sufism in South Asia,"[3] is painted to be a unique space of exceptional tolerance in the subcontinent.

The concept of *Kashmiriyat* gained traction when Sheikh Abdullah decided to root his nation building program in economic and land reform through "Naya Kashmir," and the promotion of regional-based secularism via *Kashmiriyat.*[4] In an effort to offset the political advancements of rising Muslim politicians within the state, Sheikh Abdullah posed National Conference to be a secular party that put regional identity before religious identity. Whether this preference of regional over religious identity was a reality for the Muslims and Hindus of Kashmir, or whether *Kashmiriyat* was merely a manufactured social concept that Sheikh Abdullah used as a political tool, is a central question of this paper.

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[1] Jonah Blank, "Kashmir: Fundamentalism Takes Root," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 6 (November 1999): 36-53. *Military & Government Collection*, EBSCO*host.* Accessed December 7, 2014.
[2] Vernon Hewitt. "An Area of Darkness, Still? The Political Evolution of Ethnic Identities in Jammu and Kashmir, 1947–2001," in *Ethnonational Identities*, ed. Steve Fenton (2002): 140.
[3] Mohammad Ishaq Khan, "Preface," in *Sufis of Kashmir* (Srinagar: Gulshan Books, 2011).
[4] Fahad Shah and Mridu Rai, "Memorializing 13 July 1931 in Kashmir," in *Of Occupation and Resistance: Writings from Kashmir* (New Delhi: Tranquebar Press, 2013), 225.

Brief History of Kashmir

Before I proceed into an analysis on writings regarding *Kashmiriyat*, I want to provide a brief history of Kashmir so that we can better understand the roots of this identity crisis. Just like most states in South Asia, Kashmir has a distinct language, culture, and cuisine that varies considerably from those of its neighboring states. Isolated by the Himalayas, Kashmir was ultimately brought under foreign rule by the Mughal Emperor Akbar, whose conquest marked the beginning of ongoing external governance.[5] When the Mughal Empire disintegrated and the British took over, the British awarded the state to a Hindu Rajput ruler, Gulab Singh, for supporting them during the first Anglo-Sikh War in 1846.[6] Gulab Singh's Dogra Dynasty lasted until 1947, when his power was shifted into the hands of the Kashmir state government under India.

Kashmir was a contentious issue during Partition. As a Muslim majority state with an installed Hindu leader, it served as the perfect model to wear the ideological garb of both Pakistan and India. Speaking in terms of ideology, Jinnah wanted Kashmir because Pakistan was a state for Muslims[7] and Kashmir was Muslim majority and thus fit in with Pakistan. Nehru, a staunch proponent of secular nationalism, argued that a state as unique and diverse as Jammu and Kashmir would be able to retain more autonomy under his secular, federal India than it would under an intrusive, communal state like Pakistan.

Notice how Jinnah's and Nehru's perception of Kashmir rest on two different foundations: For Jinnah, the most important part of Kashmiri identity was its Islamic aspect.[8] For Nehru, a Kashmiri Pandit (Hindu) himself, Kashmiri identity was tied to ethnicity and language more than it is to religion. This original division serves as the

[5] Tariq Ali, "The Story of Kashmir," in *Kashmir: The Case for Freedom*, 7-56.
[6] Ibid., 16.
[7] Navnita Chadha Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 27.
[8] Behera, *Demystifying*, 27.

springboard from which pro-India or pro-Pakistan writers base their imagining of *Kashmiriyat*.

Kashmiriyat in Support of Integration to India

Writers who seek to promote Kashmiri integration with India emphasize certain aspects of Sheikh Abdullah's *Kashmiriyat* to illustrate how, at an ideological level, Kashmir is better fit for India than it is for Pakistan. The Nehruvian trend of nationalist-secularism is embodied best by journalist Balraj Puri, a Jammu-native and author of "*Kashmiriyat*: The Vitality of Kashmiri Identity," as well as by Ashutosh Kumar, Professor of Political Science in Punjab University, and author of "Quest for a Land of their "Own" in Kashmir: The Autonomy Argument," in *Conflicting Ethnicities*. Ashutosh Kumar speaks to the idealistic *Kashmiriyat* definition that "*Kashmiriyat* has reflected the seminal values of the three great religious traditions, Buddhism, Shaivism, and Islam, that influenced the social and cultural life of the people of Kashmir at different periods"[9] Certain proponents of *Kashmiriyat* harp on characterizing Sufism as "syncretism," when in reality, Sufism is an inherent feature of Islam at its most core level. Puri, in turn, roots the notion of *Kashmiriyat* in a particular idea of how Islam came to the Valley: "Kashmir thus accepted Islam not as a negation but as a culmination of a proud spiritual heritage. It did not surrender to Islam but greeted it in a friendly embrace."[10] Puri's assertion that Islam arrived peacefully and gradually builds on Kumar's idea that Islam organically meshed with the native culture to create a syncretic Kashmiri religion. Kumar, in addition, cites the rise of foreign rulers as the dividing moment for Kashmiris themselves,

[9] Ashutosh Kumar, "Quest for a Land of Their "Own" in Kashmir: The Autonomy Argument," in *Conflicting Ethnicities: Locating the Local in the Global*, ed. Kousar J. Azam, 75.
[10] Balraj Puri, "Kashmiriyat: The Vitality of Kashmiri Identity," in *Contemporary South Asia* 4.1 (1995): 55-63.

claiming that animosity between Muslims and Pandits "was essentially a consequence of the pitiable socio-economic situation in which the community was placed at that time under the Hindu Dogra rule." Notably, this tendency to place the blame on an external force characterizes all three sides of the Kashmiriyat debate.

The purpose of creating *Kashmiriyat* to be a historically rooted, secular, regional identity that overcomes the communalist tendencies that plague the rest of the subcontinent is embodied in Puri's straightforward assertion: "This identity was obviously a misfit in the monolithic structure of Pakistan which did not recognize any identity other than based on religion. The federal democratic and secular framework of India, on the other hand, promised a better guarantee for the defense and growth of the Kashmiri identity."[11]

Speaking to the notions put forth by Nehruvian nationalist-secularism, Puri reveals the greater agenda behind painting *Kashmiriyat* with such a mellow brush: Puri and Kumar aim to argue that Kashmiris *inherently* identify with secularism and federalism and *inherently* put their regional identity over their religious one and thus *inherently* belong in a Nehruvian India. Going further, Puri and Kumar suggest that Kashmir's Islam is incompatible with Pakistan's Islam, and asserts that Kashmir would be a "misfit" in Pakistan. Amitabh Mattoo, a Kashmiri academic and influential Indian policy maker, notes in in his essay "India's Potential Endgame for Kashmir" that "Kashmir lent tremendous strength to the construction of India as a vibrant, secular, and pluralistic state,"[12] further illustrating how writers who want Kashmir to integrate with India have a vested interest in laying claim to this secular basis of Kashmiri identity.

[11] Ibid.
[12] Amitabh Mattoo, "India's "potential" Endgame in Kashmir," *India Review* 2.3 (2003), 16.

Kashmiriyat in Support of Accession to Pakistan

The imagining of Kashmiriyat in the eyes of those who support accession to Pakistan directly undermine that of those who support its integration with India. Theoretically speaking, if pro-Indian writers say Kashmiris place their regional identity over their religious one, then pro-Pakistan writers argue that Kashmiris define themselves first and foremost as Muslims and members of the *Ummah*, or Muslim global community. Pakistanis, including Jinnah, wanted to bring Kashmir under the Islamic social-umbrella of Pakistan. In essence, pro-Pakistan writers attempt to de-legitimize the idea of *Kashmiriyat* in an effort to show that Kashmiris are not secular, and consistently place their religious identity before their ethno-regional one. (This is ironic, especially when you consider the Sindhi-Punjabi rivalry within Pakistan). Regardless, pro-Pakistani writers write Kashmiri history in a way that suggests that Kashmir would fit in more with Pakistan.

Mir Abdul Aziz, Secretary General of the Muslim Conference in Pakistan and a Kashmiri supporter of accession to Pakistan, claims that *Kashmiriyat* is "a bogus and unbased theory [that] has been invented by Indian ideologues, with the help of some local political and literary sycophants, to the effect that the Islam of Kashmir was unique, with characteristics of its own and different from Islam in other countries."[13] He goes further stating that the term "*Kashmiriyat*" is not used often in Kashmir, stating that "this new word has been coined by the agents of Indian 'intellectuals' as an anecdote for Kashmir, a panacea for all their ills."[14] Aziz is upfront in declaring his opinions against pro-India writers for forming Kashmiriyat to be a historically inaccurate account of Islam's place in Kashmiri society and identity.

[13] Mir Abdul Aziz, *Freedom Struggle in Kashmir*. Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 2000, 38.
[14] Ibid., 395.

Aziz ends with a declaration that "Kashmir is a Muslim state and part of the Muslim world,"[15] topped with a call to action to "re-establish the glory of Islam in their land."[16] Any lingering doubts regarding Aziz's political leanings vanish at this point, and his agenda to promote pro-Pakistani sentiments become clear. His ideas echo the early sentiments of Jinnah, who sought to legitimize Pakistan's position as the Muslim state for Indians by incorporating Muslim-majority Kashmir into Pakistan. Playing into the dichotomous narrative set forth by pro accession to Pakistan or pro integration to India narratives, Aziz's writing adds flesh to the former's claim that Kashmir is *inherently* more fit to exist under Pakistan's 'Islamic' rule. His vision, like those of the opposing side of Puri and Kumar, rests on a one-dimensional understanding of Kashmiri history. The promotion of these one-dimensional histories of Kashmir, that Kashmir has either always been completely secular or always been completely Islamicized, have had deep repercussions in the formation of collective memory.

More specifically, Aziz's interpretation of *azaadi* is important because it lays the foundation for the Islamist sentiments in the Valley, especially among the disaffected youth. Although he himself is not a direct representative of millennials, his calls for establishing *Ummah* seem to be internalized by the generation that grew up in the 1990s during the height of militancy and dense militarization. Earlier generations (i.e, their parents' generation) had some tangible idea of a pre-militancy Kashmir in which Pandits existed. Millennials, on the other hand, are limited to memories of militancy itself. For this reason, they are more likely to buy into the narrative that Hindu-Muslim relations are tainted by inherent animosity. To understand the ideas of Kashmiris on their identity, we must look to Kashmiris themselves.

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[15] Ibid., 438.
[16] Ibid.

Kashmiris' Ideas on Kashmiriyat

In outlining the varying opinions of Kashmiri writers and their interpretations of *Kashmiriyat* and its history, I argue that their opinions regarding their own identity cannot be categorized along the hard-and-fast lines drawn by those who fall in either the pro-accession to Pakistan or pro integration with India category. In other words, I aim to argue that Kashmiris themselves do not adhere to any single imagining of *Kashmiriyat*, and that the religious and political orientations of Kashmiris do not correlate with their opinions on identity. In doing so, I also hope to illustrate that sentiments surrounding religious and regional identity are not fixed, and that ideas of *Kashmiriyat* changed from Sheikh Abdullah's time to militancy--further undermining the dichotomous, definite narratives put forth by pro-India and pro-Pakistan factions.

Over the past two decades, Kashmiri writers, ranging from academics to bloggers, seem to agree on one thing: the colonization of Kashmir laid the seeds for Pandit-Muslim animosity. Chitralekha Zutshi, in *Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir*, notes that pre-colonial Kashmiris were relatively comfortable with their religious identities, and that it was the arrival of the Dogra rule that altered the social fabric so that by "the 1930s, the rhetoric of belonging to a religious collectivity became inseparable from the discourse on rights."[17] Zutshi blames this merging of political and religious identity on the particular fact that "the Dogra state defined itself and its right to rule solely based on its religious affiliation."[18] More importantly, Zutshi asserts that during the time Sheikh Abdullah was putting out the term *Kashmiriyat*,

[17] Chitralekha Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 210.
[18] Ibid.

Pandits "were arrayed on the side of their enemies"[19] because of their socio-political proximity to the Hindu Dogra rulers. Unfortunately, we witness the regurgitation of this trend of linking Pandits to Hindu occupiers decades later, when Muslims accuse Pandits of allying with the Indian military and inciting a mass Pandit exodus in the 1990s. Perceiving Kashmiri history to be one that has consistently seen tensions between Pandits and Muslims, as put forth by Zutshi, supports the idea that the Pandit exodus was not an unprecedented event.

To be clear, Zutshi does not think *Kashmiriyat* was a social reality in Kashmir's early history. While she does blame externalities, she maintains that the communalization of politics in response to Hindu rule led to the deterioration of Pandit-Muslim relations in the 20th century. She asks: if *Kashmiriyat* was as strong of a regional over religious identity in the centuries leading up to Dogra rule, as argued by Sheikh Abdullah, why was there a clear political divide between Pandits and Muslims?

Notably, the time around Partition that Sheikh Abdullah enumerated *Kashmiriyat* is remembered as a time of relative peace. The claim that the Valley was untouched by communal riots as the subcontinent erupted in violence during Partition can be used to suggest that Pandit-Muslim relations were not as much of a lost cause as Zutshi paints them out to be. Kashmiri journalist Basharat Peer adds to this imagination of the Valley as a historically tolerant region by noting how during the time of Partition, "unlike many parts of India, where violence between Hindus and Muslims had killed hundreds of people, relations between Hindus and Muslims in Kashmir had been peaceful"[20] particularly because "there was a consciousness of religious identities and differences in

[19] Ibid., 233.
[20] Basharat Peer, *Curfewed Night: One Kashmiri Journalist's Frontline Account of Life, Love and War in His Homeland* (New York: Scribner, 2010), 168.

political opinion."[21] If one follows this school of thought, then the plausibility of *Kashmiriyat* becomes a tangible reality; but it only makes sense for Sheikh Abdullah to argue that *Kashmiriyat* did in fact exist if this period was as calm as some Kashmiris memorialize it to be.

Decades after Sheikh Abdullah's time, Kashmiri Pandit narratives regarding the Pandit exodus put forth a counter-claim that *Kashmiriyat* was nothing but political rhetoric employed by Abdullah. Rahul Pandita, a Kashmiri Pandit journalist, describes the build-up of persecution against Pandits in late 1980s Srinagar in his 2013 novel, *Our Moon Has Blood Clots: The Exodus of the Kashmiri Pandits*. The narrator, a young boy, describes several instances of subtle persecution he felt throughout his childhood: his school friends desecrating an image of *Saraswati* after losing to him in a cricket match, small temples being destroyed by local Muslims, and their Muslim milkman quipping "tomorrow, this house will belong to us,"[22] alluding to their pending exile. Moreover, when describing the causes behind a riot against Pandits, Pandita clarifies that the political circumstances that angered Muslims in the first place had nothing to do with Pandits, but "whatever the reasons [for the initial outburst], the Pandits would become the target."[23] In the eyes of Rahul Pandita and thousands (if not hundreds of thousands) of Pandits who fled, the *lihaaz*, or consideration, that had characterized Pandit-Muslim relations in the past had deteriorated by 1991. Militancy and the mass exodus can be seen as the ultimate collapse of *Kashmiriyat*, if it ever even existed in its Sheikh-Abdullah definition. Pandita also chips away at the idea that *Kashmiriyat* was a reality during the Sheikh Abdullah time period, noting how built up resentment against Dogra rulers

[21] Ibid.
[22] Rahul Pandita, *Our Moon Has Blood Clots: The Exodus of the Kashmiri Pandits* (Noida: Random House, 2013).
[23] Ibid.

"translated into violence against Pandits."[24] Evidently, there is no consensus on whether or not Kashmiris were committed to protecting minorities or putting regional identity over their religious one. Pandita and Zutshi both lean towards the argument that *Kashmiriyat* did not exist, thereby suggesting that Sheikh Abdullah was using *Kashmiriyat* simply as a political tool.

The other side of the *Kashmiriyat* debate consists of Kashmiri writers who counter Zutshi's claim that it was only a product of political verbiage, but do agree that it was tested by foreign intervention, referring to both Dogra rule as well as the influence of Pakistani Islamists post-1989. Some Kashmiri writers, perhaps in an effort to distinguish Kashmir as inherently non-communal, speak to narratives of Kashmir's tolerant past. Nitasha Kaul, a Kashmiri Pandit novelist, argues against the drawing of black-and-white lines when narrating the relationship between Pandits and Muslims:

> The biggest myth of recent times is that of seeing Kashmir as historically in terms of Muslim *versus* Hindu, instead of Muslims *and* Hindus. Kashmiris did not see themselves in these terms until they were classified as such by the political games of the later part of the 20th century. The centuries-old tradition of *Kashmiriyat* bears testimony to the identity of Kashmiris as people who did not let their religious affiliations overwhelm their ethnic and religious commonality. Today, very little understanding of this commonality remains.[25]

Kaul's argument against a historical narrative that portrays the Hindus and Muslims of Kashmir as distinct entities reflects an earlier argument against a British history of India that emphasized inherent animosities between Indian Hindus and Muslims in general. This method of historiography laid the seeds of the Two Nation Theory, and it seems as if Kashmiri writers are making an effort to prevent this sort of foreign splitting of native communities from occurring. Writing in 2011, Kaul speaks to this phenomena of divide-

[24] Ibid.
[25] Nitasha Kaul, "Kashmir," in *Until My Freedom Has Come: The New Intifada in Kashmir*, ed. Sanjay Kak (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2011), 198-199.

and-rule through historiography, noting how "in the last two decades, the Kashmiri psyche has been surgically cleaved into Kashmiri Hindus and Kashmiri Muslims."[26] Moreover, she highlights the political agendas of pro-India writers by asserting that "India's claim that Kashmir is 'integral' to the country only seeks to confirm its secular credentials."[27] This, in turn, builds on the idea that Kashmiris themselves are trying to resist the imposition of historical and socio-cultural narratives from either pro-India or pro-Pakistan sides. Moreover, it is indicative of a wider post-militancy longing for *Kashmiriyat*, or at least the tolerance and sense of community it promoted.

Kashmiri youths seem to echo the sentiments of Kaul in opposition to pro-India or pro-Pakistan narration of Kashmiri history, regardless of whether or not they believe in the validity of *Kashmiriyat*. One Kashmiri student, Muhammad Junaid, raised a call to action in 2011 piece "A Letter to Fellow Kashmiris": "We must not think like Indian nationalists do: that we are one as Kashmiris; that there is something called 'Kashmiriness' in our blood. Instead of oneness, we must think in terms of togetherness."[28] He departs from Kaul's vision of *Kashmiriyat* by dismissing the idea of "oneness," but nevertheless confirms the vitality of "togetherness" as Kashmir moves forward in this post-militancy stage. An anonymous blogger of the now discontinued "Kashmir.Wordpress" mirrors this opinion with a polemical undertone, arguing that "the Indian people have always wanted to see the Truth about Kashmir by eyes that have been blinded by a pride in their country, a pride that is built on rhetoric rather than reality."[29] The writings of Kashmiri youth strongly resist the framework put forth in pro-India narratives on the Kashmir issue, but also distinguish their ideas from those produced by

[26] Ibid., 203.
[27] Ibid., 195.
[28] Sanjay Kak and Muhammad Junaid, "A Letter to Fellow Kashmiris," in *Until My Freedom Has Come: The New Intifada in Kashmir* (Penguin Books, 2011), 283.
[29] "Kashmir Strikes Back." *Kashmir*. August 19, 2008. Accessed May 1, 2015.

Sheikh Abdullah. A 2007 poll conducted by an Indian newspaper indicates that 84% of Kashmiris want Pandits to return.[30] This renewed commitment to togetherness suggests that *Kashmiriyat* is not completely a myth, even if Pandit-Muslim relations have dwindled since the 19th century.

The voices of bloggers provide a window into the current imagination of *Kashmiriyat* in the minds of the youth, and the pro-coexistence stance of young writers like Junaid show that a commitment to religious pluralism has a place in the social ideology of post-conflict Kashmir--marking a shift from the perceived demise of *Kashmiriyat* just a decade earlier. It can be assumed, then, that a desire to maintain an inclusive society increased as the political and economic conditions of society improved. It seems that as conditions in the Valley normalize, Kashmiri youths are looking back to a time of greater tolerance for Pandits.

Kashmiris' Ideas on Militancy and Kashmiriyat

If 'normality' brings about a longing for social inclusion, then the period of militancy it followed brought about paranoia towards minorities. The period of militancy deserves special examination, as it posed a significant challenge to *Kashmiriyat* and its roots in peaceful coexistence. Kashmiri Journalist Najeeb Mubarki, writing against the idea that Islamization itself drove militancy, dismisses the Indian narrative of religious influences in Kashmir by asserting that "real hardcore, Taliban-style extremism is simply alien to the Kashmiri DNA."[31] Nitasha Kaul adds to the question of Islamization of youth by noting that it was in fact "the lack of economic opportunities for educated Muslim

[30] "Majority in Kashmir Valley Want Independence: Poll." *Reuters*. August 13, 2007. Accessed 5 May 2015.
[31] Sanjay Kak and Najeeb Mubarki. "The Islamism Bogey in Kashmir," in *Until My Freedom Has Come: The New Intifada in Kashmir* (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2011) 118.

Kashmiris [that] drove many Kashmiri youth to support Islamist parties."[32] Dr. Hussein, Associate Professor of Law in Central University of Kashmir, points to the larger international political climate when tracing the roots of Kashmiri resistance, citing the "the defeat and dismemberment of the Soviet Union as a result of the Afghan Mujahedeen [for causing] Kashmiri youth and militant resistance [to become] a predominant way of fighting for azaadi."[33] By arguing that religious fanaticism did not motivate natives of the Valley, all three provide support for the idea that a deeper consciousness of *Kashmiriyat* could have survived through militancy. They cite imported fanaticism, a lack of economic opportunity, and a changing international political climate as the sources behind the rise of militancy--not the demise of *Kashmiriyat* itself. They look outward when identifying the factors that chipped away at *Kashmiriyat* and the tolerant community it promoted, and their desire to focus on externalities suggests that they have faith that a foundation of *Kashmiriyat* (if not as neatly defined as Sheikh Abdullah's version, but then at least a culture of valuing diversity) was retained at the core of Kashmiri culture even as it faced external threat.

These debates surrounding the motives of militants play an integral role in understanding the interpretation of *Kashmiriyat* in the 1990s. On one hand, we have Hizbul Mujahideen (Pakistan-funded separatist group in Kashmir) supporters chanting "*Azaadi ka matlab kya? La illaha illalah,"*[34] or, "What is the meaning of freedom? There is no God but Allah," thereby connecting secession from India with the establishment of an Islamic state. On the other hand, you have the quieter voices of elderly Kashmiri Muslims like those depicted in Sanjay Kak's film *Paradise on a River of Hell* asserting

[32] Kaul, 201.
[33] Hussein, 127.
[34] Abir Bazaz and Meena Gaur. *Paradise on A River of Hell*. Public Broadcasting Service Trust. Film.

that "Azaadi 'liberation' means a Hindu shouldn't fear a Muslim, a Muslim shouldn't fear a Sikh,"[35] leaning towards the establishment of an inclusive state. The elderly, who lived in a more tolerant Kashmir than that of the 1990s, seems to believe in the concept of *Kashmiriyat* and in maintaining religious diversity in an independent Kashmiri state, whereas those influenced by the Pakistani narrative of *Kashmiriyat* (i.e, those who dismiss it as "bogus" created by the Indian state) are in favor of creating an Islamic state.

The question of whether the motivations of Kashmiris who resist Indian occupation align or misalign with the imagining of *Kashmiriyat* needs to be examined in concurrence with the circumstances surrounding more recent protest. Kashmiri writer Aaliya Anjum and trauma anthropologist Saiba Varma emphasize the sense of suffocation felt by the youth in an effort to bring light to the effects of living in such conditions:

> Indian army forces have severely restricted civilian mobility by blockading roads, neighborhoods and entire towns with barricades, checkpoints and spirals of concertina wire. Neighborhoods resemble not so much war zones, but rather prisons or ghettos of collective punishment. Umar Ahmed, an activist, describes this atmosphere as one "between a wall of physical oppression and a hard place of psychological suppression.[36]

Democratic rights activist Gautam Navlakha, in turn, delineates the difference between militancy resistance of the 1990s and the popular resistance in this past decade, highlighting the shift from armed to mass struggle:

> The mass struggle of 2008-2010 was, if anything, a celebration of a new-found defiance when confronted with oppression, and of novel ways of expression and articulation coming to fore. It was an acknowledgement of a shift from armed to mass struggle. It emerged as the collective assertion

[35] Ibid.
[36] Sanjay Kak, Anjum Alia, and Saiba Varma. "Curfewed in Kashmir, Voices from the Valley,"in *Until My Freedom Has Come: The New Intifada in Kashmir*, ed. Sanjay Kak (Penguin, 2011), 57.

> of the people. The relationship between leaders and those led, between parties and people got transformed.[37]

This shift seems to indicate that the voice represented by the elderly Kashmiri man--and the voices who seek an inclusive state for Kashmiri Pandits, Sikhs, and Muslims--will be better articulated as leadership shifts from the hands holding guns to the hands of the masses. One youth blogger, Saadut, notes that in a "recent survey conducted by MHA in Kashmir, a substantial majority, 67% of the Kashmir youth believed that Kashmiri Pandit's should return to the Valley."[38] In another article, "Is Pain a Feudal Right?" Saadut argues

> Pain in Kashmir cannot be and is not an exclusive domain of an ethnic group. Who better can understand the pain of Pandits than their Muslims neighbors, having lost thousands of their own to this conflict? Who else can understand their sense of dispossession, longing for home than people who lost their own homes to ignited infernos of Kashmir, the arson affected of Kupwara, the charred Sopore town.[39]

Embracing a more sentimental tone, he then moves to discussing the return of the Pandit exodus:

> Who are we to welcome you to Kashmir? You are as much Kashmiri as we are, as much of your right to your home as we have to ours.We don't have any special treatment or perks to offer, can only offer equal opportunities of the non existing avenues here. Comeback, you don't need a visa for home.[40]

Saadut represents a segment of society that believes not only that Pandit-Muslim animosity existed, particularly because of the former's elevated socioeconomic status under the Dogra patronage, but also that Pandits have just as much of a right to call Kashmir "home" as Muslims do. Perhaps this mindset suggests that it is not impossible to

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[37]Gautam Navalkha."The Matter of Truth, Lies, and Manufacturing Consent in a Conflict Area," in *Of Occupation and Resistance: Writings from Kashmir*, ed. Fahad Shah (Tranquebar, 2013) 111.

[38] "Speaking Chinar: Of Myths and Facts: Kashmir." *Speaking Chinar: Of Myths and Facts: Kashmir*. Accessed May 1, 2015.

[39] "Speaking Chinar: Is Pain a Feudal Right?" *Speaking Chinar: Is Pain a Feudal Right?* Accessed May 1, 2015.

[40] Ibid.

reconcile Zutshi's argument that Pandit-Muslim tensions deteriorated under the Dogra rule, and then again after the turn of the 20th century, with the idea that Pandits were still never thought of as *non*-Kashmiri. Their allegiances may have been questioned (as they were under Dogra rule, and then again during Indian militarization) because of their religious association with the "occupying" force of the moment, but voices like those of Saadut suggest that they are nevertheless considered to be integral to the social fabric of Kashmir. Pandits' politics were questioned, but their ethnicity was not.

Kashmiriyat, by Sheikh Abdullah's definition, takes this "inclusionary mindset" a step further by arguing that Kashmiris put their regional identity before the religious one. As illustrated by Kashmiri voices speaking on whether *Kashmiriyat* was a historical reality, there is no single narrative that all Kashmiris adhere to, and it is thus impossible to say whether or not all Kashmiris believed in *Kashmiriyat* before or after Dogra rule. Such conclusions would require comprehensive polling data on perceptions of *Kashmiriyat*. The closest statistic we have is that nearly 90% of Kashmiris seek independence over joining Pakistan or India. This suggests that Kashmiris put their regional identities before any nationalist association with Pakistan or India, but we cannot assume that this means Kashmiris put their regional identity before their religious identity.[41] As illustrated by the varying opinions within Kashmir, religious or political leanings do not necessarily correlate with opinions on *Kashmiriyat*, and secularist imaginings of *Kashmiriyat* are fluid; some assume that *Kashmiriyat* was a reality during Partition, as evidenced by the lack of riots, that it gave way to external threats during militancy. Most importantly, there is evidence that the next generation is invested in recreating a pluralistic society in Kashmir. In our efforts to understand historical

[41] "Majority in Kashmir Valley Want Independence: Poll." *Reuters*. August 13, 2007. Accessed May 5, 2015.

sentiments *Kashmiriyat*, we must privilege these varied Kashmiri voices over the pro-integration-to-India or pro-accession-to-Pakistan voices that have thus far dominated the debate. Examining the nuances of the Kashmiri narratives, in turn, will help us reach more comprehensive solutions regarding the political structure of Kashmir, particularly as the likelihood of Pandit return increases in the near future.

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A Tale of Two Cemeteries: The Paris Commune, the Haymarket Affair, and the Politics of Memorialization

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"The day will come when our silence will be more powerful than the voices you are throttling today."

- Albert Spies, 11 November 1887[1]

"You must close the book on these last ten years, you must place the tombstone of oblivion over the crimes and vestiges of the Commune, and you must tell everyone…that there is but one France and one Republic."

- Leon Gambetta, 21 June 1880[2]

The Paris Commune and the Haymarket Affair were two of the late nineteenth century's most infamous events. They both revealed forces of disorder that threatened to disrupt the stability of bourgeois, capitalist society, demonstrating an increasing class-consciousness among workers. Depending on which side of the bourgeois-working class divide one fell, these events were either seen as a threat to the core values of modern civilization or the spark that could ignite a full-scale working class revolution. While these incidents certainly had an international impact, their consequences were felt most deeply in Paris and Chicago, the cities in which they took place. Indeed, the Paris Commune and its subsequent repression in 1871 and the Haymarket bombing and trial in 1886 remain some of the most contested chapters in these cities' histories. In fact, the processes through which each city attempted to memorialize these events reveal many of

[1] As quoted in Paul Avrich, *The Haymarket Tragedy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 363.
[2] Extract from the speech delivered to the French National Assembly translated by J.P.T. Bury *in Gambetta's Final Years: 'The Era of Difficulties' 1877-1882* (London: Longman, 1982), 167 as quoted in Colette E. Wilson*, Paris and the Commune: The Politics of Forgetting, 1871-78* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 1.

the fundamental similarities and differences between Paris and Chicago during this period.

Though the Paris Commune and the Haymarket Affair were often compared throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the ways in which each city memorialized these incidents have not yet been explicitly compared or examined. However, the press's reception of each has received some attention.[3] A fair number of comparisons examine how the events influenced municipal socialist groups, in addition to their impact on the burgeoning international socialist movement.[4] Most explicit comparisons, however, focus on the direct aftermath of each event without exploring other possible means of comparison.

In this paper, I would like to explore one of these potential comparisons by examining the ways in which Paris and Chicago sought to memorialize the Commune and Haymarket. The process of municipally memorializing each of these incidents was intense and politically charged; usually pitting one side against another in a battle to ensure future generations would remember *their* story. Thus, the memorialization process can aid in an effective analysis of the ways in which the history of each event was constructed, in addition to examining the larger social, political, and cultural forces at

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[3] Marjorie Murphy, "And They Sang the 'Marseillaise': A Look at the French Left Press as It Responded to the Haymarket," *International Labor and Working Class History* 29 (spring 1986): 28-37; Catherine Collomp, et al. "The 'Social Revolution' in America? European Reactions to the 'Great Upheaval' and to the Haymarket Affair," *International Labor and Working Class History* 29 (spring 1986): 38-52; Samuel Bernstein, "The Impact of the Paris Commune in the United States," *The Massachusetts Review* 12.3 (summer 1971): 435-446; Philip M. Katz, *From Appomattox to Montmartre: Americans and the Paris Commune* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).

[4] Samuel Bernstein, "American Labor and the Paris Commune," *Science and Society* 15.2 (spring 1951): 144-162; Hubert Perrier and Michel Cordillot, "The Impact of Haymarket on European Social Movements: The Origins of May Day: The American Connection," in *In the Shadow of the Statue of Liberty: Immigrants, Workers, and Citizens in the American Republic, 1880-1920*, ed. Marianne Debouzy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992); Hartmut Kiel and John B. Jentz, eds., *German Workers in Chicago: A Documentary History of Working-Class Culture from 1850 to World War I* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988).

play in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Paris and Chicago. I would ultimately like to demonstrate how the differences between the memorialization process in Paris and Chicago reveals two different ways of constructing a historical narrative, which, in turn, reveal a great deal about the cities that had a hand in constructing those narratives.

In order to analyze the process of memorialization, I will examine several monuments built with either an explicit or implicit goal of memorializing the Paris Commune or the Haymarket affair, and the context surrounding their creation. Though the Haymarket affair occurred fifteen years after the Paris Commune, I will begin by analyzing *The Police Monument* (1889, also commonly known as, *The Haymarket Monument* figures 1 and 2) and *The Haymarket Martyrs' Monument* (1893, figure 3) because their construction was completed before any memorials to the Commune. Next, I will discuss the *Mur des Fédérés* (*Communards' Wall,* 1909, figure 4), the only explicit memorial to the Commune, in addition to two monuments that are often associated with the memory of the Commune: the Basilique du Sacré-Cœur (which began construction in 1875, but was not finished until 1914, figures 5 and 6) and the *Monument aux victimes des Révolutions* (1909, figure 7). To conclude, I will examine the similarities and differences between the Commune and Haymarket memorials, and what those can tell us about the Paris and the Chicago that constructed these monuments.

Chicago and the Haymarket Affair

On the evening of 4 May 1886 an unknown individual threw a homemade bomb into a group of Chicago police officers. The officers had arrived to supervise a peaceful

anarchist rally in support of a strike for an eight-hour workday.[5] During the ensuing violence in the aftermath of the bomb's explosion, seven policemen and an unknown number of civilians were killed.[6] Chicago's anarchists (of whom a large number were German immigrants) were immediately blamed for the incident: nine were indicted, seven stood trial, eight were found guilty (Albert Parsons, who had escaped arrest, surrendered himself the day the trial began), and four were executed.[7] There was minimal evidence against the defendants, save for their radical anarchist rhetoric printed in newspapers like *The Alarm* and the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*. The bomber's identity was never conclusively determined—the eight anarchists were convicted primarily on the basis of their writings.[8]

The trial, now commonly viewed as horrendously unjust, can best be understood "in terms of the willingness of the citizens of Chicago…to accept, even to expect and demand decisive action to preserve what they saw as social order."[9] More of a show trial than anything else, the guilty verdicts threatened other potential anarchist agitators with a similar fate, while also reassuring Chicagoans that public authority was effective—or at least capable of ruling with an iron fist. A little more than a year after their conviction (which was spent appealing their case) on 11 November 1887 four of the defendants (Spies, Parsons, Engel, and Fischer) were hung.[10] In the weeks following the execution, many mourned the loss of four innocent men, while many more "celebrated the moral judgment rendered on the gallows." The trial and subsequent executions seemed to divide

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[5] Carl Smith, *Urban Disorder and the Shape of Belief: The Great Chicago Fire, the Haymarket Bomb, and the Model Town of Pullman* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 120-122.
[6] Ibid., 121.
[7] Ibid., 121-122.
[8] Ibid., 116. The majority of the 136 exhibits of evidence presented by the prosecution at the Haymarket trial were words the defendants had either spoken or published.
[9] Ibid., 122.
[10] Paul Avrich, *The Haymarket Tragedy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 393.

Chicago "into separate spheres of sentiment determined largely by where they lived and worked and how well they spoke English."[11] Thus, a Chicago hostile and unsympathetic to radical politics and immigrant workers is the stage on which the drama of memorializing the Haymarket affair played out.

In January of 1888, not long after the massive funeral for the executed anarchists, a group of prominent businessmen gathered to oversee the construction of a memorial to the 180 police officers involved in the Haymarket incident, raising $10,000 for the proposed monument.[12] The *Chicago Tribune* subsequently sponsored a competition for the best design, offering a $100 prize.[13] Johannes Gelert, (ironically) a young Danish immigrant and sculptor, won the design contest despite having his first proposal rejected by the committee. His initial design was too allegorical for the high degree of verisimilitude the committee desired.[14] Gelert eventually decided to model the sculpture on a policeman whom he had seen on a Chicago street and thought of as a "model" officer. The monument committee, however, was horrified that the intended subject looked "too Irish."[15]

The Police Monument was dedicated on Memorial Day 1889, during a ceremony attended by city officials and members of the sculpture committee. The monument stood on a tall pedestal inscribed with the words, "Dedicated by Chicago to her Defenders in

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[11] James Green*, Death in the Haymarket: A Story of Chicago, The First Labor Movement, and the Bombing that Divided America* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 275.
[12] Melissa Dabakis, "Martyrs and Monuments: The Haymarket Affair," in *Visualizing Labor in American Sculpture* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1999), 45; Paul A. Shackel, "Remembering Haymarket and the Control for Public Memory," in *Heritage, Labor and the Working Classes*, eds. Laurajane Smith, Paul A. Shackel, and Gary Campbell (New York: Routledge, 2011), 47.
[13] Dabakis, 45.
[14] Ibid. Dabakis describes his rejected proposal as, "an allegorical portrayal of law as female figure holding an open book over her head."
[15] Ibid.

the Riot," and was placed in the center of Haymarket Square.[16] The statute of the officer atop the pedestal has its gaze fixed straight ahead, with one arm raised in a command to halt, and wears a replica of the 1886 Chicago police uniform.[17] The literal image of the monument would have been readily accessible to the general public, avoiding the potential interpretative confusion of an allegorical figure. However, its realism does not ensure a completely unambiguous reading. Though Gelert chose his model because "he was able to catch those ideal qualities of the guardian of the peace instead of the more unpleasant ones of strength and insensibility," viewing the monument in the context of Haymarket and its aftermath would seem to warrant a more authoritarian reading of the image as a threat to all those who dare to threaten public order.[18] This second reading is echoed in the words of Chicago's Mayor Cregier at the dedication ceremony, stating that it "stands…in this conspicuous place as a silent monitor to all who dare to come to this free land and to disobey its laws…"[19]

Though the monument was moved from the center of Haymarket Square to Union Park in 1900 because it was a traffic obstruction in the busy square, it did not lose its symbolic significance.[20] No matter where the monument was moved over the course of its 120-year history, it was always a site of controversy—frequently subject to bombing and vandalism.[21] *The Police Monument* marks Chicago's first attempt to physically construct a memory of the Haymarket affair. Further, *The Police Monument*—the only memorial to Haymarket within Chicago's city limits—has represented the "official memory" of the event as a repugnant uprising of immigrants and socialists, resulting in

[16] Ibid., 47.
[17] Ibid., 46.
[18] Johannes Gelert quoted in the *Chicago Tribune*, December 14, 1888.
[19] *Chicago Tribune*, May 31 1889, page 1.
[20] Dabakis, "Martyrs and Monuments," 47.
[21] Ibid., 47-49.

the "tragic" loss of police lives since its dedication in May 1889. The monument, which was commissioned in part by city leaders, has been subsequently supported by civic authorities in Chicago's commemoration of the Haymarket, and continues to convey "the authoritative public history" of the Haymarket.[22] In short*, The Police Monument* deploys images of authority, law, and order to construct an official memory; questioning the validity of this memory, then, would be akin to questioning the unassailable civic authority of law and order.

In response to *The Police Monument*'s construction of an *official* public memory, Chicago's anarchist community began planning a monument of its own, in the hope of offering an alternative narrative of the Haymarket affair. In July 1889, the Pioneer Aid and Support Association - a group dedicated to providing support for the families of the Haymarket martyrs and others disadvantaged labor supporters - began fundraising for a monument; all workers were asked to contribute.[23] Albert Weinert, a German immigrant and sculptor, was commissioned to design the memorial in 1892. Nearly four years later after initial planning began, on 25 June 1893, *The Haymarket Martyrs' Monument* (figure 3) was unveiled in Waldheim Cemetery in Forest Park, Illinois, attracting a crowd of 8,000.[24]

The monument consists of a dramatic allegorical hooded female figure, placing a crown of laurels on the head of dying male worker, while preparing to draw her sword. The figure rests in front of a tall granite shaft, atop a smaller granite pedestal. Albert Spies's last words, "The day will come when our silence will be more powerful than the voices you are throttling today," are inscribed on the lowest step of the pedestal, directly

[22] Ibid., 49.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Shackel, "Remembering Haymarket," 40.

below the year of the executions, 1887. The names of the eight defendants are inscribed on the back of the granite shaft.

In contrast to the stillness of *The Police Monument*, *The Haymarket Martyrs' Monument* is full of movement. The female figure lunges forward as if readying herself to step off the pedestal and into the surrounding space; her cape billows behind her as she prepares to brandish a concealed sword. Compared to *The Police Monument*, *The Haymarket Martyrs' Monument* is a direct affront to the municipal authority embodied in the first memorial. The allegorical female figure's forward motion confronts the male police officer's call to halt, refusing to be silenced by the authority of unjust law and order.

The figural relationship between the two monuments is also analogous to the empowering impact of *The Haymarket Martyrs' Monument* for Chicago's labor and anarchist communities. Not only did the new monument serve as a physical opposition to the historical narrative embodied in *The Police Monument*, it also became a site that could function as the center of activism for the anarchist and socialist movements. With the city's crackdown on the radicalism associated with Haymarket, the monument turned Waldheim Cemetery into a safe haven for the anarchist movement and other radical groups. The cemetery remained a sacred space of remembrance and mourning, but also became a place of action and aspiration.[25] The significance of the *The Haymarket Martyrs' Monument* transcended its local context, transforming Waldheim Cemetery into "a revolutionary shrine, a place of pilgrimage for anarchists and socialists from all over the world," establishing the Haymarket martyrs' place in anarchist and socialist myth.[26]

[25] Dabakis, "Martyrs and Monuments", 61.
[26] Lloyd Lewis and Henry Justin Smith, *Chicago: The History of Its Reputation* (New York, Blue Ribbon Books, 1929), 166, cited in Dabakis, "Martyrs and Monuments," 61.

The Paris Commune: Forgetting and Remembering

The Paris Commune lasted for 72 days from 18 March to 28 May 1871, following the France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, the abdication of Napoleon III, and a four-month siege of Paris by the Prussian army. The newly formed Third Republic signed an armistice with Prussia on 28 January 1871. National elections were held in February, revealing the typical division between Paris, a few other urban centers, and the rest of France. On 18 March 1871, Adolphe Thiers (the Third Republic's chief executive) sent national troops to disarm the Parisian National Guard (*fédérés,* formed to protect the city during the Prussian siege) by seizing the city cannons of Paris located atop the Butte Montmartre.[27] Though rooted in a variety of complex social and political issues, the national government's attempted disarmament of Paris provided the necessary spark that ignited a spontaneous popular Parisian uprising which soon exploded into violence.[28] The insurrection resulted in the establishment of an autonomous municipal government: the Commune. The official declaration of the Commune and its corresponding governing body - the Central Committee of the National Guard - was declared on 26 March 1871, and remained in power for 72 days.[29]

Viewed by many as an example of Karl Marx's "dictatorship of the Proletariat," the Commune was violently repressed by the Versaillais - troops of the national government, based in Versailles since the final months of the Franco-Prussian War - from 21-28 May 1871. This week, known infamously as *la Semaine sanglante* (the Bloody Week), resulted in the deaths of at least 20,000 Communards, with some estimates

[27] Wilson, *Paris and the Commune*, 5.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.

putting the death toll closer to 30,000.[30] The dead consisted of far more than combatants or those in combat areas: the Versaillais were ruthless in killing their prisoners, or those suspected of aiding the Communards, including women and children.[31] After a week of brutal fighting, the final battle of the Paris Commune took place at the Père-Lachaise cemetery in northeastern Paris, the Communards' last stronghold. Vicious combat took place among the tombstones until nightfall, when the remaining 150 Communards surrendered to the Versaillais, and were subsequently lined-up against the cemetery's eastern wall, shot, and thrown into a common grave.[32]

The *Semaine sanglante* was followed by a period of equally harsh political, cultural, social, and artistic repression and censorship, along with continuing trials, executions, and deportations of the Communards.[33] The Third Republic did everything it could to ensure that Paris and the nation would forget the "crimes of the Commune" and move forward as one unified Republic. This policy of forgetting was so successful that the French state did not officially recognize the executions and deaths of innocent civilians by the state during the repression of the Commune until 2001.[34]

The repressive, reactionary atmosphere in Paris during the post-Commune years is a key factor in explaining why it took nearly fifteen years for a particular place to emerge as a memorial site dedicated to the Commune's memory.[35] In spite of harsh censorship laws forbidding any reference to the Commune, its memory among the

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[30] Janice Best, "Une Statute monumentale de la République," *Nineteenth-Century French Studies* 34 (2006), 303.
[31] David A. Shafer, *The Paris Commune: French Politics, Culture, and Society at the Crossroads of the Revolutionary Tradition and Revolutionary Socialism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): 90-1.
[32] Pierre Milza, *L'année terrible* (Paris: Perrin, 2009), 413-14; Shafer, *The Paris Commune*, 183-84.
[33] Wilson, *Paris and the Commune*, 8.
[34] Ibid., 210.
[35] Madeleine Rebérioux, "Le Mur des Fédérés: Rouge, 'sang craché'," in *Les Lieux de mémoire I: La République*, edited by Pierre Nora (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), 620.

working classes could not be entirely extinguished.[36] The battle at Père-Lachaise between the Versaillais and the last of the Communards had not yet become particularly important in popular memory. Instead, smaller acts of mourning and remembrance took place at other, smaller, cemeteries elsewhere in the city.[37] However, after the national government granted full amnesty to all exiled and imprisoned Communards in 1880, commemoration practices began to change.

The government struggled to keep the Commune out of public memory as the exiled Communards returned to the city, threatening to renew interest in the Commune and France's revolutionary past.[38] The early 1880s witnessed a growing consciousness of the Commune's memory. This occurred through the evocation of the infamous wall in the Père-Lachaise cemetery as a memorial site in poems and songs, which was soon followed by drawings, prints, and paintings.[39] In the most comprehensive early history of the *Mur des Fédérés* (Communards' Wall), Madeleine Rebérioux argues that the evocation of the wall in images and songs was the catalyst in inspiring the first organized demonstrations using this site.[40]

The Père-Lachaise Cemetery soon became a hotly contested public space as it gained increasing symbolic and memorial importance. Conflicts developed between the Parisian municipal council, led by a radical republican and socialist coalition, and the moderate-conservative republicans running the national government. The disagreement began over the national government's refusal to allow the addition of an epitaph reading "Member of the Commune" to the tombstones of several Communards buried in Père-

[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid., 624.
[38] Shafer, *The Paris Commune*, 183.
[39] Rebérioux, "Le Mur des Fédérés," 624-25.
[40] Ibid., 625.

Lachaise.[41] This incident led to further conflicts between municipal and national authority over public acts of remembrance concerning the Commune such as funerals, a monument dedicated to the Communards executed in Père-Lachaise, and the renaming of streets after prominent Communards.[42]

These disputes did not stop Parisians - mostly from working class or socialist backgrounds - from undertaking an annual *montée au Mur* on the anniversary of Parisian insurrection which established the Commune, 18 March.[43] They carried on this tradition in spite of the restriction on any sort of speech in the cemetery or before the wall: they would march silently through Père-Lachaise, carrying wreaths to place along the wall.[44] Indeed, these rituals were the primary method of combatting the national government's attempt at pushing the Commune out of French memory. Finally, in 1909, a small plaque inscribed with the phrase "To the dead of the Commune, 21-28 May 1871" was fastened to the wall, thus marking the *Mur des Fédérés* (Figure 4) as an explicit memorial to the Paris Commune.[45] Though the Commune would never be part of official French memory, this simple plaque on that infamous wall ensured that the Commune would not be forgotten. If nothing else, the plaque marked the wall as the official memorial site for those who continued to honor the Commune, and refused to let its memory be stamped out by the national government.

Though the *Mur des Fédérés* is the only explicit site memorializing the Paris Commune, there are two other monuments often associated with the Commune's

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[41] Shafer, *The Paris Commune*, 183.
[42] Ibid., 183-84
[43] The *montée au Mur* is a memorial procession during which a large group climbs up the hill to Père-Lachaise to pay their respects at the *Mur des Fédérés*.
[44] Rebérioux, "Le Mur des Fédérés," 625.
[45] Wilson, *Paris and the Commune*, 15. Original French text reads, "Aux morts de la Commune 21-28 mai 1871."

memory. The construction of the Basilique du Sacré-Cœur (figure 5), for example, has been perceived as expiation for the excesses of the Second Empire and the Commune. Built high atop the Butte Montmartre, the Basilique du Sacré-Cœur towers over the Parisian landscape below it, symbolically dominating the city in its shadow (figure 6). In 1872, the Catholic Church persuaded the young Third Republic to grant it this prime Parisian real estate. The decidedly conservative post-Commune government passed a law declaring the construction of the basilica "a work of public utility," enabling the use of expropriation laws to secure the necessary land.[46] Consequently, the Basilique du Sacré-Cœur was built on the very spot where the Commune began in a skirmish over Parisian canons, and very near the cemetery where the Commune met its violent end.[47]

From the beginning of construction in 1875, until its subsequent completion in 1919, many Parisians viewed the project with contempt and did everything in their power to prevent the project.[48] The basilica was built on the remains of Communard martyrs in an attempt to redeem the sin they had unleashed upon Paris. It seems that forgetting the memory of the Commune was the most effective way to absolve Paris of its sin; in this way it almost seems as if Sacré-Cœur is an anti-memorial. Although the Basilique du Sacré-Cœur was not explicitly conceived of as any sort of memorial or anti-memorial to the Paris Commune, it is understood as a highly charged political symbol because of the context in which it was built.

Commonly mistaken for the *Mur des Fédérés*, the *Monument aux victimes des Révolutions* (figure 7) is actually a separate memorial sculpted into a wall of the square de Samuel-de-Champlain, a stone's throw from Père-Lachaise and the *Mur des Fédérés*.

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[46] David Harvey, "Monument and Myth," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 69.3 (September 1979), 376.
[47] Ibid., 362.
[48] Ibid.

The 1909 memorial depicts a mysterious female figure emerging from the wall with her arms spread wide to either side, protecting numerous male figures—just barely visible—from harm's way. Many have commented on the monument's connection to the *Mur des Fédérés*, with some suggesting that the sculptor, Paul Moreau-Vauthier, used stones from the original wall (which had been partially destroyed).[49] The *Monument aux victimes des Révolutions* represents a 26-year long battle between the Parisian municipal council and the national government: the city had requested permission to build a monument to the Commune since 1883. Finally, in 1909, the national government agreed to let Paris build a monument, but forbid exclusive memorialization of the fallen Communards. The national government would only authorize a monument to the victims of all of France's revolutions, and would only permit its constructed outside of the recently politicized public space of the Père-Lachaise cemetery.[50] The case of the Parisian process of memorializing the Commune was not a battle between two competing memories, but a battle between remembering and forgetting.

A Tale of Two Cemeteries: Forgetting and Remembering in Paris and Chicago

The fundamental difference between the memorialization of the Haymarket affair and the memorialization of the Paris Commune is the role that memory played in each context. In the Chicago case, two alternate memories of the Haymarket affair materially coexist as monuments in constant tension with one another over which account holds more authority over the general public. Chicagoans from disparate ends of the political and socioeconomic spectrums agreed that Haymarket must be *remembered*. The stakes were too high for both sides to simply let the events from May 1886 to November 1887

[49] Best, "Une statue monumentale," 316.
[50] Ibid., 315.

fall into historical oblivion. The memory of Haymarket was powerful ammunition for either side, with both camps claiming their own martyrs. Paris, on the other hand, was not the site of a battle between two conflicting memories, but a struggle to ensure that the Commune was remembered. Post-Commune Paris witnessed continual conflict between a will to forget the painful, violent disruptions of the past and a will to desperately remember the bloody, unjust foundation upon which France's Third Republic was founded. To many Parisians, even those who had supported the Commune, reconciliation was critical to future stability, and reconciliation meant forgetting.[51]

For Chicagoans, memorializing the Haymarket affair began in January 1888 shortly after the executions of the four anarchists in November 1887. Because the entire affair was so contested, a memorial like *The Police Monument* sought to cement a readily comprehensible image of what Haymarket was *really* about. The business and civic elites of Chicago set out to reaffirm their commitment to law and order, demonstrating that the city would resort to violence or even potential injustice in order to ensure "tragedies" like the Haymarket affair would never happen again. To Chicago's elites, the real martyrs were the policemen who had been killed without any semblance of justice while upholding their duty to protect law and order. Though this view of Haymarket alienated a sizeable portion of Chicago's immigrant working classes and political radicals, the city of Chicago was willing to pay the price to ensure that its martyrs were remembered.

The immigrant, anarchist, and socialist community of the Pioneer Aid and Support Association had a similar end in mind as the elites responsible for *The Police Monument. The Haymarket Martyrs' Monument* is even more important, however, because not even city restrictions on radical political activity could stop the socialist

[51] Shafer, *The Paris Commune*, 184.

community from memorializing their unjustly executed martyrs, in addition to creating a new public space which this community could claim as their own. Though they were relegated to Waldheim Cemetery, just outside of Chicago's city limits, *The Haymarket Martyrs' Monument* gained just as much attention as *The Police Monument*, noted for the massive processions from the city to Waldheim Cemetery each year. Though dismissed by Chicago's municipal authorities, *The Haymarket Martyrs' Monument* is a testament to a marginalized community's will to have its side of the story permanently cemented in public memory.

In contrast, Paris was much slower to memorialize the Commune, even though the city's municipal council was full of liberals and radicals who had supported the Commune, or were at least sympathetic to sustaining its memory. Though there were numerous acts of mourning for the fallen Communards, this early activity was not focused on remembering and memorializing the Commune as an event. Further, the decades following the Commune were notable for their absence of any official memorial. Despite the efforts of groups like the Amis de la Commune, the French Communist Party and their supporters who undertook regular efforts memorialize the Communards, it took more than thirty years for the *Mur des Fédérés* to be physically marked as a memorial site. Indeed, until the 1980s, the *Mur des Fédérés* in all its austere simplicity was the only memorial or monument explicitly dedicated to the Commune's memory.[52] Citizens of Paris had to fight long and hard against the national government's policy of forgetting and the enthusiastic support that policy received among many (mostly bourgeois) Parisians. However, the *montée au Mur* and other rituals of remembrance kept the Commune's memory alive long enough for the national government to finally permit the

[52] Wilson, *Paris and the Commune*, 207-208.

wall in the Père-Lachaise cemetery to be officially marked as a memorial for generations to come.

The lack of obvious anti-Communard heroes and martyrs could be another potential explanation for the lack of an "official", government-approved memory of the Paris Commune. Unlike the slain police officers of the Haymarket affair, it is difficult to pinpoint specific Versaillais who could have feasibly entered the pantheon of early Third Republic martyrdom. Though there certainly were casualties on both sides, even MacMahon, a leader of the Versaillais, stated in a post-Commune deposition that, "All I can is that the insurgents lost a lot more people than we did."[53] No matter how justified and necessary the repression of the Commune was to the national government, the inequity of death and brutality was not something deemed worthy of official remembrance. Though there have been numerous instances of the French republican governments using violence against its citizens, in order to ensure its survival the early Third Republic needed to separate itself from the state-perpetrated violence of its predecessors.[54] A simple, effective way to achieve this separation was to try to erase all traces that it ever happened. The Third Republic would not let itself be linked with the bloody memory of the Reign of Terror of 1793 or the June Days of 1848: both were short-lived and ended in the coup d'état of a Bonaparte. Forgetting was the easiest way to ensure people did not perceive that history was once again repeating itself.

These two events had a profound impact on their respective cities. Thus, the two cities' reactions to each reveal a great deal about their underlying characteristics and history, calling into question the fruitfulness of a comparison altogether. For instance,

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[53] Deposition de M. le maréchal Mac-Mahon (28 August 1871) *in Enquéte Parlementaire sur l'insurrection du 18 mars 1871* (Paris: Librarie Législative, 1872), 183.
[54] Robert Gildea, *The Past in French History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 19, 24.

Paris and Chicago diverged dramatically over questions of municipal autonomy and authority. Though the Haymarket affair reverberated in the national American consciousness, the bulk of the event was chiefly handled by municipal authorities. The conflict that existed over memorializing the Haymarket was played out between the interests of civic elites who largely represented Chicago's municipal authority and the interests of the immigrant and working classes. Parisian municipal autonomy was hotly contested throughout the post-Commune years, which was characteristic of the historic tension between the interests of Parisians and those of the nation as a whole. For the national government, controlling Paris was paramount—resulting in both in the Commune's bloody repression and the struggle to relegate all memory of it into historical oblivion. Unlike Chicago, Paris - in the eyes of the national government - could not be permitted to cultivate a conflicting account of the past. An official history was critically important to the security of the young Third Republic, and any contestation of that official memory was anathema to it. Memory threatened to divide the nation as well as Parisians, with the risk of provoking yet another outbreak of violent revolution.

When comparing the memorialization of the Paris Commune and the Haymarket Affair, the similarities that emerge do not seem rooted in something shared between Paris and Chicago as cities. Rather, the similarities between the two seem to stem from larger international trends connected to the developing international socialist and labor movements. Indeed, these international movements expressed solidarity for the working class victims of each event, lionizing them as martyrs, rallying around them in annual memorial celebrations. Both Chicagoan and Parisian socialists transformed the cemetery into a politicized public space, creating places of pilgrimage where socialists and their sympathizers could gather to pay respect to fallen comrades, as well as plan for the future

of working class liberation. These trends do not seem to be related to anything specific to Chicago or Paris. If a similar event, perceived by the general public as representative of some sort of class conflict, had happened in another major urban center, a similar reaction may have been expected to occur. Therefore, what connects the Commune and the Haymarket are forces that seem to transcend the particular municipal spaces in which they occurred.

Both the Haymarket affair and the Paris Commune demonstrate the profound power of silence. Though silence is often used by those in power as a weapon of oppressing dissenting opinion (through censorship, violence etc.), the groups that it intends to silence often repurpose it, using it to their advantage. Indeed, memorials, monuments, and the dead are all characterized by silence, but that is the very source of their power. Once the voices of a people are enshrined in a physical memorial or monument, they will remain forever heard in the monument's silence. Though time literally quiets these voices, the monument contains them, so they can never permanently be forgotten. The simple and austere plaque on a wall in the Père-Lachaise cemetery where death silenced so many is a testament to the voices of Parisians who refused to allow their collective memory to be suffocated. Not even the national government's systematic forgetting could extinguish the memory of the fallen Communards. Though there was no analogous policy of forgetting the Haymarket affair, there was indeed an attempt on the part of the business elites and their allies in the city government to suppress the memories of the "other": the anarchist, the immigrant, the worker. Though Chicago succeeded in pushing these memories outside of city limits, the imposed silence within the city backfired on municipal authority, resulting in the stunning monumental silence of the *Haymarket Martyrs' Monument* at Waldheim Cemetery. Though memorials

of the Haymarket affair and the Paris Commune may not point to many similarities between Chicago and Paris, comparing them certainly reveals the power of monument and memory, and the struggle many undertake to have their stories cemented in monumental silence

Appendix: Images

Figure 1. Johannes Gelert, *The Police Monument*, 1889, bronze, life-size. Courtyard of the Police Academy, Chicago.

Figure 2. A. Witteman, Photograph of *The Police Monument* and its pedestal as originally installed in Haymarket Square, 1889. Chicago History Museum (ICHi-14452).

Figure 3. Albert Weinert, *The Haymarket Monument*, 1893, life-size bronze figures with 16’ granite shaft. Forest Home Cemetery, Forest Park, Illinois.

Figure 4. *Le Mur des Fédérés* (The Communards’ Wall). Père-Lachaise Cemetery, Paris.

Figure 5. La Basilique du Sacre-Cœur, Paris.

Figure 6. View of the Basilique du Sacré-Cœur on the Butte Montmartre, Paris.

Figure 7. Paul Moreau-Vauthier*, Monument aux victimes des Révolutions*, 1909. Square Samuel-de-Champlain, Paris.

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Civil Rights in New Rochelle: A Case Study

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In traditional narratives, the Civil Rights Movement is often remembered as a primarily southern phenomenon. The most famous Civil Rights actions —the Birmingham Bus Boycott, the March on Selma, the Greensboro sit-ins, and the Freedom Rides—all took place south of the Mason Dixon Line. The NAACP is celebrated for its legal challenges that helped topple de jure segregation in the southern states, such asBrown v. Board of Education (which outlawed the segregation of public schools based on race), Smith v. Allwright (which ended the all-white primary system), and Shelley v. Kraemer, which ruled that courts could not enforce racially restrictive housing covenants. What is often lost in this narrative is the important element of the Civil Rights Movement that fought de facto segregation and racial discrimination in the southern states. While many forms of discrimination and segregation were officially outlawed in the North, in practice there were still vast racial inequalities that affected the lives of African-American residents. Fighting this ostensibly illegal but rampant discrimination required a multifaceted and complex strategy, one that differed significantly from that used to challenge the legalized segregation of the South. By studying the Civil Rights Movement in the northern states, a more complicated and dynamic picture emerges of the struggle for racial equality across the nation. This picture challenges the traditional South vs North, integrated vs segregated narrative of the country's history, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of the role of race in American society.

An in-depth case study of a northern city presents the best way to fully explore the trajectory of Civil Rights activism in the region. An intense study of one city allows

for the exploration of the more intricate facets of the struggle for equality. It enables a strong dissection of the different actors in the movement, including local citizens, national organizations, and the media, as well as their interactions with one another. It helps illuminate the many different areas of life in which activists challenged segregation and discrimination, allowing for comparisons between tactics used in northern cities and those employed by southern activists. And finally, it facilitates a chronological study of the movement, charting at what points in time protestors challenged different injustices, and the shift in strategies they used.

New Rochelle, New York is a great candidate for such a study. A suburb of New York City located in Westchester County, New Rochelle had a diverse racial and ethnic makeup. In 1960, it was 14% African-American, 45% Catholic, and 30% Jewish.[1] The Catholic and Jewish populations interacted with the African-American community in complex ways in their struggle for equality, ranging from support to hampering to flat out indifference to their fight. New Rochelle also had a strong local branch of the NAACP, which played a key role in many of the major civil rights battles in the city. New Rochelle's NAACP was also vitally important on a national level, as its actions set the precedent for the national NAACP's course of action across the North. The American Jewish Committee also had a robust chapter in New Rochelle, and its interactions with the local African-American community as well as the NAACP chapter are representative of a broader outlook on the Civil Rights Movement. Similarly, the Knights of Columbus, a Catholic fraternal organization, had a substantial presence in New Rochelle, and was a player in the city's path towards racial equality. Finally, New Rochelle's proximity to New York City, home to a robust black press, meant that its struggles and triumphs were

[1] John Kaplan, "Segregation Litigation and the Schools—Part I: The New Rochelle Experience," *Northwestern University Law Review* 58 (1963-1964): 5.

broadcasted to readers across the nation, giving the city's civil rights activists a national audience and support for their movement.

Housing discrimination was a central area of concern to northern civil rights activists, as many tools were used to create and maintain segregated neighborhoods in northern cities. In the early 20th century, one of the most popular tools was the racially restrictive covenant, a contract signed by the buyer of a house stating that he would not sell his house to certain racial, ethnic, and religious groups.[2] If an owner attempted to break the covenant and sell to an African-American family, others in the community would often use the courts to forbid the sale and uphold the covenant.[3] This practice was challenged in 1945 when the Shelley family, who were African-American, bought a house in St. Louis, unaware that it had a racially restrictive covenant in place.[4] Local residents turned to the city court to enforce the covenant, and to prevent the Shelley's from assuming ownership of the house.[5] When the city court refused to uphold the covenant, the neighbors appealed to the state Supreme Court, which reversed the lower court ruling and declared the covenant legally binding.[6] The Shelleys then submitted their case before the Supreme Court in 1948, which ultimately decided that racially restrictive covenants were unenforceable by state courts, as they violated the 14th Amendment.[7] While state courts could no longer legally prevent African-Americans from buying homes with racially restrictive covenants on them, such covenants were still privately

[2] U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Understanding Fair Housing* (February 1973): 4. Available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/cr11042.pdf. Accessed: 03/30/15.
[3] Ibid.
[4] *Shelley v. Kraemer*, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.

enforceable—meaning that if private homeowners refused to sell their houses to African-Americans solely based on the color of their skin, they were legally allowed to do so.

Activists in New Rochelle turned their attention towards this privatized discrimination. A complaint filed by Norris Shervington, a New Rochelle resident, played a key role in the enforcement of the Fair Housing Practices Bill, passed by the New York State Congress in 1956. Commonly known as the Metcalf-Baker Bill, the Bill outlawed discrimination in private housing built with federal assistance.[8] The Bill's co-sponsor, Bertram Baker, was the first African-American assemblyman from the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of Brooklyn, investing it with additional significance.[9] Shervington's complaint tested the dedication of the courts to upholding and enforcing this law and helped question the meaning of "federal assistance."

Norris Shervington was a middle-class office manager of the Associated Publishers Inc., who moved from Chicago to New York for his job.[10] Upon his move, he attempted to rent a unit in the Rochelle Arms apartment complex in New Rochelle, but the project's developers, Pelham Hall Apartments, Inc., rejected his application solely on account of his race.[11] Shervington filed a complaint with the State Commission Against Discrimination, alleging that the developers' actions were in violation of the Metcalf-Baker Bill, as the developers had used a federally backed mortgage to build the complex.[12] The developers did not contest the fact that they had discriminated against Shervington based on his race, but argued that the Bill itself was unconstitutional. They

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[8] James Bookes, "Plans Fight to End in Housing Bias Case," *New York Amsterdam News*, June 15, 1957, 15.
[9] "Barker Stock Has Gone Up with Passage of New Bill," *New York Amsterdam News*, April 20, 1963, 23.
[10] James Bookes, "Plans Fight to End," 15.
[11] Layhmond Robinson Jr., "Landlord Loses on Housing Bias," *New York Times*, July 3, 1957, 25.
[12] Ibid.

contended that the New York Legislature could only regulate housing built with state assistance, but had no jurisdiction over federally aided developments.[13] Shervington's complaint would thus decide the constitutionality of the state's anti-discrimination law, as well as help define what type of federal involvement constituted the aid that was grounds for state involvement.

The developers' defense was also significant: while northerners often contended that de facto segregation above the Mason-Dixon Line was just a by-product of natural population and sociological trends, Pelham Hall Apartments statements proved that this was not the case. They readily admitted that they had discriminated against Shervington based on his race and wanted to keep their development all white. Shervington's appeal shattered the notion that it was not just de jure southern segregation that was founded on unabashed racism; many instances of de facto northern discrimination were bigoted in origin as well.

The State Commission Against Discrimination granted Shervington a hearing to decide the matter—the first ever discrimination complaint heard publicly by the Commission.[14] The black press was keenly aware of the case's importance: the *New York Amsterdam News* described its "nationwide significance," and noted that Shervington had "received inquiries from people in several other Northern states where similar anti-discrimination housing laws have been passed."[15] Several other African-American newspapers across the nation, including *The Chicago Defender* and *The Baltimore Afro-American*, provided extensive coverage of the case as well.[16] Additionally, the

[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Bookes, "Plans Fight to End," 15.
[16] See "Firm Tests Law that Hits Bias," *The Chicago Defender (national edition)*, June 22, 1957, 7; "Segregated Housing Test Set," *The Baltimore Afro-American*, December 7, 1957, 19; "A

mainstream *Chicago Daily Tribune* featured an article about Shervington's complaint, and *The New York Times* continued to update its readers on the case.[17]

The great press coverage granted to Shervington's appeal ensured that the Commission's decision would have an impact across the nation. The Commission ruled that the developers' acted in violation of the Metcalf-Baker Bill and ordered them to allow the Shervington family to rent an apartment in the complex.[18] However, Pelham Hall Apartments refused to accept the verdict, and appealed to the New York State Supreme Court.[19] Justice Samuel W. Eager heard the case, and upheld the Commission's decision.[20] His decision gave further legal support to state laws against discrimination, although he emphasized that states should act in a measured manner. In his decision he wrote that the New York State Legislature "was authorized to proceed as it did in imposing a ban against discrimination in housing," but that such actions must be taken "in gradual steps," starting with publicly owned housing, and then slowly spreading to private developments.[21] The New Rochelle case thus played a significant role in upholding and enforcing New York State's anti-discrimination law, as well as setting a precedent for similar actions across the North.

While this decision was a decisive victory in the fight against housing discrimination, New Rochelle activists felt there was still more to be done. The Metcalf-Baker Bill had been successfully upheld, but the activists felt there were still gaps in this

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Great Court Ruling," *The Chicago Defender (daily edition),* January 21, 1958, 11; "Momentous Decision, *The Baltimore African-American*, February 22, 1958, 4, among others.

[17] See "Flat Drops Battle to Bar Negroes," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 2, 1958, A5; "Housing Bias Case Awaits a Ruling," *The New York Times*, June 28, 1957, 19; "Negro Wins Rent Order," *The New York Times*, July 24, 1957, 11; and "State is Upheld on Housing Bias," *The New York Times*, January 17, 1958, 10, among others.

[18] "State Asks Writ in Housing Bias," *The New York Times*, November 21, 1957, 26.

[19] "State is Upheld on Housing Bias," 10.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

Bill (specifically in areas of private housing developments) that needed to be corrected. In March of 1957, a group of delegates from New Rochelle traveled to Albany to urge state legislatures to pass an amendment to the Bill.[22] The amendment would expand the anti-discrimination law to all apartment complexes, as well as any single-family housing developments constituted of ten or more homes.[23] The Westchester Committee for Intergroup Legislation sponsored the trip, with assistance from other local organizations andhigh representation from those centered in New Rochelle. These included the Council for Unity of New Rochelle, the New Rochelle Branch of the NAACP, and the New Rochelle Committee and Urban League.[24] Representatives of Westchester's Jewish Community, including members of the American Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, participated in the trip as well.[25] The amendment ultimately passed, and was eventually extended to cover all types of housing except single or two-family homes occupied by the owner. Baker explained this exception was based on the idea that "a man's home is his castle," and Baker did not want "to invade his right in his home in the selection of tenants."[26]

The involvement of the Jewish groups in the appeal is not surprising. Both groups had local chapters in New Rochelle, and had been attuned to the significance of the Bill and Shervington's appeal from the start. On August 23, 1957, The American Jewish Committee and The Anti-Defamation League sent out a joint memorandum about Shervington's complaint to all of their local, regional, and national offices.[27] The memo

[22] "New Rochelle Aids Baker Home Bill," *New York Amsterdam News,* March 9, 1957, 18.
[23] Ibid.
[24] "New Rochelle Aids Baker Bill," 18.
[25] Ibid.
[26] "Baker Stock Has Gone Up," 23.
[27] Sol Rabkin and Theodore Leakes to CRC Offices, AJC Offices, and ADL Regional Offices, August 23, 1957, "Decision of New York State Commission Against Discrimination in New

was written by Sol Rabkin and Theodore Leakes, two prominent leaders of the organization, and offered a detailed description of Shervington's complaint and the Commission's decision supporting his cause.[28] The fact that Rabkin and Leakes thought it was essential for all their branches to be aware of the details of Shervington's case highlights its significance to these groups. The organizations viewed the fight for fair housing in New Rochelle as one of national importance and precedence, and wanted to keep their members aware of its trajectory.

Both organizations had a longer history of involvement with the movement for fair housing. Sol Rabkin, the co-author of the memo, had been of counsel on an amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of a number of Jewish organizations (including the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League), supporting the Shelley family, in the Supreme Court case of Shelley v. Kraemer.[29]

In the brief, the Jewish organizations explained why they support the Shelley family's case, stating that "each of these organizations has among its fundamental tenets the preservation of the rights guaranteed every citizen by our Federal Constitution."[30] The organizations saw themselves primarily as advocates for true equality for all groups, not just Jews. They thus saw it as their essential duty to fight against racially restrictive covenants, which the brief called "an instrument of bigotry giving aid and comfort to racial and religious prejudice."[31]

Rochelle Housing Development case," NAACP Papers, accessed through Proquest History Vault, 03/17/15.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Brief for the American Jewish Committee, Anti-Defamation League, Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America, and Jewish Labor Committee as Amici Curiae, Shelley V. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), i.

[30] Ibid, 2.

[31] Ibid., 3.

The organizations also attempted to build a common rapport between African-Americans and other ethnic and religious minorities, including Jews. They note that "although Negroes have suffered most from the widespread use of restrictive covenants, many other groups including Mexican, Spanish Americans, Orientals, Armenians, Hindus, Syrian, Turks, Jews, and Catholics have found such covenants barring them from many residential areas in many cities."[32] They cite as examples cases of courts enforcing racial covenants against both Native American and Jewish families.[33] They saw the experience of housing discrimination as one that had the potential to unite various ethnic and religious minority groups.

The organizations further connected the African American experience of discrimination with that of European Jews. They explained that the "Jewish experience under European despotism gave rise to the word 'ghetto'," and labeled "the threat of revival of that institution," as "implicit in the mushroom growth in almost every major American city of racial restrictive covenants."[34] They thus cite the commonality in experience of segregation between Jews and African-Americans as another reason for Jewish organization to be dedicated to anti-discrimination causes.

The American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League would also play roles in the struggle for school desegregation in New Rochelle. Although school segregation was officially illegal in New Rochelle (like in most northern cities), in reality, schools were still often almost exclusively white or black. Northerners often painted this as a natural consequence of housing and neighborhood patterns, but school districts were often specifically created in ways meant to promote and maintain

[32] Ibid., 4.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid., 5.

segregation. The landmark case of Taylor v. Board of Education of New Rochelle, which was a major victory for New Rochelle civil rights activists, would highlight this fact. The case served as the culmination of many years of activism by New Rochelle residents attempting to equalize the city's school system.

New Rochelle activists had a long history of fighting for equality in the realm of education, of which the local NAACP chapter played a major part. Beginning in the 1920's, the NAACP launched a campaign to get an African-American appointed to the New Rochelle Board of Education.[35] Their efforts culminated with the appointment of Dr. Clarence M. Long, Sr. to the Board in the spring of 1946.[36] Dr. Long was deeply involved in the intra-racial political coalitions of the city, having served as a member of the executive committee of the Mayor's Interracial Committee, and as secretary and president of the Interracial, Interdenominational Minister's Alliance.[37] Upon his appointment, Long declared that the Mayor of New Rochelle had shown the "ever-growing spirit of liberalism in the city," and had joined the ranks of those "those who not only preach democracy but seek to apply its principles in all aspects of daily life."[38] Long painted a picture of a city dedicated to racial equality, working to ensure fairness in education for all of its citizens.

Other victories in educational equality in the 1930's and 1940's would seem to support Long's statement. In 1934, the NAACP arranged a meeting of the New Rochelle Board of Education, in which the Board agreed to circulate anti-discrimination rules to

[35] "Negro Appointed to New Rochelle Education Board," *The Chicago Defender*, May 11, 1946, 9.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.

the principals of all local schools.[39] The NAACP was also successful in introducing an African-American history course at a local high school.[40]

In the summer of 1943, the organization formed the Education Committee in response to discrimination against African-American students in local retail training courses.[41] Although the students were admitted to and successfully completed the courses, stores refused to hire them. Dr. Leon Scott, the chairman of the Committee, explained that black students "had been selected from their classes and sent to the stores, but they were not accepted by the merchants."[42] The superintendent of the New Rochelle school system, Herbert C. Clish, as well as the vice-president of the Board of Education, B. Harold Brod, both agreed to serve on the Committee.[43] All of this seemed to indicate that the Board of Education and city officials were dedicated to the cause of equal opportunity, and interested in promoting racial equality.

The controversy surrounding the Lincoln School in the 1950's, culminating in the case of Taylor v. Board of Education of New Rochelle, would put major dents in this image of racial harmony. The roots of the conflict lay in the "neighborhood school plan" that the Board used to determine where students attended school.[44] Although this policy was ostensibly color-blind, civil rights activists charged that it in fact constituted a deliberate attempt to segregate the city's schools. Such neighborhood school plans were often the foundation of de facto school segregation in northern cities. During the Taylor v. Board of Education trial, testimony revealed that the Board had engaged in

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[39] John Robinson, "City Organization Helps New Rochelle in Race Program," *New York Amsterdam Star-News*, February 28, 1942, 10.
[40] Ibid.
[41] "New Rochelleans Assist Students," *New York Amsterdam News*, August 28, 1943, 6.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Irving R. Kaufman, "The New Rochelle Decision: The Facts," *Journal of Educational Sociology* 36 (February 1963), 262.

gerrymandering, redrawing the school district lines over time so that they followed racial migration patterns.[45] This policy ensured that the Lincoln School would remain in a majority black area, and thus function as an almost all-black school.

Furthermore, any white students who were somehow caught in the Lincoln School district were allowed to transfer to predominantly white schools in other areas.[46] African-American students were not given this option.[47] The result was that in 1949, the Lincoln School had an entirely black student body.[48]

This led to the first challenge of the Board's discriminatory policies by local activists. In response, the School Board ended the policy of allowing white students to transfer to schools outside of the Lincoln district.[49] The white parents whose children would be affected by this change angrily filed a petition in Westchester County Court to stop the Board from altering this rule.[50] They claimed that the facilities at the Lincoln School were "inferior," and their children should thus not be forced to attend the school.[51] The NAACP, on the other hand, argued that the real issue at hand was segregation, and that the Board's resolution must be allowed to go forward in integrating New Rochelle's public schools.[52]

The NAACP scored a victory when the Board's resolution was upheld, ending the policy of allowing white students to transfer out of the Lincoln School district.[53] However, this did not lead to any significant change in the racial make-up of the school.

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[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] "School Fight Hearing Held," *Afro-American*, January 21, 1950, 7.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Irving R. Kaufman, "The New Rochelle Decision," 264.

The Board of Education did not redraw the district lines so that they would be more racially heterogeneous; by the time of the Taylor lawsuit, the school remained 94% black.[54]

The controversy over the Lincoln School started up again in the spring of 1957, when the New Rochelle Board of Education called for a referendum on school funding.[55] Their proposal included a plan to renovate and rebuild the Lincoln School building.[56] Opponents of the plan argued that it would in effect "freeze" an all-black school into the New Rochelle school system.[57] They argued that instead the Lincoln School should be shut down permanently, with its students distributed among the city's other majority white schools to promote a fairer and more integrated school system.[58] Local activists formed the Committee Against Segregation in the Public Schools of New Rochelle to lead the fight against the referendum.[59]

The Committee included members from many different segments of New Rochelle's population. The chairman of the committee, Dr. Max Wolff, was Jewish, the Rev. M. DeWitt Bullock, president of the local NAACP, was a prominent member, as was Father Arthur C. Moore, a Catholic head of the Ministers' Alliance.[60] The Committee protested the rebuilding of the Lincoln School as "it was originally zoned as segregated school," and in the words of an NAACP spokesman, would "give Negro children a new school building, but will leave their segregated status undisturbed."[61]

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[54] Ibid.
[55] "New Rochelle Parents Fight Segregated School," *New York Amsterdam News*, April 27, 1957, 17.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.

The Committee's efforts were successful, with residents rejecting the plan to rebuild the Lincoln School in the May 14 referendum.[62] In response, the Board commissioned a report by Dr. Dan W. Dodson of New York University, to advise them on the best way to move forward with school integration.[63] The report came out in January of 1958, and agreed with the NAACP's belief that the Lincoln School should be closed.[64] It also urged the Board of Education to redraw district lines so that elementary schools would be more racially heterogeneous.[65]

By the fall of 1959, however, the Board had still not taken any action to close the Lincoln School and redistribute its pupils. In response, a group of parents, led by the Rev. Bullock of the NAACP, picketed the school and kept their children from attending class.[66] Bullock reiterated their demands that the Board draw "new school district lines so our Negro pupils will have opportunities to attend some of the cities better schools."[67] Superintendent Clish promised to again consider the matter, in exchange for the parents stopping their protests.[68]

In December of 1959, the Board voted to rebuild the Lincoln School, in opposition to the results of the referendum and desire of local civil rights activists.[69] In response, the NAACP organized a protest at the Lincoln School's grounds, with a keynote address by Roy Wilkins, national executive secretary of the organization.[70] He

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[62] Merrill Folsom, "School Defeated in New Rochelle," *The New York Times*, May 15, 1957, 21.
[63] Merrill Folsom, "Race Study Filed in New Rochelle," *The New York Times*, January 9, 1958, 35.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Sara Slash, "New Rochelle Parents Call Off Boycott," *New York Amsterdam News*, October 10, 1959, 30.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] "Fight Negro School in New Rochelle," *New York Amsterdam News,* December 12, 1959.
[70] Merrill Folsom, "School in Dispute May be Replaced," *The New York Times,* December 2, 1959.

too reiterated that the rebuilding of the school would perpetuate segregation in the New Rochelle school system.[71] The New Rochelle division of the American Jewish Congress also lent its support to protestors.[72]

It was at this moment when Superintendent Clish pointed out the main point of contention over de facto school segregation in the North. Clish argued that while in Brown v. Board of Education the Supreme Court had outlawed "enforced segregation, it did not require enforced integration by abnormal procedures."[73] The fight over equal school opportunities in both New Rochelle and cities across the North would increasingly give thought to the idea of school desegregation versus school integration.

The activists then turned to the New York State commissioner of Education, Dr. James E. Allen Jr., to help with their cause. They requested that he stop the New Rochelle Board of Education from rebuilding the Lincoln School.[74] However, he denied to honor their demands, and allowed the Board to go forward with their plans.[75]

The Board of Education had still not made any meaningful attempts at school integration before the start of the school year in the fall of 1960. In response, New Rochelle parents took on a decidedly more active plan of action to bring about desegregation. On September 14, 1960, the parents of twelve black students tried to register their children at the new, all-white William B. Ward Elementary School outside of their district.[76] The next day, another group of black parents attempted to register their

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[71] Ibid.
[72] "Fight Negro School in New Rochelle," 38.
[73] Ibid.
[74] "Desegregation Suffers Setback in New Rochelle," *Philadelphia Tribune,* January 12, 1960, 2.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Merrill Folsom, "Negro Pupil Shift Balked in Suburb," *The New York Times*, September 15, 1960, 39.

children at the majority white Roosevelt Elementary School.[77] The increased protests culminated in a sit-in at the Ward School on September 21, which resulted in the arrest of eight of the adults for trespassing.[78]

It was at this point that disagreement between the black community and New Rochelle chapter of the NAACP over the new and more activist strategies began to appear. Paul Dennis, Jr., an executive in the local branch of the NAACP, was a big supporter of the new strategies, and one of the parents arrested at the sit-in.[79] Paul Zuber, a young black lawyer, took up the defense of the Dennis and the others arrested.[80]

On the other hand, Randall Tolliver, another leader of the NAACP and a member of the New Rochelle Youth Commission, labeled the school demonstrations "ridiculous," and the work of "radicals."[81] He stated that he was "100 per cent for integration but by orderly means," and that the majority of New Rochelle's African American community opposed the demonstrations.[82] In response, the New Rochelle branch of the NAACP issued a statement repudiating Tolliver's comments, calling them unauthorized, untrue, and gross misrepresentations."[83] This led to Tolliver's resignation from the organization.[84]

The uncertainties within the New Rochelle branch reflected larger ambiguities in the national NAACP's stance on northern school desegregation. In an internal memo, Robert L. Carter, the general counsel of the organization, decried its failure to "formulate

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[77] Merrill Folsom, "Negro Children Refused at New Rochelle School," *The New York Times,* September 16, 1960, 33.
[78] Merrill Folsom, "New Rochelle Quashes School Sitdown by Negroes," *The New York Times*, September 22, 1960, 29.
[79] Merrill Folsom, "School Sitdown Divides Negroes," *The New York Times*, September 29, 1960, 37.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.
[83] "2 of NAACP Quit in New Rochelle", *The New York Times,* October 6, 1960, 81.
[84] Ibid.

any definitive policy or program on northern school desegregation,"[85] which led to the different branches "going off in all directions," and forcing the national organization to "accept policies and programs (or at least be placed in the position that we could not disagree with what has been done) adopted at the local level which has disturbed this office."[86] Carter's solution would have been to add someone to the NAACP's staff who would be responsible "full-time" for matters concerning "northern school integration."[87] Similar to Superintendent Clish, Carter saw "northern school integration" as inherently different from "southern school desegregation." The challenges in fighting de facto northern segregation were "not legal impediments," but rather "the neighborhood school concept."[88] Carter saw this form of segregation as in some ways harder to fight than de jure Jim Crow laws. He noted that the neighborhood school concept was very "appealing," and appeared benign to northern whites, but that to residential segregation, "school discrimination in the North will remain as fixed as it now in the South."[89] Carter wanted to add a full-time worker to the NAACP's staff to deal with this issue, so that the organization could take a more active role in shaping the responses of local branches to issues of school segregation, and not be forced to go along with the actions of those outside of the organization, such as Paul Zuber.

The protests in New Rochelle directly precipitated Carter's memo. He would not have necessarily supported the sit-ins and Zuber's ensuing litigation, but felt that the

[85] Robert L. Carter to Mr. Wilkins, Dr. Morsoll, Mr. Current, Miss Black, Mr. Wright, and Mr. Farmer, October 14, 1960, Untitled Memo on New Rochelle Situation, NAACP Papers, accessed through Proquest History Vault, 03/18/15.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.

organization now "may not be able to avoid it."[90] He went on to say that "whatever we have to do in New Rochelle in order to maintain the integrity of our Branch, I hope the headaches it will cause us will give us the needed impetus to come to grips with fact that we have to decide on the outlines of an overall policy and program for the future guidance of our Branches on this subject. I think it requires immediate attention."[91] New Rochelle thus played a fundamental role in focusing the attention of the NAACP on the issues of de facto school segregation in the North. While the national organization had exerted a lot of effort in legal challenges to de jure southern school segregation, it had not formulated a coherent strategy for challenging de facto segregation of the North. The New Rochelle activists played a big role in directing the NAACP towards issues of northern school segregation.

The fight to integrate the schools climaxed in Judge Irving Kaufman's decision in the case of Taylor v. Board of Education of New Rochelle. Wilbert and Hallie Taylor brought the suit on behalf of their children Leslie and Kevin.[92] They had initiated the action after the arrests of the protestors in the fall of 1960,[93] and argued that the Board of Education's neighborhood school plan was segregationist in nature and would lead to unequal schooling for their children.[94] Justice Kaufman agreed with their contention, stating in his opinion that the law "violated the Constitution, denying the plaintiffs the right to the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."[95] He

[90] Ibid.
[91] Ibid.
[92] *Taylor v. Board of Education of New Rochelle*, 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
[93] Ibid.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid.

ordered the Board of Education to come up with a plan to desegregate the city's schools that would be ready to implement by the fall of 1962.[96]

This landmark decision paved the way for the desegregation and integration of schools across the North. The NAACP saw the New Rochelle case as a touchstone that would be used to inspire activism in cities across the North. At a Board of Directors Meeting of the NAACP on February 14, 1961, the executive secretary Roy Wilkins said the decision would "be used to activate our branches in Northern."[97]

The case succeeded in doing so. At a Board of Directors Meeting in May of 1961, Wilkins noted that the Chicago NAACP branch "has sent in a formal request for assistance and advice on procedures in tackling school segregation, especially asking for details of the New Rochelle situation."[98] The fight to integrate the public schools in New Rochelle consequently succeeded in bringing national attention to the issue of northern school segregation, as well as inspired activists in city across the North to fight for racial equality in schooling.

New Rochelle was thus at the vanguard of the struggle for equality against de facto segregation and discrimination in the North. Activists in the city paved the way for rulings against housing and schooling discrimination that would be across the North in order to help bring about racial equality. They succeeded in bringing the attention of the NAACP to the inequalities faced by African-Americans above the Mason-Dixon line. They also engaged with the local community in their efforts, forming cross-racial and cross-ethnic coalitions to fight for the cause of racial equality. But there is a lack of scholarship on New Rochelle's status as a center of civil rights activism; one of the only

[96] Ibid.
[97] Minutes of the Board of Directors of the NAACP Meeting, February 14, 1961, The NAACP Papers, accessed through Proquest History Vault, 03/19/15.
[98] Minutes of the Board of Directors of the NAACP Meeting, May 8, 1961, The NAACP Papers, accessed through Proquest History Vault, 03/19/15.

books that discusses the subject is Professor Thomas' Sugrue Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North. An increase in scholarship on the subject could lead to an even more nuanced understanding of the city, its civil rights history, and its impact on the trajectory of the Civil Rights Movement across the nation.

Such scholarship is of particular relevance today:at a time where schools across the nation (especially in the North) are still overwhelmingly segregated and unfair and discriminatory housing practices are rampant, it is worth taking a more in-depth look at the actions of those who dealt with similar issues in the past. Studying civil rights activism in New Rochelle has the potential to illuminate the origins of the problems Northern cities face today, as well as to help determine possible ways to correct continuing racial injustice.

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